Calvinism, Subjectivity and Early Modern Drama by Streete, Adrian George Thomas
Calvinism, Subjectivity and Early Modern Drama 
Adrian George Thomas Streete 
A thesis submitted to the Department of English Studies at the University 
of Stirling 
In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
October 2001 
Contents 
Acknowledgements 
Introduction 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Early Modem Authority 
Reforming Semiotics 
The Development of Calvinism in Early Modem England 
Catholics and Fantasy: The Early Modem Unconscious 
'Consummatum est': Calvinist Exegesis, Mimesis and Doctor Faustus 
'Am I far enough from myself?' Avenging Lineage in The Revenger's 
Tragedy 
111 
1 
30 
77 
117 
155 
202 
231 
7 'Nothing is but what is not': Macbeth, Witchcraft and the Subject of Anti- 267 
Time 
8 'He was as rattling thunder': Foreigners, Protestantism and Antony and 293 
Cleopatra as Early Modem Apocalypse. 
Conclusion 320 
Bibliography 325 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the connections between Calvinism and early modern 
subjectivity as expressed in the drama produced during the reigns of Elizabeth I 
and James I. By looking at a range of theological, medicaL popular, legal and 
polemical writings, the thesis aims to provide a new historical and theoretical 
reading of Calvinist subjectivity that both develops and departs from previous 
scholarship in the field. 
Chapter one examines the critical question of 'authority' in early modern 
Europe. I trace the various classical and medieval antecedents that reinscribed 
Christ with political authority during the period, and show how the Reformers' 
conception of conscience arises out of this movement. In chapter two, I offer a 
parallel reading of Refonned semiotics in relation to the individual's response to 
two specific loci of power, the Church and the stage. Chapter three brings the 
first two chapters together by outlining the development of Calvinist doctrine in 
early modem England. Chapter four offers a theoretical reading of the early 
modern 'unconscious' in relation to the construction of England as a Protestant 
nation state against the threat of Catholicism. 
In the next four chapters, I show how the stage provided the arena for the 
exploration of Calvinist subjectivities through readings of four early modern 
plays. Chapter five deals with Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and in 
particular the Calvinist conception of Christ interrogated throughout the play. 
Chapter six looks at The Revenger's Tragedy in relation to the question of 
masculine lineage and the Name-of-the-(Calvinist)-Father. Finally, in chapters 
seven and eight, I examine two of William Shakespeare's plays, Macbeth and 
Antony and Cleopatra. In the first, I demonstrate how the play's concern with 
witchcraft brings about a parody of providential discourse that is crucial to an 
understanding of Macbeth's subjectivity. And in the second, I excavate the use 
of the biblical book of Revelation in Antony and Cleopatra in order to show how 
an understanding of the text's 'religious' concerns problematises more 
mainstream readings of the drama. 
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Introduction 
From the Subject of Protestantism to Calvinist Subjectivity 
Christianity is a revealed religion. Nevertheless, some versions of 
Christianity reveal less to the human subject than others. One such version is 
Calvinism. In this thesis, I examine the connections between Calvinism and the 
experience of early modem subjectivity. The focus of my enquiry is on early 
modem drama. For it is in the plays produced during the reigns of Elizabeth I 
and James I that the far-reaching effects of the Protestant Reformation and its 
doctrinal corollary, Calvinism, are perhaps most intensely explored. In a sense, 
there is nothing new in this project. The relationship between imaginative 
writing and Protestant religion has long been one of the most examined areas in 
early modem studies. However, in this thesis, I aim to show that, far from being 
an exhausted topic, there are many aspects of this relationship that are 
comparatively under explored as well as being under theorised, particularly in 
relation to the early modem experience of subjectivity. To this end, it is 
significant that the most recent revival of scholarship concerned with early 
modem religion and the subject has also gone hand in hand with a noticeable 
critical conservatism. In this introduction, I want to suggest that aspects of this 
theoretical development are acutely reactionary and have for too long gone 
unchallenged. But before examining the problems presented by this critical 
counter attack, it will first be necessary to consider the progress of scholarship 
concerned with early modem imaginative writing, Protestantism and 
sUbjectivity. 
Any account of this development needs to begin with Shakespearian 
scholarship. For it is in relation to the works of William Shakespeare that, for 
better or for worse, most early explorations of early modem religion have 
emanated. In a twentieth century context, this movement arose largely as a 
reaction against the religious scepticism of the influential critic A. C. Bradley. 
As Bradley wrote in Shakespearean Tragedy: 'The Elizabethan drama was 
almost wholly secular; and while Shakespeare was writing he practically 
confined his view to the world of non-theological observation and thought' . 
Bradley concludes: Shakespeare 'looked at this "secular" world ... and he painted 
it ... with entire fidelity, without the wish to enforce an opinion of his own'. 1 The 
overriding creative genius who stands outwith the ideological bias of his time is 
able to fashion a work of art that reflects his own ideological equipoise. 
Therefore, when encountering a Shakespearian text, the reader will not be 
contaminated by extraneous matters such as religion, but will, instead, encounter 
the 'true' Shakespeare. As Terence Hawkes puts it, for Bradley 'the text 
functions as a reasonably straightforward pathway to that mind, and ... there 
exists a perfect expressive "fit" between the text and its author's mental 
processes.,2 Because Shakespeare's religious beliefs have no impact on the 
creative process and because early modem society was 'secular', Bradley is able 
to dismiss the question of religion out of hand. 3 
In the 1920s and 30s, G. Wilson Knight led the reaction against Bradley's 
anti-religious approach to Shakespearian criticism. In a series of books and 
essays, Knight argued in language that is more often poetical than critical that 
many of Shakespeare's plays were compatible with an identifiable Christian 
outlook. For example, in an essay entitled 'Tolstoy'S Attack on Shakespeare', 
Knight sets out to defend Shakespeare from the Russian novelist's charge that 
Shakespeare has 'no religious centre, background, or framework for his art. ,4 
For Knight, Tolstoy has misunderstood not only the form but also the function of 
Shakespeare's writing. As he explains: 'Whilst Shakespeare's plays are allowed 
to stand insouciantly regardless of all ultimate questions, then we can safely 
continue to deny any necessary religious content to the great dramatic poetry'. 5 
But if, by inference, the critic asks the correct questions of the plays, 'then the 
case for the religious message and purpose of the drama becomes 
unanswerable. ,6 By discovering this interpretative/exegetical key, the critic or 
reader is taken on a redemptive (and strictly chronological) journey through the 
Shakespearian oeuvre where, Knight promises, 'we shall be directed to the birth 
and resurrection dramas of the Final Plays; recognizing therein true myths of 
immortality caught from the penetralium of mystery by one of the few greatest 
writers of the world.' 7 It is interesting to note that, even though they stand at 
opposite ends of the critical spectrum, both Knight and Bradley advance a 
spiritual model of interpretation whereby what Roland Barthes calls 'the 
"message" of the Author God' 8 is, without impediment, disseminated to the 
reader. What divides both critics is the precise nature of the 'message'. 
In the years that followed, scholars interested in early modern religion were 
more inclined to accept Knight's assertion that Shakespeare's texts did contain 
an identifiable religious element. But as in the works of their critical leader. the 
writings of these scholars were undermined by a rather vague conception of 
what sixteenth and seventeenth century religion actually meant in practice. In the 
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work of the 'School of Knight' , as Roland Frye pointed out, 'rarely - indeed, 
almost never - do we find evidence cited from the sixteenth century to buttress 
the assertions,.9 It is also relatively rare to find references in these writers to 
Protestantism, let alone to Calvinism as the official religion of early modem 
England. To put it crudely, for the 'School of Knight' religion meant 
'Christianity' and Christianity stood for a broadly conceived humanism that had 
little if nothing to do with doctrinal distinctions. This humanism was concerned 
in the main with the teleological fate of mankind. According to the humanist 
critic, Shakespearian tragedy offers an expression of existential 'wholeness'. As 
Jonathan Dollimore explains: 'tragic death restores transcendent unity of the 
subject and to man, not despite but because of the fact that now it ceases to be 
conditional upon a redemptive identification with the absolute. Man gathers that 
unity into himself .10 So while Shakespeare was, broadly conceived, a 'Christian 
writer', that Christianity was not as important as the transcendent humanism 
expressed in his plays. To take one example, as Derek Traversi argues in relation 
to King Lear, this 'final tragedy is consistently related to universal issues.' 11 
More than this, 'Shakespeare's great series of plays is a synthesis of the 
experience of the individual; as such, it is supreme.' 12 
When Roland Frye's Shakespeare and Christian Doctrine was published 
in 1963, he was attempting to correct what he saw as the vague abstractionism of 
the 'School of Knight's' approach to matters 'Christian' in Shakespeare's plays. 
The importance of Frye's study has sometimes been underestimated and his 
knowledge of early modem religious writing is nothing short of daunting. 
Alongside Lily B. Campbell in Divine Poetry and Drama in Sixteenth Century 
England, Frye was one of the first scholars to recognise that the so-called 
religious 'background' to early modem literature was in fact more central and 
particular than had hitherto been supposed. He also provided an outline of 
Protestant doctrine and offered an interpretation of how it might connect with 
the literature of the period. In the same way that texts such as E. M. W. 
Tillyard's The Elizabethan World Picture and C. S. Lewis' The Discarded 
Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature I3 had 
broadened the scope of intellectual enquiry for many scholars and enabled them 
to foreground the religious 'background' of early modem literature, so the books 
of Campbell and Frye represent an avowedly historicist tum in the study of 
Shakespeare and early modem religion. 14 As Frye pointed out: 
The role of theology in Shakespeare's age may be misunderstood or 
distorted, but its importance can scarcely be overestimated. Theology was 
everywhere discussed, and the level of theological literacy among educated 
people was considerably higher than in our own time. Approximately half 
of the books published in England between the inception of printing and 
the parliamentary revolution bore explicitly religious titles, and religious 
ideas figured prominently or pervasively in many if not most of the 
others. IS 
This is a reading of early modem religion and culture that, broadly speaking, still 
holds true today. However, like Campbell, Frye's critical position is rooted in a 
humanist conservatism towards the function of literature. It is for this reason 
that, without any apparent awareness of contradiction, Frye can explain at 
scholarly length the outlines of Protestant religion as understood in 
Shakespeare's day, while at the same time assert that 'literature, when judged by 
competent theological opinion, should be secular as regards theology and 
universal as regards ethics.,16 As he somewhat strangely concludes: 'The 
sixteenth-century Protestant views reconstructed here are of considerable 
importance for appraising the essentially secular character of Shakespeare's 
drama.' 17 For Frye, Shakespeare's culture is resolutely Protestant yet the 
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ideological tentacles of that culture do not extend to the fundamentally 'secular' 
outlook of Shakespeare's transcendent plays. 
From Individual to Subject 
In 1985, John Drakakis argued: 'The nature of the relationship between 
drama and society has usually been treated eclectically by Shakespeare scholars, 
alternating between empirical and idealistic approaches to the problem. ,18 But 
with the advent of critical theory in the late 1960s and early 1970s, scholars 
began to re-examine the ideological assumptions behind older approaches to the 
question of early modern imaginative writing and religion. As Debora Shuger 
points out: 
Before the late 1970s ... a vast amount of scholarship was devoted to the 
religious backgrounds of English Renaissance literature; the main reason 
religion has dropped out of Renaissance scholarship is that people got tired 
of articles on eucharistic imagery in The Faerie Queene, etc. Even this 
early research, however, usually conceived of religion as a circumscribed 
category unrelated to the constructions of gender, subjectivity, sexuality, 
power, nationalism, and so forth. 19 
While Shuger tends here and elsewhere to exaggerate the extent to which the 
study of religion 'dropped out of Renaissance scholarship', her second point 
stands. Too often, religion was seen, at best, as being of marginal importance to 
the politics of early modern culture and writing; at worst, it was viewed as 
essentially unconnected to either. But with the publication of seminal 
monographs such as Alan S infield , s Literature in Protestant England 1560-
1660, Catherine Belsey's The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in 
Renaissance Drama and Jonathan Dollimore's Radical Tragedy: Religion, 
Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries, the 
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complexity of early modern Protestantism began to be systematically explored 
and theorised. These books shared two features which~ when, taken togetheL 
amounted to a radical overhaul of previous scholarship. Firs~ they heralded a 
broad shift from the study of Protestantism to the study of Calvinism, its 
doctrinal manifestation.2o Secondly, Shakespeare began to be seen as one of 
many writers operating in the period, and not as the lens through which all 
interpretation had to pass. Similarly, while the texts of important theologians like 
John Calvin himself and Richard Hooker were examined in relation to the 
literature of the period, the work of scholars like Sinfield, Belsey and Dollimore 
also brought to the fore the complexity of Calvinism and the ideological 
differences of some of its practitioners in early modern England: for example, 
William Perkins, Henry Smith, Godfrey Goodman and George Hakewill.21 In 
short, these scholars systematically undermined the received notion of what 
Calvinism stood for. As Sinfield argued, 'The detennination to create a more 
immediate relationship between humanity and God ... paradoxically placed a vast 
and uncertain gulf between them.,22 What writers like Sinfield demonstrated was 
that Protestantism in general, and Calvinism in particular, is contradictory and 
diverse both in doctrine and in practice. In order to understand early modem 
Calvinism it is necessary to be aware that it is not, and never was, an ideological 
and doctrinal monolith. 
An important methodological feature shared by each of these scholars was 
their commitment to the critical practice of cultural materialism.23 Drawing upon 
the work of theorists such as Louis Althusser, Pierre Macherey ~ Raymond 
Williams and Michel Foucault, the work of these scholars led to a radical 
questioning both of earlier critical practices and, more importantly, the politics 
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of early modem culture. Among their primary concerns, the place and function 
of the human individual was fundamentally re-examined. And to put it simply. 
the 'individual' of humanist scholarship made way for the subject of post-
structuralist theory. At the beginning of The Subject a/Tragedy, Catherine 
Belsey provides an outline of the critical position that she and others were 
contesting: 
The human subject, the self, is the central figure in the drama which is 
liberal humanism, the consensual orthodoxy of the west. .. And yet the 
subject conventionally has no history, perhaps because liberal humanism 
depends on the belief that in its essence the subject does not change.24 
By arguing that the subject was not a free standing, unchanging essence, but, in 
fact, a production of specific historical, cultural and political forces, she 
established that 'the unified subject of liberal humanism' - the subject 
presupposed by critics from Bradley to Frye - 'is a product of the second half of 
the seventeenth century.,25 By demonstrating how 'Subjectivity is discursively 
produced and is constrained by a range of subject-positions defined by the 
discourses in which the concrete individual participates' ,26 Belsey also provided 
a history of the (early modem) subject. There is no doubting the importance or 
timeliness of works such as Belsey's. However, the history of the subject that 
she outlined has proved as controversial as it has proved influential. 
Controversial because in recent years, scholars have come to see that the 'history 
of the subject' proposed by Belsey and Dollimore - along with Francis Barker in 
his book The Tremulous Private Body - is itself often partial and selective, 
especially in relation to its construction of the medieval heritage of early modem 
culture and the bearings that this construction has on its conception of the 
subject. 
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Mediating the Medieval 
In an important essay entitled' A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists', 
the medievalist David Aers takes to task what he calls 'radical critics writina 
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about early-modern England and the history of the subject' for their often partial 
readings of the medieval intellectual tradition.27 According to Aers, these 
scholars' constructions of the medieval period both simplify that period and, by 
inference, delimit crucial medieval antecedents that inform and often 
contextualise early modern subjectivities. Put simply, the problem is the refusal 
by many early modem critics to engage with identifiable medieval subjectivities. 
Indeed this refusal is commonly explained, according to Aers, by an 'alleged 
fact, namely, that in medieval culture individual identity simply did not involve 
individual self-consciousness since that polity did not produce or need to 
produce such individuated subjects. ,28 This thesis serves an avowedly 
oppositional purpose. The Middle Ages, Aers goes on to note, is in effect turned 
into 'a homogenous and mythical field which is defined in terms of the scholars' 
needs for a figure against which "Renaissance" concerns with inwardness and 
the fashioning of identities can be defined as new.'29 What Aers' article seeks to 
demonstrate is that, contrary to the work of Belsey, Dollimore, Sinfield and 
Barker, the subject did not emerge in the West at some vaguely defmed point 
between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
In this context, it is worth noting an important scholarly debate amongst 
medievalists that dates from the 1970s and early 1980s that is very similar to the 
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work of the cultural materialists to the extent that it is concerned with the 
emergence of medieval sUbjectivity. It is also, as far as I have been able to find, 
a debate that early modem scholars have overlooked. To take one noticeable 
example, in his book The Discovery of the Individual 1050-1200, Colin Morris 
argues that, in opposition to the common thesis that sees the 'individual' 
emerging during 'the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century', the 'discovery 
of the individual was one of the most important cultural developments in the 
years between 1050 and 1200.,30 By examining the various influences of 
medieval psychological theory, confession, autobiography, portraiture, theories 
of love and friendship and developments in theology, Morris presents a 
compelling case for the medieval subject. In contrast, Caroline Bynum has 
modified Morris' thesis somewhat. She demonstrates that 'it is possible to 
delineate the period even more precisely when "discovery of self' is coupled 
with and understood in the context of "discovery of [a] model for behaviour" 
and "discovery of consciously chosen community.",3l As Bynum interestingly 
concludes: 
The individualism historians usually find in the later Middle Ages, 
Renaissance, and Reformation is not only in continuity with the twelfth-
century discovery of self; it is also ... in contrast with the twelfth century 
equilibrium between interior and exterior, self and community.32 
What Bynum and Morris make clear is that the history of the subject cannot be 
periodised as neatly as some early modem critics have supposed. This is not a 
retreat into some essentialist conception of the self where historical difference is 
subsumed by the overriding humanity of the individual. As the medievalist Lee 
Paterson writes in his book Negotiating the Past: 'Whatever individualism we 
seek to sustain must, to be sure, insist upon its historicity: the idea of the 
individual arises at certain historical moments and becomes submerged at 
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others' .33 Rather, what I intend both in this introduction and in this thesis is a 
cultural, theoretical and historical broadening out ofBelsey's original argument 
that 'Subjectivity is discursively produced and is constrained by a range of 
subject-positions defined by the discourses in which the concrete individual 
participates' . 
The Order of Periods? 
The question of 'periodisation' is crucial to all the debates that I am 
outlining in this introduction and any account of the shift from late medieval 
heterodoxy to early modem Reformation will inevitably have to confront this 
issue. As Heiko Oberman has astutely observed, in the fifteenth century 'The 
road to Reformation of Church, university, and society at large did not yet seem 
to require a break with the past.,34 But this is precisely how the movement from 
medieval to early modem has long been categorised: as marking an epochal shift 
between two clearly definable periods. A particularly influential example of this 
model is theorised by Michel Foucault in The Order of Things, a text that 
provides the theoretical foundation of much cultural materialist analysis.35 In his 
preface, Foucault argues that the 
fundamental codes of a culture - those governing its language, its schemes 
of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its 
practices - establish for every man ... the empirical orders with which he 
will be dealing. 36 
Because these 'practices' inevitably change over time, Foucault identifies the 
'codes' of a given culture with what he calls an 'episteme'. As he argues: 'what I 
am trying to bring to light is the epistemological field, the episteme in which 
knowledge ... manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection. but 
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rather that of its conditions of possibility'. 37 In other words, the Foucaultian 
episteme embodies the distinct signifying practices of a given period in history. 
Recently, however, this method of periodisation has been re-evaluated. 
Scholars have come to recognise that, even though it was not necessarily 
Foucault's intention, his epistemic approach can lead to the homogenisation of 
certain important historical phenomena which, in their very existence, resist easy 
categorisation. It is undoubtedly the case, as Hugh Grady had written, that 
periods are 'basic to all attempts at a systematic reconstruction of the past, and 
no history can be written without some explicit or implicit commitment to 
them. ,38 But it is equally true that the history of ideas, especially in the period( s) 
under examination, relies on a dialectical tension between opposing positions 
that has no regard for the niceties of epochal distinction. In Grady's words, 
"'periods" have no "objective" status. ,39 Or as Timothy Reiss has said of the 
frequently proclaimed epistemic break between medieval and early modem: 'No 
such rupture occurred' and 'profound change grew from within firm 
continuities. ,40 For these reasons, it is Fredric Jameson who has provided a 
model that allows for the necessary distinctions to be made between 'periods' 
but which also retains the element of dialectical tension so crucial to the early 
modem ideas that I will be examining in this thesis. As he notes in The Political 
Unconscious: 
The triumphant moment in which a new systematic dominant gains 
ascendancy is therefore only the diachronic manifestation of a constant 
struggle for the perpetuation and reproduction of its dominance, a struggle 
which must continue throughout its life course, accompanied at all 
moments by the systematic or structural antagonism of those older or 
newer modes of production that resist assimilation or seek deliverance from 
it. The task of cultural and social analysis thus construed within this final 
horizon will then clearly be the rewriting of its materials in such a way that 
this perpetual cultural revolution can be apprehended and read as the 
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deeper and more permanent constitutive structure in which the empirical 
textual objects know intelligibility.41 
Jameson makes clear that the ongoing process of 'cultural revolution' is 
constitutive of the ways in which ideas achieve recognisable social signification. 
In the case of the Reformation, it gains its radical import from its continuing 
struggle with a medieval legacy which, in political and polemical terms, it must 
be seen to largely repudiate. Nevertheless, as I will show, as an ideological 
edifice, the discourse of the Reformation demonstrates its vulnerability to those 
ever-present 'older or newer modes of production that resist assimilation or seek 
deliverance from it.' 
A commitment to a 'history of the subject' does not necessarily have to 
imply a concomitant devotion to 'history' as an ever-unfolding 'master 
narrative'. While I will be concerned in this thesis with cultural and intellectual 
continuities, I am also concerned with the ways in which 'old' discourses get re-
appropriated, re-fashioned and, quite often, misrepresented within the context of 
radical social movements such as the Reformation.42 To ignore the cultural and 
philosophical antecedents of the medieval period is, by inference, to presume 
that early modem thinkers did the same. Such a presumption would be 
dangerous. To this end, instead of celebrating continuity it might be somewhat 
more profitable to focus on discontinuity via another F oucaultian construct, the 
figure of the genealogist introduced in the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History.' Foucault notes, 'Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to 
restore an unbroken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten 
things' .43 In other words, the practice of genealogy is also the practice of re-
telling narratives when the boundaries of accepted 'knowledge' themselves have 
to be re-told. This is as true for the construction of an apposite critical 
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methodology as it is applicable to the early modern period's appropriation of 
medieval discourses. 
More specifically, such a project must also mean forsaking any adherence 
to a crude periodisation of history where a certain century, say the twelfth or the 
sixteenth, is noted as a point in time during which the individual sUbject(ivity) 
holds a particular cultural dominance. In the words of Katherine Maus: 
"Subjectivity" is often treated casually as a unified or coherent concept 
when, in fact, it is a loose and varied collection of assumptions, intuitions, 
and practices that do not all logically entail one another and need not appear 
together at the same cultural moment. A well-developed rhetoric of inward 
truth, for instance, may exist in a society that never imagines that such 
inwardness might provide a basis for political rights. 44 
Subjectivity is, I suggest, an ever present given in all recorded human 
existence.45 This is manifestly not the same as saying that subjectivity is 
unchanging throughout time or that it is an equally prominent feature at all times 
in intellectual discourse. At some points in time, humans develop culturally 
heightened, complex sets of discourses for examining the experience and 
perceived processes of SUbjectivity. At other points in time, varied cultural, 
political and intellectual circumstances mean that the development of these 
complex discourses is, momentarily, stunted. But subjectivity is, nonetheless, 
always already there. It must therefore be the purpose of an attentive criticism to 
develop discourses sensitive enough to excavate these subjectivities. 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of this proposition, I want to consider 
two examples from early and late medieval literature of what might be termed 
'individuated subjects'. The first is taken from an early Anglo Saxon poem 
entitled "Soul and Body." In this text, the Soul berates the Body for its squalor 
and sinfulness. The Body cannot respond because its 'tongue is tom into ten 
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pieces for the hungry wonn's pleasure' .46 For this reason it must endure the 
chilling imprecations of the Soul: 
[Eardode] ic pe in innan. No ic pe of meahte, 
flresce bifongen, ond me firenlustas 
pine geprungon. Pret me puhte ful oft 
pret wrere pritig pusend wintra 
to pinum deaodrege. Hwret, ic uncres gedales bad 
earfoolice. Nis nu se ende to god. 
W rere pu pe wiste wlonc ond wines sred, 
prymful punedest, ond ic otpyrsted wres 
go des lichoman, grestes drinces. 
(30-38)47 
I dwelt within you - I could not get out from you, being engrossed in flesh 
- and your wicked lusts oppressed me so that it often seemed to me that it 
would be thirty thousand years to your death-day. See! I reluctantly waited 
for our severance: now the outcome is none too good. You were 
extravagant with food and wine; full of your glory you flaunted yourself 
and I was thirsty for the body of God and spiritual drink. 48 
The internal voice of the Soul points up most forcefully a split within the subject 
that operates at least two different identifiable levels of signification. First, the 
self-speaking voice constructs its interlocutor through its absence; there is no 
reply from the Body. This only serves to highlight the ideological function of the 
narrative. In the context of Anglo Saxon oral poetry, those who listen to the 
poem are constructed as the silent Others, the Bodies who, if they act upon it, 
render the Soul's message into the signifying realm of the subject. Second, the 
poem reflects the ideological focus of Anglo Saxon society with its emphasis 
(one with clear pre-Christian roots) on the futility of this present life and the 
reward of the next. By emphasising a split in the subject between abject Body 
and admonitory Soul, the poet affects a parallel between the inner state of the 
subject and the ideological structure of the listeners' society. 
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My second example comes from The Fire of Love written by the mystic 
Richard Rolle in 1343. In the Prologue to this remarkable and beautiful text, 
Rolle explains to his readers the beginnings of his mystical journey. He says: 
I cannot tell you how surprised I was the first time I felt my heart begin to 
warm. It was real warmth too, not imaginary, and it felt as if it was actually 
on fire. I was astonished at the way the heat surged up, and how this new 
sensation brought great and unexpected comfort. I had to keep feeling my 
breast to make sure there was no physical reason for it! But once I had 
realized that it came entirely from within, that this love had no cause, 
material or sinful, but was the gift of my Maker, I was absolutely delighted 
and wanted my love to be even greater. And this longing was all the more 
urgent because of the delightful effect and the interior sweetness which this 
spiritual flame fed into my soul. Before the infusion of this comfort I had 
never thought that we exiles could possibly have known such warmth, so 
sweet was the devotion it kindled. It set my soul aglow as if a real fire was 
burning there.49 
Rolle is describing an avowedly subjective experience. This is one of the reasons 
for a narrative that in places reads more like the omniscient narrator of a realist 
novel than a medieval mystic. The difference is that in Rolle's text, his 
subjectivity describes his own response and it validates, or rather stands as a 
template for, his readers in their quest towards mystical 'warmth' or to what 
Jean Fran90is Lyotard has termed the 'aesthetics of the sublime'. According to 
Lyotard, this is an indeterminate feeling that arises when sensory representation 
fails. As he notes: 'This failure of expression gives rise to a pain, a kind of 
cleavage within the subject between what can be conceived and what can be 
imagined or presented. ,50 To this end, it is noticeable that Rolle is not satisfied 
by his initial experience of 'warmth'. Almost immediately, he suffers 'longing', 
an encounter that could also be related to the Augustinian notion of caritas, the 
perpetually unfulfilled desire of the subject for the complete knowledge of God's 
love. He is left with a gap at his centre that should be filled with God, but is not. 
In many respects the fire stands for the deferred presence of the deity. So in the 
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same way that the reader of Rolle's text can never gain immediate access to the 
writer's subjectivity, so the mystic is always left desiring the ultimate subject, 
God. 
What both of these examples serve to demonstrate is that the • historY of the 
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subject' is rather more complex than conventional narratives might suppose. It is 
difficult to deny that both "Soul and Body" and The Fire of Love describe an 
identifiable subjective experience. Interestingly, both writers affect this feeling 
through the didactic or affective function of the narrative's language. Both texts 
aim, through the description of subjective experience, to inscribe a similar kind 
of experience in the listener/reader. To this end, it is noticeable that in her 
discussion of early modem subjectivity, Catherine Belsey chooses to emphasise 
the formal properties of early modem literary language in order to differentiate 
between the medieval and the early modem. As she asks: 
How is the impression of interiority produced? Above all by formal means 
of the soliloquy ... In contrast to the alliterative verse of the fifteenth 
century, and the 'tumbling' fourteeners characteristic of the sixteenth 
century moralities, the more flexible and fluent iambic pentameter, to the 
degree that it does not rhyme and is not necessarily end stopped, disavows 
the materiality of the process of enunciation and simulates a voice 
expressing the self' behind' the speech. 51 
While I would not want to disregard the role that the formal properties of 
language might play in the production of SUbjectivity, it is nonetheless the case 
that Belsey offers only a partial reading of the connection between discourse and 
subjectivity. Interestingly, in her discussion, she draws upon Antony Easthope's 
book Poetry as Discourse. While Easthope argues here that 'pentameter is able 
to promote representation of someone "really" speaking' 52 he also notes more 
generally and perhaps more usefully in this context that 'Subjectivity is integral 
to all discourse and there cannot be discourse apart from subjectivity.' 53 As I 
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note in later chapters, both medieval and early modern imaginative writers 
shared a fundamental awareness of a crucial didactic function of discourse , 
namely its ability to move the listener/reader at an affective level. So while it is 
possible to debate - and many rhetoricians and grammarians did - which forms 
of language best affected the desired response in the subject, this should be 
viewed in tandem with the almost universal view that discourse should be 
judged on its success at effecting a response in the subject, whatever that might 
be. In the first instance, subjectivity is the prerogative of individuals, but at the 
moment of its textual, that is to say historical iteration, it loses any claims that it 
might have held of existential autonomy. It might be true, as Friedrich Nietzsche 
observed, that 'all being is hard to demonstrate; it is hard to make it speak. ,54 
But this does not mean that it is impossible, as both "Soul and Body" and The 
Fire of Love demonstrate. The dialectic of subject and society may well write the 
text, but in the context of a genealogy of the interior, the text writes subjectivity. 
Emending Cultural Materialism 
While I disagree with certain aspects of the cultural materialist approach to 
the early modern subject as outlined above, it is important to state that I do 
concur with this approach in relation to its political engagement with early 
modern culture. This engagement arises in relation to Louis Althusser's notion 
of subjective interpolation. According to Althusser, through a complex network 
of authorised discourses (Church, State, Judiciary), society regulates subjects 
(interpolation) by making them subject to the very discourses perpetuated by 
'authority' .55 For this reason, all aspects of social life operate relatively 
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autonomously but are also held together by the cohesive bond of ideology. As 
such the separation of realms of existence such as the religious and the political 
presupposed by idealist criticism is rejected. Nonetheless a series of recent 
books by American scholars has sought to discredit the political project of 
cultural materialism.56 For example, in her book Habits o/Thought in the 
English Renaissance: Religion, Politics and the Dominant Culture, Debora 
Shuger takes cultural materialism to task for what she sees as its problematic 
division of 'ideas' into subversive and orthodox. She argues: 'it is not always 
clear what precisely is subversive with respect to the dominant ideology, nor 
does orthodox ideology seem quite as monolithic and hegemonic as either 
Tillyard or his critics seems to have supposed.,57 Shuger then goes on to point 
out: 
Religion is, first of all, not simply politics in disguise, a set of beliefs that 
represent and legitimate the social order by grounding it in the Absolute ... 
Religious belief is "about" God and the soul as much as it is "about" the 
sociopolitical order. 58 
It is important to state at this point that my disagreement with Shuger concerns 
her critical reading of cultural materialism. Aside from this, she is one of the 
most interesting scholars of early modem religion to have emerged in recent 
years and I use her work at various stages in this thesis. However, if it is not to 
be seen as wilfully misrepresenting the cultural materialist position then 
Shuger's argument must arise from a misunderstanding of the basic tenets of that 
project. 
First, the cultural materialist conception of the 'dominant ideology' is not 
nearly as monolithic as Shuger supposes. As Jonathan Dollimore argues 
(following the work of Pierre Macherey and Raymond Williams): 
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Non-dominant elements [in a culture] interact with dominant forms, 
sometimes coexisting with, or being absorbed by or even destroyed by 
them, but also challenging, modifying or even displacing them. Culture is 
not by any stretch of the imagination - not even the literary imagination - a 
unity. 59 
Shuger is incorrect that cultural materialism posits the 'dominant culture' as an 
ideological given and then decides what is subversive or orthodox in relation to 
that culture. Instead, the constitution of culture is such that non-dominant 
discourses exist in a dialectical relationship with the dominant elements. What 
culture presents as 'dominant' is only ever conditionally the case - how 
otherwise would intellectual and political change come about? Secondly, by 
stating that 'Religious belief is "about" God and the soul as much as it is "about" 
the sociopolitical order', Shuger also posits a separation between God and the 
subject that recapitulates the deity as onto logically distinct from the 
appropriations and ideological manoeuvres of a given culture. From an explicitly 
Christian perspective, this makes sense. From an ideological perspective, it does 
not. To put it another way, Shuger attempts to yoke together a quasi-
Althusserian conception of ideology with a Christian belief in God. As she 
admits at the beginning of another book: 'I am a Christian and an academic and I 
have no idea how to put these two together, how to formulate a language that 
would be both reverential and professional. ,60 It is not my intention to criticise 
Shuger's personal beliefs but it does seems to me that that a commitment to God 
as prime mover does not equate with a consistent theory of ideology in respect 
of early modem culture. 
Calvinism, Subjectivity and Early Modem Drama 
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In order to bring together the somewhat disparate strands of this 
introduction, I want to turn finally to a text that offers an interesting commentary 
on both the shift from medieval to early modem as well as on the concern of this 
thesis with Calvinism and subjectivity. The text in question is Thomas a 
Kempis' classic late medieval tract The Imitation of Christ (c. 1414). Even after 
the Reformation, this book remained one of the most popular of European 
religious manuals. In early modem England, however, what was important was 
not so much the Ubiquity of this doctrinally Catholic text but rather the slant that 
Protestant translators put on a Kempis' notion of imitation. For example, in 
Thomas Roger's 1580 translation of the text, he writes in the epistle: 'Who [ever J 
entreth into a due consideration of mans nature, shal easilie perceaue that most 
stranglie it is addicted vnto imitation. ,61 It is interesting to note that Rogers 
presents imitation not in a positive light but as a strange addiction, an 
unfortunate human habit that needs to be fed. The suspicion that the ideology 
propagated by the text stands in opposition to the ideology of the culture 
utilising it is confirmed when Rogers writes: 'For albeit 1 say in al things our 
Sauiour Christ is always; yet 1 do not saie in al things: and though necessarilie 
to be followed; yet not as he was God ,62 Unlike the medieval subject, the early 
modem subject may only imitate Christ up to a certain point. What is the reason 
for this seeming contradiction in Roger's text? The short answer is: Calvinism. 
Thomas a Kempis' medieval text is about the relationship between the 
individual subject and the politics of imitation/representation. Rogers' early 
modem translation of this text highlights an apparent gulf between medieval and 
early modem conceptions of imitation/representation. Indeed, this difference has 
been taken as read in so many critical studies of Calvinism and early modem 
21 
writing that it is commonly assumed that imitation/representation is of marginal 
importance in the construction of Calvinist subjectivity. Calvin makes man so 
aware of his distance from the deity that the only thing man can imitate is his 
own sinful nature. A further effect of this reading is that much recent literary 
scholarship has virtually ignored the central fact (both for Calvin and his 
followers) that Calvinism is a profoundly Christocentric religion. In this thesis I 
want to dispute this recent reading of Calvinism by reintroducing it as a version 
of Christianity firmly wedded to an epistemology of imitation and 
representation. In the first place, I will demonstrate that early modern 
subjectivity is a marker of a fundamental re-positioning of the individual in 
relation to God affected by Calvinism. So while Alan Sinfield is correct to assert 
that 'The protestant subject arises, not in the accomplishment of domination or 
negation, but in the thwarting of harmony, cogency, common sense,63, I want to 
offer a reinterpretation of precisely how this subject came into being. In order to 
do this, in chapter one I examine the debates surrounding early modern authority 
and in particular the ways in which these debates contributed towards the 
Calvinist conception of subjectivity. In order to maintain a methodological 
coherence with this introduction, I set these debates in context by charting their 
classical and medieval antecedents. By re-examining the political and conceptual 
importance of Christ in the political development of the West, I outline the 
changing position of the subject in relation to external and internal authority. In 
particular, I trace the development of the idea of conscience, especially as it 
applied to the political project of the Reformers. 
In chapter two I take forward the enquiries initiated in the previous chapter 
by looking at the Protestant conception of semiotics. If Linda Gregerson is 
correct when she observes that 'The semiotic lineage from Plato to Augustine is 
fraught with much internal division' ,64 then by tracing that lineage and by 
examining how both early modem humanists and Reformers wrestled with its 
divisions it is possible to delineate an identifiable Protestant conception of signs. 
By looking in particular at the semiotics of early modem clothing as they 
manifested themselves in both the ecclesiastical and dramatic arenas I offer a , 
practical example of what might be termed a Reformed semiotics. Because this 
debate was characterised by the question of from where authority ultimately 
emanated, the response of the individual subject to that authority became 
paramount. To this end, in chapter three I extend my examination of the 
Reformed conscience in relation to the development of casuistry. This 
investigation in contextualised by outlining the various ways in which Calvinism 
developed in post Reformation England. This ideological scene setting is 
particularly necessary in respect of chapter four which examines the ways in 
which early modem culture constructed itself as a nation under the banner of 
Protestantism. I argue in this chapter for the existence of the 'early modem 
unconscious' and connect this phenomenon with the gradual cultural and 
subjective intemalisation of Calvinism during the period. 
This internalisation is best expressed, I argue, in the drama of the early 
modem stage. Accordingly, the final four chapters are devoted to the subject of 
early modem drama and the way in which the human subject, male or female, is 
represented both to his or her self and to the audience. In chapter five I examine 
the connections between Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and sixteenth 
century Calvinist Christology. Focusing on the magician's response to various 
New Testament texts as well as his relationship to Mephistopheles, I argue that 
by replicating Faustus' focus on his own achievement and to the existential 
reality to which he appeals, many critics have neglected to consider the way in 
which relationality is dealt with both in early modern Calvinism and in the play. 
Then in chapter six, I develop the work of the previous chapter by dealing with 
the Calvinist conception of the Father as it is manifested in theological and 
imaginative writings of the period. Through a reading of William Shakespeare' s 
Hamlet and The Revenger's Tragedy I propose that early modern culture is 
deeply underwritten by a traumatic hiatus between father and son, a hiatus that 
has far-reaching consequences for the experience of subjectivity. 
The final two chapters of the thesis deal with two plays by William 
Shakespeare. In the first, I examine Macbeth in relation to contemporary 
Calvinist discourses of witchcraft. By reading the play through the lens of early 
modern inversion theory, it becomes possible to see how the play offers a kind 
of anti -time that parodies the legitimate time of providential history. It is this 
process that foregrounds Macbeth's subjectivity and which also allows an early 
modern audience to see that their entire ideological edifice was predicated upon 
the failure of representation as a constitutive necessity. Representation is also the 
key to the last chapter on Antony and Cleopatra. By focusing on a play not 
immediately concerned with matters religious, I aim to show how a genuinely 
interdisciplinary approach to early modern religion allows for previously ignored 
narratives to be reconstituted, narratives that moreover throw new light on the 
central themes of the play. By examining the status of the Egyptian race in early 
modern England, the use of the biblical book of Revelation in Antony and 
Cleopatra is shown to be more important than many scholars of the play have 
hitherto supposed. 
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Chapter One 
Authority and Early Modern Discourse 
The first beginning of religion was only to keep men in awe ... all men in Christianity ought to 
endeavour that the mouth of so dangerous a member may be stopped.) 
Richard Baines still has much to answer for. On the 18th May 1593, the 
Privy Council issued a warrant for the arrest of the dramatist Christopher 
Marlowe at the home of Thomas Walshingham. Two days later Marlowe 
acknowledged the warrant and was bound to daily attendance.2 Ten days after 
this, he was dead. It is not known precisely when the spy Baines wrote the 
document listing Marlowe's heterodox opinions but it seems reasonable to 
suppose that it was probably produced towards the end of the dramatist's life, or 
possibly not long after he died. Yet by beginning with what Jeffrey Masten has 
called the 'famous testimony of Richard Baines', I run the risk of potential 
overkill.3 After all, Baines's accusations have been taken down and used in 
ideological evidence in such a disparate range of critical projects that it is 
admittedly difficult to see what any (re )visitation of such a well-known text 
might hope to achieve. This is particularly the case in relation to an area as 
distended and nebulous as early modern authority. Moreover, it is tempting to 
conclude that the methodological prominence which the deposition holds in a 
large number of studies actively threatens to make it a paradigm within or, worse 
yet, a supplement to the examination of early modern ideological 
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configurations.4 But if the supplement is understood, as J ac'ques Derrida would 
have it, as both 'the fullest measure of presence' and simultaneously as "an 
adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes - (the) - place [tient lieu],5 then within 
the roots of this potential conclusion lie both the refutation of its postulate and 
the seeds of a new mode of enquiry. 
As an instance of the early modem subject 'before the law', the Baines text 
viewed as a Derridian supplement would not promise an unmediated 
commentary on the workings of early modem authority. For just at the point 
where those workings appear to be within grasp, Janus-like, Baines's Marlowe6 
returns the critical gaze, resisting the possibility of a transparent epistemological 
moment that would reveal the workings of a repressive state system. What is 
more, this supplementary recontextualisation negates the possibility that the 
following appropriation of the Baines text might somehow rise above the flux of 
critical, political and ideological partiality. For this reason, when I return to the 
Baines deposition, it will be less as a paradigm of the operations of early modem 
authority and more as an unstable text, a 'subaltern instance' reflexive of both 
early modem ideological configurations as well as my reading of them. 
In order to do this, it will be useful to look first in some detail at the broad 
historical and philosophical background to early modem political thought. By 
doing so, it will be possible to understand the radicalism and influence of the 
writings of the major Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin. This 
ideological scene setting will enable me to outline some of the ways in which 
authority operated and was debated in sixteenth and seventeenth century 
England. It will also contextualise much of what follows in later chapters and in 
particular this thesis's concern with subjectivity. An inevitable feature of such a 
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project will also be an examination of some recent critical methodologies and, 
arising from this, a new hypothesis conceiving the ways in which early modem 
authority might be critically theorised. For these reasons it might be useful at 
this stage to sketch broadly the direction that this hypothesis will take: that early 
modem writing concerned with the question of authority constructs what 
Jonathan Goldberg has called a 'socially sanctioned double agency,7 or to put it 
another way, a subjective double bind before the law; that the subject's struggle 
for identity and/or a subject position involved both subjective identification with 
and internalisation a/various overlapping structures of authority, what might be 
called the residual imperative of the communitas; that this process was always 
politically determinate in the broadest sense of the term;8 finally, that total 
subjective identification was never completely attainable and that the 
corresponding axis of identification/lack was the dialectic upon which this 
subjectivity was predicated. 
Regnum Dei, Regnum Mundus 
Up until roughly the fifth century AD, the precise nature of the relationship 
between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Man was, theologically, 
somewhat underdeveloped.9 To a certain extent this is hardly surprising. The 
early history of the Christian Church in the West is one of religious survival, 
consolidation and slow doctrinal development. 1o So while the writings of the 
early Church fathers such as Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom and Augustine 
of Hippo were resolutely political, this is 'politics' understood primarily in the 
pre and early medieval sense of auctoritates. What this meant in practice, as 
B. B. Price observes, was an overriding concern 'that ideas be collected~ 
organized in specific divisions and transmitted, than that the actual content of 
those ideas be analyzed. ' II In short, the political focus of the early Church was 
on the order and stability that doctrinal and discursive clarity might provide. 
Nonetheless, if the history of the Christian Church demonstrates anything, it is 
that the exegetical imperative cannot be contained indefinitely. With the passing 
of the Creed of Nice a in 325 AD and the longer Nicene Creed in 381 AD, 
theologians began to solidify a burgeoning conceptuallexis that enabled them to 
develop their exegeses in a more systematic way. And although not all members 
of the Church accepted the refoTIIlulated Creed, ultimately the goal of unity 
outweighed doctrinal dissent. I2 For example, in De Doctrina Christiana (396 
AD), Augustine signals the shift away from a delimiting sense of auctoritates: 
'The teacher who reads out a text to listening students simply articulates what he 
recognises; but the teacher who teaches the alphabet has the intention of 
enabling others to read too.' 13 To borrow Augustine's metaphor, the Nicene 
Creed enabled theologians to 'read' with impunity. Inevitably, with the question 
of the self-proclaimed 'Alpha and Omega' answered within an accepted 
conceptual frame, attention turned to (and the solecism is unavoidable) political 
auctoritates. 
Perhaps the most important doctrinal development that the Nicene Creed 
instituted was its affinnation of Christ's homoousia. This was an emphasis on 
the primacy of Christ's nature which, although one and undivided was 
concomitantly said to be human and divine. This apparent contradiction had 
given rise to no end of theological disputation, often culminating in accusations 
of heresy. In no small part, the Nicene Creed was fOTIIlulated in order to put an 
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end to this wrangling. According to the words of the Creed, Christ is 'begotten 
not made, of one substance with the Father. .. and was made flesh of the Holv 
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Spirit ... and was crucified for us' .14 This basic Christological principle appears in 
the work of almost every orthodox theologian in the Christian tradition. Indeed 
because of this, it is difficult to see how the Aristotelian law of non-
contradiction that Jacques Derrida associates with Western metaphysics can be 
applied to this central theological and exegetical principle of the Christian 
Church, formulated as it was prior to the concerted introduction of Aristotle's 
work around the twelfth century. IS The metaphysics of the early Church in 
relation to Christ were - to put it both anachronistically and crudely -
contradictory. What is more, it is the archetypal figure of Christ that has 
underwritten - if not always at a conscious level - many subsequent explorations 
of subjectivity in the West, at least until the nineteenth century. 16 Central to this 
cultural paradigm has been Christ's avowedly split subjectivity. As Jonathan 
Dollimore has noted, 'the crisis of subjectivity was there at the inception of 
individualism in early Christianity, and has been as enabling as it has been 
disturbing (enabling because disturbing). ,17 This point notwithstanding, an area 
that is comparatively under-explored is the way in which, as the central figure of 
Christian identification, Christ's conceptually precarious subjectivity, His 
homoousia, has proved critical to the development of political auctoritates. 
As Matthew makes clear in his Gospel, Christ was always human yet also 
divinely Other: 'he taught them as one hauing authority, and not as the 
Scribes' .18 What Matthew hints at is the fact that Christ operates simultaneously 
within two realms of authority the divine and the secular: humans cannot and do 
not. Indeed, this realisation emphasises the potential problems that political 
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auctoritates predicated upon Christ's homoousia might conceivably present. 
Doctrinal coherence at a conceptual level is not always easily translated into 
material practice. Put simply, Christ's authority derives in the main from his 
duality. It is His homoousia that enabled him to transcend death and 
consequently save man. However, this duality cannot be imputed to anyone but 
Christ. The question then arises as to how, subjectively, conceptually and 
emotionally, man might identify with his saviour? Modem psychoanalytic 
criticism has emphasised the ways in which the desire for subjective 
identification with an Other is critical in the formation of human identity. It 
might therefore seem that the archetypal figure of Christian identification 
functions rather like Jacques Lacan's object petit a, the constantly sliding 
signifier that 'is most evanescent in its function of symbolising the central lack 
of desire' .19 At the point where human identification seems possible, Christ's 
divine nature renders that identification, at best, partial. 
Yet just as the Lacanian object petit a provides a point of entry into, or 
rather oscillation between the imaginary and symbolic realms, so the question 
arises as to Christ's precise position between the divine and human realms. If 
men desire identification with Christ and if that identification is only partial, 
then what is the position of Christ in relation to man within a political context? 
The City of God 
Although the idea of the earthly and the heavenly cities 'has origins as far 
back as Cicero' ,20 the first systematic exposition of this topic, Augustine's The 
City o/God (413-426 AD) was to prove the most influential in subsequent 
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political thinking. Augustine wrote this text against the backdrop of political and 
militaristic turmoil. Rome had fallen in 410 to the Visigoth king Alaric and the 
Huns were marauding through Christendom threatening the precarious political 
stability of various states. It is perhaps not surprising to find that The City of God 
is, in its primary focus, an eschatological, even apocalyptic text. The 
eschatological mindset is of necessity focussed upon division, violence and 
retribution and is predicated upon what Jean Baudrillard has called 'the 
bipartition of survival' .21 Some will be saved; many will not. For this reason, it 
is also not hard to see why Reformed thinkers, with their similarly apocalyptic 
outlook and emphasis upon the cultural centrality of election and reprobation, 
drew so heavily upon Augustine. Eschatology is in many respects the midwife of 
predestinarianism. 
According to Augustine, 'two cities have been formed by two loves: the 
earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love 
of God, even to the contempt of self' .22 The earthly city affirms the self in all its 
cupidity while the heavenly city negates this subjective focus because it 
abrogates the self. The latter city is almost inevitably superior to the former, not 
only because it is divine but, interestingly, because it is free of contrariety: 'True 
peace shall be there, where no one shall suffer opposition either from himself or 
any other.,23 In Augustine's schema, existence in the civitas dei is ontologically 
different from existence upon earth. Because the heavenly city is divine, all who 
exist there necessarily participate in the divine, safe from the dualities of earthly 
contradiction. However, this is not to posit a final split between the two realms. 
As it is writing 'about-the-end', eschatological discourse must, logically, always 
be condemned to write what might be called an open-ended-ending. In other 
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words, complete separation of the divine and human realms would necessarily 
negate all writing, even writing 'about-the-end'. For this reason, eschatological 
discourse is always condemned to be writing against writing because logically as 
the ultimate expression of an eschatological discourse, the end of the world 
would cancel out the need for eschatology itself. 
Augustine avoids being drawn into this somewhat deconstructive realm of 
sliding signifiers by recapitulating Christ's authoritative centrality. As he writes 
in his Enchiridion (421 AD): 'when sins had made a wide rift between mankind 
and God, it was necessary that we should be reconciled to God ... by means of a 
mediator who alone was without sin in his birth, life, and execution. ,24 Or as he 
puts it in The City of God: 'it was necessary for the mediator between God and 
us to have a temporal mortality and an eternal beatitude; to have correspondence 
with mortals by the first, and to transfer them to eternity by the second. ,25 The 
central thrust of the Nicene Creed is taken here to its most logical and eloquent 
conclusion. Because of Christ's split/undivided nature, human identification 
with Christ is seen to take place only in so far as it is humanly possible. What I 
mean by this is that Christ enables man to identify with His human nature but at 
the point where human identification with the divine nature no longer becomes 
possible then Christ slides into mediatory mode. Or as Slavoj Zizek puts it: 
'There is no "direct" identification with (or approach to) the divine majesty: I 
identify myself with God only through identifying myself with the unique figure 
of God-the-Son abandoned by God.'26 Thus the superiority of the heavenly city 
- to which the divine nature corresponds - is logically affirmed along with a 
human recognition of this structure and man's fallen state within it. 
37 
It is important to state that at this stage in the history of theological 
discourse, Augustine's mediatory model was an essentially dispassionate 
paradigm, corresponding as it did to a wider cultural view of 'Christ~s humanitv 
as largely impersonal. ,27 The more subjective or affective mode of identification 
associated with Christ in the early modem period was mainly as a result of 
doctrinal developments during the mid to late medieval period.28 I will return to 
these issues in chapter five. For the moment it is enough to say that in 
appropriating Augustine's system as they did on the back of a complex and 
important medieval Christological heritage, early modem thinkers were, in 
effect, whether they realised it or not, confiating two modes of Christo logical 
identification. The first mode was stoical and removed and the second, affective 
and emotional. Indeed, as I will argue shortly, the augmentation of a political 
epistemology predicated upon a co-dependent dualism between caelurn and 
rnundus in the early modem period also informs an utterly new conception of 
subjectivity and SUbjective identification. 
Returning briefly to Augustine, it is true to say, as Christopher Kirwan has, 
that by focussing almost exclusively upon the city of God, the saint 'left us no 
blueprint for human society upon earth' .29 In many respects the reason for this 
omission was precisely because Augustine did not set out to provide such a 
blueprint in the first place. It is true that for Augustine, the state existed in order 
to provide a corrective to the sins of men. Nevertheless, because of the 
subsequent theological popularity of the text this political caveat almost does not 
matter. It was incumbent upon those thinkers who followed Augustine - when 
the apocalypse did not come - to develop the fairly obvious political inference of 
this system with regard to secular authority. An emperor or a king was merely a 
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secular ruler; the spiritual ruler, and by this most thinkers meant the Pope, was 
God's representative on earth. Therefore the secular should be subordinate to the 
spiritual. Indeed, one of the earliest Christians to state this position 
unequivocally was Pope Gelasius I who wrote in 494 AD to Emperor Anastasius 
that 'you should be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order' ,30 It 
would be no exaggeration to say that in theory, if not always in practice, this was 
to remain the dominant theological and political model in the West, at least until 
the twelfth century. 
'The Philosopher': Aristotle 
As I intimated earlier, the recovery of the Aristotelian corpus in the West 
around the twelfth century represented a paradigm shift in Western 
metaphysics.31 The dominant Platonism of the Chartres school and the mystical 
neo-Platonism of thinkers like Pseudo-Dionysus and Meister Eckhart were 
radically challenged by the texts entering mainland Europe via the Arab 
philosophers A vicenna and A verroes, amongst others.32 At a less abstract level, 
Aristotle's works offered what many thinkers came to see as an intrinsically new 
political model in opposition to the dominant Augustinian metaphysic. The 
Aristotelian challenge also arrived at a judicious moment in the political 
development of the West. As Gerhard Ebeling observes: 'it was no accident that 
this [introduction of Aristotle] coincided with the crowning achievement of the 
papacy in extending its influence over secular rulers' .33 Interestingly, the high 
point of Aristotelianism reached in Thomas Aquinas's great synthesis of faith 
and reason also contributed to a reaffirmation of the existing political 
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hegemony.34 The twelfth century was also noteworthy for witnessing a growing 
self-confidence and geographic expansionism amongst European rulers. One of 
the consequences of this shift was, as Marcia Colish notes, the 'redefining [of] 
Crusades as battles against heretics within Europe's borders', notably the 
Cathars and Albigensians.35 Doctrinal disputation and its semantic bedfellow, 
heresy, became a political fact of life in mainland Europe in a way that had not 
always been the case in the past. In short, the period saw a shift away from the 
corporate abstract to the individual's relationship with the corporate: from the 
city of God to the city of man. Furthermore, the renewed study of Roman law in 
the major European Universities taken alongside the now flourishing 
Aristotelianism all had the combined effect, as Richard Southern points out, of 
'making human justice and government an affair subject to human rules and 
dependent upon the efficacy of human agents. ,36 The locus of authority shifted 
decisively in the twelfth century - at a conceptual and political level - from the 
sacred to the secular. 
In one of those newly discovered texts, the Politics (3 rd c Be), Aristotle 
states: 
as all associations aim at some good, that association which is the most 
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim highest, i.e. at 
the most sovereign of all goods. This is the association which we call the 
state, the association which is 'political'. 37 
It is what society becomes, or is in the process of becoming, that signifies its 
worth for Aristotle, and each subject must play their part in achieving a good 
'end' for the society of which they are a part. In the first place, man is motivated 
to do this by pragmatic political reality: 'essential is ... the combination of the 
natural ruler and ruled, for the purpose of preservation ... there is a common 
interest uniting master and slave. ,38 Moreover, as Aristotle notes, 'the state has a 
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natural priority over the household and over any individual among us. For the 
whole must be prior to the part. ,39 It is easy to see how this kind of view would 
have chimed well with the burgeoning nationalistic ambitions of the major 
European states during the mid to late medieval period. But perhaps the most 
radical proposition in Aristotle's Politics was the separation of the religious from 
the political in the state: 
It is clear then that the state is both natural to and prior to the individual. 
For if an individual is not fully self-sufficient after separation, he will stand 
in the same relationship to the whole as the parts in the other case do. 
Whatever is incapable of participating in the association which we call the 
state, a dumb animal for example, and equally whatever is perfectly self-
sufficient and has no need to (e.g. a god), is not a part of the state at al1.4o 
Essentially what Aristotle outlines here is an avowedly secular state. And 
although many moderate thinkers of the period were to interpret this model 
theologically, there were also those who were prepared to take Aristotle at face 
value. Indeed, it is hard not to see in the lines quoted above a direct catalyst for 
the political theories of secularist thinkers like Marsilius of Padua and William 
ofOckham. 
In political terms, the travails of the medieval papacy provided the impetus 
for scholars to reconsider the whole question of secular and spiritual authority. 
At the start of the fourteenth century, Pope Boniface VIII asserted in a dispute 
with Philip IV of France that, as Bernard Reardon puts it, 
the temporal and spiritual 'swords' were alike committed to the church, the 
latter to be wielded by the clergy directly, the former, though delegated to 
the secular authorities, to be used on behalf of the church and under its 
d· . 41 lrectlOn. 
As a result of this dispute Boniface was captured by the French, an event that 
was to have far-reaching consequences for the institution he represented. From 
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1304 to 1378, the papacy was based not in Rome but in Avignon, a 'captivity~ 
that virtually destroyed any lingering prestige the papacy might have held. 
It was against this backdrop that Marsilius of Padua and William of 
Ockham formulated their ideas. Both men were part of an emerging group of 
thinkers that have come to be known as the via maderni who, in the context of 
contemporary political developments, were prepared to radically rethink the 
limits of secular authority in relation to the Church. First, in his seminal text, The 
Defender afthe Peace (1324), Marsilius argues that 'plenitude of power does not 
belong to the Roman bishop or to any other' .42 This was an uncompromising 
proposition, as was the suggestion that 'both Christ and the apostles wanted to 
be and were continuously subject in property and in person to the coercive 
jurisdiction of secular rulers' .43 Essentially, Marsilius believed that the Church 
had misunderstood its own authoritative position in society by supposing, as it 
had done since the days of Gelasius, that it possessed coercive powers. As 
Marcia Colish points out, for Marsilius 'The role of the church is spiritual only, 
and if clerics trespass into temporal affairs, the emperor has the right to judge 
and punish them under the civil law with political sanctions, up to the pope 
himself.,44 Ockham went even further than his Italian counterpart. He first 
formulated his theories in response to Pope John XXII's views on poverty and 
the ownership of material possessions.45 Ockham's most startling insight was to 
suggest that even if society distinguished between two loci of power (the 
spiritual and the secular), that distinction did not necessarily call for two separate 
regulators. As he frequently insisted, 'no community is best ordered unless it is 
under one head upon whom the jurisdiction of all others depends. ,46 The 
spiritual ruler, in this case the Pope, is certainly responsible for administering 
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justice pertaining to the spiritual. However, 'Since it extends only to matters of 
faith, papal authority has no role in temporal politics and cannot use political 
means. ,47 For these reasons, Ockham concluded, the secular ruler was best 
placed to govern society. What this signalled as A. S. McGrade notes was 'the 
end of political Augustinianism and the hierocratically inspired descending 
thesis of government with its resulting program of moulding society from 
above. ,48 More fundamentally than this perhaps, the work of Ockham, Marsilius 
and later thinkers like John Wycliffe and John Huss planted the conceptual seeds 
of the Refonnation.49 
Mediating Luther 
The name of Martin Luther has become synonymous with the Reformation 
itself. Yet as Bernard Reardon has noted, 'of all the reformers he is apt to strike 
us today as the most medieval, the most unmodern,.5o Perhaps for this reason, it 
is in Luther's work that we are most likely to observe those processes that 
Frederic Jameson identified as necessary for 'cultural revolution'. Indeed, in 
relation to the question of authority, this development is perhaps less difficult to 
trace than in other aspects of Luther's thought, primarily because he was 
building upon the clearly defined and oppositional tradition of Marsilius and 
Ockham. It is also significant that the social climate of Western Europe at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century made the question of secular and sacred 
authority an urgently practical one. Oberman explains: 
On the eve of the Refonnation, an important change took place. Earlier, 
the appeal to old "common" law and custom over against the irresistible 
spreading of centrally administered territories, the precursors of our 
modem states. was a cry of distress ... from those "below" to those 
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"above" ... However, where the appeal to the new divine law penetrates~ the 
injustice experienced because of unbearable tax burdens, encroachment on 
the common pasture and, and further disenfranchisement of free men starts 
to spark off intensified reflection and action ... We now hit upon a new 
awareness of all men being equal under the just will of God, which is seen 
as equally binding, embracing, and obligatory for the entire society.51 
So while the question of authority was debated in terms that Marsilius and 
Ockham would probably have recognised, two important differences can be 
noted. 
First, the new debates have a much more recognisably communal political 
impetus. There is a sense that the Reformers are responding to the practical 
needs of their people in a way that was not always the case with the high 
medieval scholastics. Seeing the Pope effectively neutered as an active political 
force for the foreseeable future, the Reformers turned their focus upon the 
misuse of power by secular rulers. Yet in many respects, by doing this, they 
became victims of their own success. Having fought against the supremacy of 
the Pope for so long by promoting the virtues of the secular ruler, there was also 
the danger that secular rule would become valorised regardless of the qualities 
he possessed or the actions that he undertook. 52 The second difference in the 
way in which authority was debated is perhaps the most important as well as the 
most under explored. The Reformers effectively reinscribed the figure of Christ 
as a political avatar through which the question of authority might be 
conceptualised. Following the important lead set by Desiderius Erasmus in his 
Enchiridion militis Christiani (1503-4), the first generation of thinkers including 
Luther and Huldrych Zwingli (re ) invigorated Christ at a political and at a secular 
level. By constructing Christ as they did, the early Reformers also politicised 
him in a way that developed an important strain of medieval Christo logy . As 
David Aers notes, the conventional paradigm in medieval studies that sees Christ 
as a figure of emotionalised, eroticised and often-feminised identification and 
imitation obscures a radically politicised reading of the imitatio Christi 
associated with Lollard heterodoxy. As Aers writes, 'Such an imitation of Christ 
would encourage challenges to the authority and power of the church in many 
domains: legal, political, economic, military, and theological.' 53 This reading of 
the saviour as an actant in corporate politics personalised Him in a much more 
actively political way. In order, therefore, to understand Luther's reading of 
authority and the function of this new Christology within it, it will be necessary 
to return to the competing models of Augustine and Aristotle outlined earlier. 
I have already argued that Aristotle gave Western political thought a 
different epistemological emphasis especially in relation to the prevailing 
Augustinian paradigm. As Quentin Skinner observes, 'Augustine had pictured 
political society as a divinely ordained order imposed on fallen man as a remedy 
for their sins. But Aristotle's Politics treats the polis as a purely human creation, 
designed to fulfil purely mundane ends.,54 Skinner's emphasis upon the 
Augustinian political society as a remedy for sin is pivotal because in classic 
Christian theology, sin may only be redeemed through Christ. Because many late 
medieval and humanist thinkers had adopted a communal political model which 
sidestepped the fact that, as Aers puts it, 'representations of Christ hold political 
consequences' ,55 the express danger was that Christ's sacrifice ceased to be the 
'political' and religious centre of Christian life. The problem for Luther was that 
on the one hand he was an avowed Augustinian in most matters theological, but 
in respect of the question of authority he sided with the secularist political school 
that took their inspiration from Aristotle. 56 
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This is one of the points that Luther was addressing when he wrote in his 
Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517) that 'the whole Aristotle is to 
theology as darkness is to light.' 57 What he was to call elsewhere the bondage of 
the will was, along with his re-formulated Christo logy, to become the modus 
operandi behind his exploration of secular authority in his Von Weltlicher 
Oberkeit (1523). Written ostensibly in response to the prohibition of his 
translation of the Bible, this work sets out to attack those secular rulers who 
'have had the temerity to put themselves in God's place, [and] make themselves 
masters of consciences and belief. 58 What Luther fears most is sUbjugation of 
men's consciences to the secular ruler. All this not only emphasises how far (for 
Luther) Marsilius and Ockham's insights had been perverted, it also draws 
attention to the Lutheran conception of the spiritual freedom of the conscience 
which was to become extremely influential for later thinkers. 
In connection, therefore, with the problem outlined above, Luther observes: 
And so God has ordained the two governments, the spiritual [government] 
which fashions true Christians and just persons through the Holy Spirit 
under Christ, and the secular [weltlich] government which holds the 
Unchristian and wicked in check and forces them to keep the peace 
outwardly and be still, like it or not.59 
It might seem from this that Luther both ignores his earlier strictures concerning 
conscience and also creates a spiritual elect distinct from the rest of society. Yet 
this is not quite the case as the following qualification shows: 
Without the spiritual government of Christ, no one can be made just in the 
sight of God by the secular government [alone]. However, Christ's spiritual 
government does not extend to everyone; on the contrary, Christians are at 
all times the fewest in number and live in the midst of the Unchristian. 
Conversely, where the secular government or law rules on its own, pure 
hypocrisy must prevail. 60 
Luther's concern is with the Christians; the fate of the 'Unchristians' is a 
secondary matter for him. This distinction is all the more important because it is 
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so slight. Perhaps more than most discourses, theology relies heavily on 
relatively acute lexical differentiation. Yet it is these seemingly minute 
differences upon which theological systems and subjective positionalities are 
determined. In Von Weltlicher Oberkeit Luther, somewhat surprisingly, appears 
to follow Aristotle. The Unchristian are, to quote Aristotle, 'incapable of 
participating in the association which we call the state'. Effectively, what 
Luther does here is to apply Aristotelianism to the reality of election and 
reprobation and yoke to it a political Augustinian dualism solely at the level of 
the individual. It was this insight that made Luther one of the most instrumental 
thinkers of the Reformation. 
On two counts therefore, Robert Weimann seriously misinterprets Luther's 
political insight when he writes: 'Since the two kingdoms are radically distinct 
but also parallel manifestations of one heavenly design, the corresponding 
locations of authority, although different, overlap. ,61 Firstly, I have already 
shown how the via moderni, and in particular Ockham, signalled the end of 
political Augustinianism as a discourse and as a practice. Augustine and his 
'political' theology were, of course, highly respected by the Reformers and cited 
widely, but at a micropoliticallevel, not as a macropolitical paradigm. Secondly, 
and leading on from this point, by re-imposing the old Augustinian hegemony 
which viewed the civitas mundi as a tiresome, sin-infested adjunct to the civitas 
dei, Weimann fails to see that Luther's concern was with the spiritual within the 
temporal, manifested at the level of private, internal discourse. By accepting 
God's overarching sovereignty and the secular ruler as God's guarantor upon 
earth, Luther's focus is rather with the internal imperatives of authority as 
completely separate from the outer imperatives (which in any case are associated 
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with the Unchristian). I will return shortly to the problems such a conception 
might well present, but for the moment it is enough to say that Luther~ s political 
focus is on the subjective experience(s) of going before the law. 
The seeds of this far-reaching theology are to be found in the 1517 
Disputation that I quoted from earlier. Luther writes elsewhere: 
87. Since the law is good, the will, which is hostile to it, cannot be good. 
88. And from this it is clear that everyone's natural will is iniquitous and 
bad. 
89. Grace as a mediator is necessary to reconcile the law with the will.62 
In Lutheran theology, grace is only ever received in the Augustinian manner by 
and through Christ, a fundamental asserted by revalidating Augustine's critical 
theory of Christ as a mediator between man and God: 'Christ is full of grace, life 
and salvation. ,63 It is for this reason that, while God in his sovereignty still holds 
sway over all things, this is in many respects a secondary feature of Luther's 
thought, especially his political thought. God's power for Luther is an 
ontological not an epistemological issue. So, bearing in mind the 
analogous/similitudinous position of the secular ruler and taking into account the 
subjective, spiritual position of Christ in relation to man, an interesting 
possibility arises: that the subject might actually be party to two potentially 
competing forms of identification. What is more, both of these forms of 
identification (one inward and spiritual, one outward and temporal) take place 
within the temporal order. 
Like Christ's homoousia, the subject's internal and external relations with 
'authority' necessarily split the Lutheran subjectlivity. I labour this point 
because it seems to me that this intellectual development, and its medieval 
antecedents at the start of the Reformation are seriously overlooked as a 
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cynosure for the explorations of subjectivity and the strange, often baffling 
workings-out of inwardness found in so many early modem texts. 'One simply 
cannot write the history of the subject in a culture where Christian beliefs and 
practices are pervasive without taking Christianity extremely seriously,64 as 
David Aers has observed. This is a valuable point. To take early modem religion 
'seriously' must also, as part of that project, mean paying close attention to the 
complexity and diversity of the medieval religious foundations I mentioned 
earlier. But one problem remains. If Luther's project creates within the subject, 
in Debora Shuger's formulation, ' aprivate and inward spiritual kingdom 
[divided] from the whole temporal order of society' ,65 it surely also leaves that 
subject oscillating between the two types of authoritative 'institution'. In other 
words, with whom or with what does the subject ultimately identify: the signifier 
of inward, spiritual authority or of outward, secular power? If identification is 
central to the forming of subjectivity, so the signifier that the subject identifies 
with must, in some way, be reflected in the way that that subjectJivity operates. 
In order to clear up this problem, I want now to turn to the relationship between 
conscience and political resistance. 
'The Sword and the Law' 
Heiko Oberman has noted that 'Luther suffered through the 
conflict ... between the conscience and Evangelical reliance on God. ,66 This 
personal affliction is perhaps mirrored in his somewhat agonised argument in 
relation to political resistance in Von Weltlicher Oberkeit. An intimation of this 
difficulty is found when Luther states that the secular ruler should believe that· I 
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belong to the people and to the land; I ought to do what is advantageous for 
them. ,67 Yet perhaps more than most, Luther knew full well that this degree of 
magnanimity was not common amongst early modem rulers. He also recognised 
that if this position was developed to its logical conclusion, tyranny could hide 
under the mask of 'just', secular self-authorisation. Because of this possibility, 
and perhaps also because of the ideological imperatives of his people's 
precarious political position,68 Luther was compelled to ask whether an unjust 
ruler might be lawfully opposed. 
In Von Weltlicher Oberkeit, his answer to this question is, to say the least, 
unsatisfactory. He states that 'love of one's neighbour has no regard for self ... so 
long as it is for the good of one's neighbour or the community.,69 Luther would 
appear to be working towards a position where resistance is permissible if it is 
for the Aristotelian common good. Indeed as he had previously remarked: 
Although you yourself do not need your enemy to be punished, your weak 
neighbour does, and you are to help him enjoy peace and see to it that his 
enemies are kept in check. And that cannot be unless power and superiors 
are held in honour and awe.70 
This sentence bypasses logical disputation and the final caveat negates all his 
previous observations on this matter. By failing to address directly the 
possibility that the enemy of the neighbour might well be their secular superior, 
Luther is able to deny (however illogically) that a secular ruler might be 
opposed. However, not only was this stance unsatisfactory and logically 
invidious, it was not to remain Luther's last word on the matter. 
Writing in 1531 against the very real threat of a Catholic uprising against 
the various Protestant groupings throughout continental Europe, Luther stated in 
the Warning to His Dear German People that 'If the emperor should issue a call 
to arms against us on behalf of the pope ... no one should lend himself to it or 
50 
obey the emperor in this event.' 71 Again, conscience is to the fore: 'how will 
your conscience bear the blasphemous fraud of purgatory, with which they [the 
Catholics] also treacherously duped and falsely frightened all the world' .72 
Finally, Luther's radicalism concerning the spiritual freedom of conscience is 
extended into his political auctoritates. He was writing during what were 
extremely difficult and unsure times both theologically and politically and 
resistance against an unlawfuVungodly ruler is not exactly mandated here. 
Nevertheless the important point is that the precedent for further debate on this 
topic had been set. Luther knew as much. This is perhaps the reason why he 
could not bring himself personally to validate what he had said: 
My ardent wish and plea is that peace be preserved and that neither side 
start a war or give cause for it. For I do not want my conscience burdened, 
nor do I want to be known before God or the world as having counselled or 
desired anyone to wage war or to offer resistance except those who are 
enjoined and authorised to do so [Romans 13].73 
My purpose in quoting this passage is not to draw attention to Luther's inability 
to develop the consequences of what he was suggesting or to the maddeningly 
contradictory argument he once more employs, but rather to highlight two 
features of this objection central to the next stage of my discussion. 
Firstly, Luther bases his objection upon his conscience, which, as I have 
shown, he considered to be spiritually free. Why therefore should he worry 
about his conscience 'before God'? The answer lies in realising that for Luther 
the spiritual freedom of conscience does not correspond to a Hegelian personal 
and moral counterbalance.74 Rather, as Oberman points out, 'it [conscience] is 
always guided and is free only once God has freed and "captured" it.' 75 So 
although free from those loci of secular authority that the Reformers found so 
distasteful, the Lutheran conscience always remains internally subscribed. But 
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this was only the beginning of a new paradigm. As I pointed out earlier, Luther 
was frequently caught between conscience and the evangelical imperative. It is 
no mistake to find therefore that the career of perhaps the greatest Reformed 
evangelical, John Calvin, corresponded - not least in his own work - to a radical 
development of Lutheran conscience, inspired by evangelism, and debated in 
relation to authority. 
The second and final point is to note that as the author of a (potentially) 
radical view of the subject's obligations before the law, Luther was not prepared 
to go that stage further and personally authorise that discourse. This text - or 
rather its message - as Barthes would have it, "reads without the inscription of 
the Father,76 and in a way that reconstructs a Lutheran subject position 
oscillating once more between two authors/authorities. In other words, the 
Lutheran subject is predicated upon a type of interiority that does not and cannot 
correspond to an autonomous self, but a self caught in a double bind, a dialectic 
of identification and loss. The desired identification with the authoritative figure 
is rendered impossible because to achieve this would require (in this case) the 
very act of radical social living that would render the authoritative figure absent 
once more. What I have outlined here is, as Linda Gregerson has observed, "the 
formal and thematic cultivation of a subject-in-exile, a subject defined and 
produced by its loss of address to, and search for authorising ground.' 77 The 
effect of Calvinism was to make this subject even more diffuse. 
In the last quotation from Luther above, it is interesting to note that his objection 
is supported by a specific biblical passage, Romans 13. This particular text, 
although always popular in Christian discussions of authority and law, was, 
52 
because of Luther's use of it, to prove highly significant for later thinkers. 
Accordingly this text, along with the Old Testament book of Daniel will provide 
the framework for the next part of the discussion in relation to John Calvin. 
Conscience and the Bible 
The key to understanding Calvin's conception of conscience lies in his 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He writes: 
For by a kind of mutual bond the Lord has joined together the certainty of 
his Word and of his Spirit so that the perfect religion of the Word may 
abide in our minds when the Spirit, who causes us to contemplate God's 
face, shines; and that we in turn may embrace the Spirit with no fear of 
being deceived when we recognise him in his own image, namely, in the 
Word. 78 
The Holy Spirit is 'recognized in his agreement with Scripture,79and is also the 
entity that paves the way for the mediator between man and God: 'the Holy 
Spirit is the bond by which Christ effectually unites us to himself.' 80 In an 
evolution of the Lutheran system, Calvin positions God just that bit further away 
from man. Indeed in Calvin's theology, Deus is as far away as he can be without 
being absconditus. 
Scripture is used by Calvin as both the basis for secular governance and 
also as the starting point for the affective, subjective exploration of self. 
According to Robert Weimann, a problem arises because of this. He argues: 
'Calvin paradoxically projected a Holy Spirit whose identity in bridging two 
radically different worlds, must be resolutely fixed; when all is said and done 
such fixture .. .is that of the meaning of Scripture itself. ,81 As with his discussion 
of Luther, it is the case that Weimann misreads the focal point of Calvin's 
thinking on this matter. The Reformer may have been confused (and 
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occasionally confusing) but he was certainly systematic and what Weimann fails 
to take into account is Calvin's development of the Lutheran notion of 
conscIence. 
Perhaps the best way of highlighting the problem is to examine a sentence 
from the text with which I began this chapter, the Baines deposition, which is 
rarely (if ever) commented upon: 'That all the apostles were fishermen and base 
fellows, neither of wit nor worth; that Paul only had wit, but he was a timorous 
fellow in bidding men to be subject to magistrates against his conscience. ,82 
Ostensibly this is a highly heretical assertion. By claiming that Paul went 
'against his conscience', it may seem that Baines's Marlowe effectively denies 
the lex divinus or, in the words of Saint Augustine, 'that the Scriptures were 
delivered to mankind by the Spirit of the one true God who can tell no lie.' 83 Yet 
there is another more intriguing possibility. 
It will first be useful to look in some detail at the biblical text to which this 
accusation refers, namely Chapter 13 of Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans: 
Let euery soule be subiect vnto the higher powers: for there is no power but 
of God: and the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoeuer therefore 
resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, 
shall receiue to themselves condemnation. For magistrates are not to be 
feared for good works, but for euill. Wilt thou then be without feare of the 
power? doe well: so shalt thou have praise of the same; For he is the 
minister of God for thy wealth: but if thou doe euill, feare: for he beareth 
not the sword for nought: for he is the minister of God, to take vengeance 
on him that doeth euill. Wherefore we must be subiect, not because of 
wrath onely, but also for conscience sake. 84 
I have quoted the first five verses in full for, as Quentin Skinner has observed, 
due to the influence of Luther, Romans became 'the most cited of all texts on the 
foundations of political life throughout the age of the Reformation' .85 Regardless 
of whether Baines or Marlowe made the accusation regarding PauL the accuser 
knew he was on contentious. if well-worn ground. The reasons for this texf s 
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popularity are complex but illuminating. As Christopher Hill writes, 'The Bible 
had been a political creation from the beginning'. 86 In a sense then, by re-
emphasising its social primacy as Luther and Calvin did, and by ensuring its 
relative accessibility at all cultural levels, the Reformers re-claimed the divine 
logos from the admittedly abstract uses to which it had often been put by the 
high Scholastics. In short, throughout early modem Europe, the Bible was 
gradually re-politicised. 
As a result of this shift, Romans, more than most biblical texts, provided a 
divinely sanctioned basis for reconstructing a Reformed polity for the Church. 87 
The other factor that determined the new exegesis associated with Romans was 
the crucial influence of continental legal humanists such as Lorenzo Valla, 
Guillaume Bude and Andrea Alciato.88 These scholars established a return to the 
writings of the ancients, and in particular to those texts of Roman law which had 
enjoyed such precedence at least since Justinian. These scholars all shared a 
commitment to examine these texts in their social and historical context. For 
example, in his discussion of the foundation of monarchy in De I 'Institution du 
Prince (c. 1520), Bude notes that its origins 'would not have been based on 
legitimate domination but on unjust, unlawful seizure and usurpation. ,89 This 
was radical material that chimed with the ongoing debates on authority 
throughout Europe. Furthermore, in the intellectual imbroglio of the 
Reformation it was almost inevitable that the principles of these legal humanists 
would have some bearing on biblical exegesis. According to Debora Shuger, the 
effects of this appropriation were potentially drastic: 
The transformation of Roman law from a textual auctoritas to an 
instrument of theoretical analysis is as properly a Renaissance phenomenon 
as the recognition of the law's contingent contexts. And both are 
potentially forms of demythologisation.9o 
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It is precisely this intellectual development that is reflected in the Baines 
reference to Romans, but in an unexpected way. 
With its references to the disparity of biblical time lines and its emphasis 
upon contingent historical fact - this explains the otherwise spurious reference to 
the actual economic lowliness of biblical Palestinian fishermen - the Baines text 
appropriates the lessons of the humanist revisionists in a way that seems to pre-
date David Friedrich Strauss's Das Leben Jesu (1835-6) and the Higher Critics 
by almost 250 years. But I want to return to the document's reference to 
conscience. Clearly this alludes to the passage in Romans that reads 'ye must 
need be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake'. Now while the 
emphasis of the Baines text sets Paul's personal conscience aside from those of 
other men, the inference is that men's consciences may be externally subjugated 
to the authority of magistrates. In his Commentary on Romans, it is thus 
fascinating to fmd Calvin, Marlowe's supposed nemesis in so much else, 
admitting as much initially, and then adding, in an illuminating caveat: 
we must voluntarily take upon ourselves the submission to which our 
conscience is bound by the Word of God ... The whole of this discussion 
concerns civil government (de civilibus praefecturis). Those, therefore, 
who bear rule over men's consciences attempt to establish their 
blasphemous tyranny from this passage in vain. 91 
In sharp contrast to the biblical Paul's conception of an externally imposed 
authority, Calvin's voluntarism would seem to posit conscience as an active 
faculty of moral exertion. But as Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham and 
Martin Luther understood only too well, to give conscience an active 
psychological role is to raise the possibility of active resistance led from the 
conscIence. 
56 
As I pointed out earlier, the only way in which the 'Word of God' could be 
made apparent to men, according to the Reformers, was by and through the lex 
divinus. So, by denying that tyranny - which, after all, is a mode of authority-
could be established over men's consciences, Calvin's argument leaves only two 
possible conclusions. The first is that although men's consciences may be 
subjugated to authority, the tyrannous implications of the biblical passage 
effectively refute the Bible as the basis of authoritative discourse. But this 
conclusion not only misrepresents the passage, is misunderstands Calvin's whole 
conception of authority. Therefore, the second and most likely conclusion is that 
tyranny exists despite the Bible and because of this, men's consciences are 
caught between the imperative to obey the Bible, and align with tyranny, or to 
follow their subjective consciences, thus denying the Bible but refuting the 
tyrant. Is this a circle that can be squared in practice? 
Conscience and Civil Living 
The centrality of conscience to both Scripture and the Holy Spirit is 
affinned in two of Calvin's sermons on the Epistles 01S. Paule to Timothie and 
Titus (1579). First he states that 'if we haue not a good conscience, our faith 
shall be taken away from vs, & we shall be made naked of the grace of the holy 
Ghost.,92 Calvin is operating here from the other side of the argumentative 
dialectic noted at the beginning of the last section: a good conscience is 
necessary for the operation of the Spirit. He then goes on to note later that 'a 
good conscience is the meanes to keepe this treasure of the Gospel' .93 Logically 
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to adhere to Scripture is to affirm the Holy Spirit and thus hold a good 
conscience. Nonetheless, Calvin had stated in the Institutes: 
For even though individual laws may not apply to the conscience, we are 
still held by God's general command, which commends to us the authority 
of magistrates. And Paul's discussion turns on this point: the magistrates, 
since they have been ordained by God, ought to be held in honour 
[Rom. 13 : 1). Meanwhile, he does not teach that the laws framed by them 
apply to the inward governing of the soul94 
Bearing in mind what I have said about Calvinist interiority in relation to 
subjective identification, the only possible conclusion that can be drawn from 
Calvin's reading of conscience is that in a similar way to Luther, he was 
prepared to view it as logical and illogical, verifiable and contradictory. 
This seems at this point the only satisfactory way of explaining Calvin's 
slippery argument. It would also appear to be the best way of accounting for the 
dichotomy between the apostle's conscience and those of all other men proposed 
by Baines's Marlowe. For if authority is to remain with the Bible, it must also 
remain with the disseminators of that text, in this case Paul. But because the 
overriding focus of Calvin's political theory was on the community of the 
faithful (and their covenant with God), his difficulty arose when attempting to 
account for the contingent actions of individuals operating within this 
framework. This explains his curious insistence earlier that his account of 
conscience (which can never be a corporate faculty) refers to de civilibus 
praefecturis. It is therefore necessary to turn to another commentary on Romans, 
one which was undoubtedly influenced by Calvin, but which had a far greater 
effect than any other Reformed commentary, and one that is the key to 
understanding the Baines reference to conscience: the marginal commentary in 
the Geneva Bible. 
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Next to the fifth verse of Romans in the margin of the Geneva Bible is 
written: 
Wee must obey the Magistrate, not onely for feare of punishment, but 
much more because that (although the Magistrate haue no power ouer the 
conscience of man, yet seeing hee is Gods minister) hee cannot be resisteth 
by any good conscience.95 
Again a similar exegetical double truth would appear to be in evidence here. The 
statement that a magistrate cannot be opposed by 'any good conscience' seems 
to negate the assertion that the magistrate has 'no power over the conscience of 
men'. However, this would be to disregard the crucial supplementary marginal 
note that is attached to the final predicate of the biblical verse, 'but also for 
consciences sake'. This note states: 'So farre as lawfully we may.' for if vnlawfull 
things be commanded vs, we must answere as Peter teacheth vs, It is better to 
obey God than man.,96 What this note does is to reclaim the Bible as lex divinus 
by making the lex exist in a contingent relation to the divinus. In other words, 
just as the humanists' historicisation of Roman law led to an awareness of its 
contingent contexts, so men's actions (be they contemporary or biblical) can, 
potentially at least, be seen to occur at a specific historical moment under 
contingent social conditions. 
But this recognition came at a price. Just as the Geneva note quoted above 
exits as a supplement to the main marginal exegesis, so a new conception of 
conscience begins to emerge, in the Geneva Bible, in the Baines text and in early 
modem culture at large. This is a conception predicated upon the radical 
inferences of Calvin's exegesis. Put simply, the Reformers' need to encompass 
all forms of moral behaviour within the boundaries of the Bible led to the 
emergence of a decidedly supplementary conception of conscience in relation to 
authority. It relied, as I have shown, on the suspension of formal logic. By 
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reclaiming the unlawful within the divine text, this movement allowed for a 
conscience bound by scriptural and temporal auctoritas (the Pauline line). At the 
same time, this movement sanctioned the possibility, with biblical assent, of 
rebellion (the Petrine line). 
All of this serves to demonstrate the difficulty of locating the parameters of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the period. Because conscience, however it 
manifested itself, was only ever experienced as an interior reality, it can only 
itself be supplementary to any political theory constructed around it. Leaving 
aside the important fact outlined earlier that for Luther and Calvin, spiritual 
conscience could not in any way be contained, the supplement always declares, 
as Derrida puts it, that 'the sign is the supplement of the thing itself. ,97 In other 
words, even if the notion of containment is permitted in relation to the 
supplementary conscience, it will only ever be the containment of one side of 
this mental dialectic. This is not a perverse, a-historical or even post-modem 
retrojection but an actual mode of discourse and, indeed, existence in early 
modem society. For this reason, Shuger is surely correct when she states that 
what she calls participatory consciousness 'remains relatively indifferent to the 
law of non-contradiction itself in the early modem period.98 The 'new 
systematic dominant' of the Reformation could never completely efface the 
spectre of Augustine and a wholly different epistemological schema. 
Resisting the King 
There is some disparity in the early modem period between certain aspects 
of what John Calvin wrote and the uses to which his writings were actually put.99 
60 
This is especially the case in relation to the question of authority, a topic on 
which Calvin was decidedly ambivalent. As Quentin Skinner notes, while 
Calvin's theory of civil order remained consistent: 'Calvin is at all times a 
master of equivocation, and while his basic commitment is unquestionably to a 
theory of non-resistance, he does introduce a number of exceptions into his 
argument.,lOO Importantly, it was Calvin's equivocation on this matter that 
influenced an important group of writers known as the resistance theorists. IOI In 
order to explain the work of this group, I want to turn to the last page of the 
Institutes. In his final edition of the text (1559), Calvin took what could possibly 
be construed as a Petrine line in relation to resistance. Utilising Daniel's 
rebellion against King Darius, he asserted: 'Daniel denies that he has committed 
any offence against the king when he has not obeyed his impious edict 
[Dan.6:22-23, V g.]. For the king had exceeded his limits ... abrogat[ing] his 
power.' 102 It is interesting to not~ that in their various English editions of the 
Institutes, Edmund Bunney omits Calvin's addition and William Lawne calls the 
Daniel passage a 'caueat.' 103 Calvin's English translators seemed aware that this 
was dangerous material, what one commentator has designated as an 'orthodox 
Calvinist policy of disobedience in all things repugnant to the law of God, but 
passive acceptance of any persecution that such a stance might bring upon 
them. ,104 It was this policy that was picked up and developed by a number of 
the resistance theorists. 
The most well known writers on resistance such as John Ponet, Christopher 
Goodman and John Knox all had one thing in common. All had fled England to 
escape persecution at the beginning of the reign of the Catholic Queen Mary I. 
And although their rhetoric is clouded to varying degrees by the misogynistic 
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assertion that no female should ever be monarch, their work nevertheless takes 
the efforts of the Reformers to its most radical conclusions. For example, in his 
Treatise of Politike Power (1556), John Ponet returns to the question of Daniel 
and Darius. As he asks: 'why did Daniel not folowe king Darius and his 
counsailles commaundement. .. but was content to be cast to the lyones?,105 
Ponet then goes on to utilise Daniel in the course of constructing a theory of 
lawful resistance against unlawful rulers: 'The lawe testifieth to euery mannes 
conscience that it is natural to cutte awaie an incurable membre' .106Jt is crucial 
to note once more how conscience becomes the touchstone of a theory of 
resistance. Similarly, in his How Superior Powers Oght to Be Obeyd (1558), and 
in a passage marked 'Note this al ye Gentelmen and Nobles of Inglande', 
Christopher Goodman noted: 'But Daniel not contented to do as he was 
commaunded, did as he was accustomed, the contrary not once, but thrice every 
day, transgressinge the kinges commaundement.' 107 But perhaps most notorious 
of all the resistance tracts was John Knox's First Blast of the Trumpet Against 
the Monstrous Regiment of Women (1558) which, unsurprisingly given its title, 
represented the most extreme expression of political misogyny . Yet in most 
other respects, Knox's argument was no different to those of Ponet and 
Goodman, particularly in his use of Daniel. 108 However, in the context of early 
modem politics, this did not matter. Although perhaps more talked about than 
read, Knox's Monstrous Regiment was to have a lasting effect on the reception 
of Calvinism in England. 
In the first place, the resistance theorists did not, like most Lutheran 
writers, insist that resistance could only be lead by a magistrate. On the contrary, 
they argued that bodies of people and even individuals could rise up against a 
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wicked ruler. As Quentin Skinner observes: 'One way in which this conclusion 
was reached was by developing the private-law theory of resistance in such a 
way as to highlight its most individualistic and populist implications.' 109 In early 
modem Europe, such conclusions were, of course, highly dangerous and before 
long, Calvinism came to be associated with this form of political radicalism and 
to be seen as an incendiary theology. This was especially the case in England 
when, with the death of Mary, one female monarch was replaced with another. 
Elizabeth I knew the writings of the resistance theorists and in particular the 
misogynistic polity promoted by John Knox. She was not alone in associating 
Knox's brand of political radicalism with Calvinism. In the words of Keith 
Randell, Elizabeth's 'attitude towards Calvinism was coloured by the writings of 
Knox ... Elizabeth had decided that Calvinism was a creed which brought civil 
war in its train.' 110 The fact that Elizabeth did adopt Calvinism says as much 
about her own political expediency than any particular doctrinal devotion and it 
is of considerable importance that she should have formulated her views on 
Calvinism in relation to its most controversial derivative school of thought. This 
was to prove crucial to the development of Calvinism in England, as I will 
demonstrate in chapter three. 
Of course, Ponet, Goodman and Knox also shared the distinction of being 
rabidly anti-Catholic. They developed their views under the twin miseries of 
doctrinal persecution and exile. It is therefore important to note that in early 
Elizabethan England, more 'moderate' Calvinists like Peter Martyr and John 
Bradford also echoed Calvin's new conception of conscience and, in Martyr's 
case, Calvin's theory of resistance. As Skinner notes, 'Martyr defends a version 
of the constitutional theory of resistance both in his Commentaries upon the 
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Epistle of St Paul to the Romans and in A Commentary upon the Book of Judges, 
which he completed in 1558 and 1561 respectively.' III These dates are 
instructive for in 1559 Elizabeth passed the Acts ofUnifonnity and Supremacy, 
legislation designed to unite the English Church under both her leadership and 
doctrinal Protestantism. Crucial to both of these acts was the revival of, or rather 
re-emphasis upon, the official Church homilies, which were appointed to be read 
at mass throughout the land. In many respects, these homilies can be seen as an 
ideological reaction against the resistance theory that was being debated at the 
time. Naturally, Elizabeth's precarious religious and political position1l2 had 
much to do with this movement, but it is possible to read in these homilies -
which first appeared in Edward VI's reign but which were supplemented by 
Elizabeth's bishops - a marked reaction to the resistance theory that so 
characterised the 'left' wing of Protestant thought. 
F or example, the Exhortation concerning good order, and obedience to 
Rulers and Magistrates states: 'we must refer all judgement to God, to kings, 
and rulers, and judges under them, which be God's officers to execute justice; 
and by plain words of Scripture have their authority and use of the sword 
granted from God'. 113 It is significant that this sennon ignores the 
Lutheran/Calvinist emphasis upon the spiritual freedom of conscience for its 
own ideological ends, stating the biblical line: 
all subjects are bound to obey them [Magistrates] as God's ministers, yea 
although they be evil, not only for fear, but also for conscience-sake .. .it is 
not lawful for inferiors and subjects ... to resist and stand against the 
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supenor powers. 
The unproblematic parallel that the homily writer draws between ruler and God 
smoothes over the complexities of two hundred years of intellectual history. 
According to the Homilies, Elizabethan subjects were expected to obey, and 
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conscience was constructed less as the keeper of spiritual and, potentially, 
political 'freedom' than as a moral counterweight preventing moral or political 
assertion. In so far as conscience was an 'inward' faculty, it was still answerable 
to the often-crushing weight of external, political imperatives. The battle lines in 
Elizabethan England were drawn and fought over the conscience and I have only 
outlined the initial skirmishes. 
It should be clear now why Baines's Marlowe was such a dangerous figure. 
Logically for most Protestants Paul did go against his conscience when he 
ordered men to be subject to magistrates and logically this is what Calvin and 
the Geneva Bible also suggest. As Donna Hamilton explains: 
A related rhetoric of subjectivity and idea of individual autonomy that was 
important to these church-state controversies was the discourse of 
conscience ... which owed some of its most important formulations to 
contexts within which someone needed to defend action that ran contrary to 
official church policy. 115 
Paul also helps to emphasise that the dominant culture in early modem society 
was not a monolith guaranteeing its own cultural hegemony and containing 
dissent. When Baines's Marlowe addressed the issue of conscience, he was 
speaking from the cultural and intellectual centre in respect of contemporary 
theological debates. In doing so he exposed the fact that this ideological centre is 
most at risk when the precariousness of its centrality is exposed to a gaze from 
the margin which in turn reveals that marginality as only ever supplementary. As 
Slavoj Zizek writes, ideology 'is a fantasy-construction which serves as a 
support for our "reality" itself: and "illusion" which structures our effective, real 
social relations and thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible 
kernel'. 116 In relation to the Calvinist subject before the law, this kernel is the 
Janus-faced God, the figure of authority, the locus of lack, and the producer of 
65 
an internal, spiritual, supplementary subjectivity. For these reasons~ in chapter 
three, I will outline in greater detail the development of Calvinism under 
Elizabeth as well as providing an account of the changing role of conscience and 
other internal faculties in early modern England. But in order to contextualise 
this account properly, in chapter two I examine Protestant sign theory. For, in 
looking at the legacy and application of Reformed semiotics, it will be possible 
to better understand the experience of subjectivity in early modem England. 
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Chapter Two 
Reforming Semiotics 
The Reformed Inheritance 
If there was one arena that rivaled theology in the intensity of debate during 
the early modem period, then it was semiotics. In many respects, the 
controversies surrounding the teaching, function and signification of language 
have similar roots to the theological controversies outlined in the previous 
chapter. Specifically, they arise in relation to old arguments revivified under the 
impetus of changes in early modem pedagogy and politics. Particular practices 
of language very quickly came to be associated with specific political and 
theological allegiances. As Erika Rummel observes: 'Neither the language nor 
the issues of the debate in the Renaissance was entirely new. The controversy 
had roots in both classical antiquity and early Christian thought.' 1 Of particular 
importance were the relative pedagogical and functional merits of dialectic and 
rhetoric. Although this issue goes back to the classical period and in particular 
the opposing merits of the Platonic and Isocratic schools, it was during the 
Middle Ages that the matter came to the fore. 2 
In the medieval universities, the academic curriculum was divided into two 
parts. Under the trivium, students studied grammar, rhetoric and dialectic and in 
77 
the quadrivium they examined mathematics, geometry, music and astronomy. 
However, not all subjects carried an equal pedagogic weighting, a fact that was 
to have far-reaching consequences for early modem semiotics. Most noticeably~ 
in the trivium rhetoric was sidelined in favour of dialectic. Brian Vickers notes: 
In the revival of school and university education in the eleventh to 
thirteenth centuries, rhetoric occupied its place in the trivium alongside 
grammar and logic, but with a much reduced importance. Dialectic 
appropriated the commonplaces, definition and proof, while moral and 
political questions were transferred to theology ... The subordination of 
rhetoric to dialectic was increased by the fact that the basic textbook of 
Latin rhetoric until c.1150, the De inventione, failed to deal with three of 
the five divisions of rhetoric, e!ocutio, pronunciato and memoria. Limited 
to inventiato and status-theory, rhetoric was seen as an inferior branch of 
logic, concerned with particular rather than general issues.3 
This state of affairs did not last. Once more, the shift can be traced back to the 
recovery of classical authors around the twelfth century, particularly in this case 
Aristotle, Horace, Cicero and Quintilian. Under the influence of these writers, 
rhetoric was gradually habilitated as the prime area of semiotic enquiry. But 
rhetoric only achieved pedagogic primacy during the late fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries when, in response to the classical scholarship of the Italian 
humanists, thinkers in the north of Europe gradually developed their own 
humanist manifesto. This programme had three main aims. Alister McGrath 
explains these aims as follows: 
a literary or cultural programme, directed towards the ideal of bonae 
litterae; a religious programme directed towards the ideal of 
Christian ism us renascens; and a political programme, primarily directed 
towards the establishment of peace in Europe. 4 
These aims notwithstanding, this does not explain why humanist scholars 
believed rhetoric to be the best tool in helping them to achieve their goals. In 
order to address this point, it is necessary to tum again to Aristotle. 
78 
In his Rhetoric (3 rd c BC)~ Aristotle notes that rhetoric is 'an offshoot of 
Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may reasonably be called Politics .. 5 
Because they discussed rhetoric primarily in linguistic tenns, medieval 
schoolmen were, as Vickers makes clear above, not concerned with the political 
aspect of rhetoric. So by reviving the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric, early 
modem humanists subscribed to the view that 'good' literary practice would 
have a decidedly political aim. Moreover, Aristotle says, 'Rhetoric may be 
defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in 
reference to any subject whatever. ,6 To put it slightly differently, the practice of 
rhetoric is the practice of affective persuasion. In the context of the fraught early 
modem political situation, this ability would prove decidedly useful. For as 
Cicero observes in On the Orator (46 BC): 'the wise control of the complete 
orator is that which chiefly upholds not only his own dignity, but the safety of 
countless individuals and of the entire State.' 7 This Ciceronian idea, with its 
'connotations of social bonding, humanity and altruism', 8 had a particular 
resonance for humanist scholars. Consequently in humanist discourse, language 
and its practical application became the measure by which a society was judged 
and, more importantly, ordered. 
Initially, this humanist model expressed itself in a rather uncritical 
admiration of Rome's political and literary achievements. For example, as the 
poet and early humanist Francesco Petrarch admits in On His Own Ignorance 
(1367), 'If to admire Cicero means to be a Ciceronian, I am a Ciceronian. I 
admire him so much that 1 wonder at people who do not admire him' .9 Petrarch' s 
view held considerable sway during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries 
in works such as Coluccio Salutati' s paean to Cicero and Petrarch, On 
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Petrarch's Eloquence (1374).10 Soon however, this rather uncritical view of 
Cicero gave way to a more hardheaded attitude towards his work and to the 
classical heritage in generaL 11 Of particular importance in this respect was the 
work of the Italian scholar Lorenzo Valla. Perhaps best known for revealing the 
so-called 'Donation of Constantine' as a fraud, Valla was a radical in the truest 
sense of the term. 12 Indeed, by questioning established systems of belief in the 
way that he did, his iconoclastic approach seems remarkably similar to those of 
the Reformers who followed him. As Copenhaver and Schmitt point out: 
Time and again ... [Valla] challenged cardinal points of Christian belief -
the superiority of the monastic life, the special efficacy of religious vows, 
the usefulness of sacramental theology - in the conviction that his own 
linguistically acute faith was closer to Gospel purity. 13 
Copenhaver and Schmitt's emphasis on Valla's linguistic acuteness is of 
particular importance. Through his philological approach to questions of textual 
authenticity and authority, Valla was almost single-handedly responsible for 
rigorously historicising the study of semantics. As Richard Waswo argues, Valla 
saw 'the meaning of words as determined not by ontological correspondence, 
but by their manifold relations to other words and by their uses in historical 
contexts.' 14 
Aside from his historicist endeavors, the Italian scholar also questioned the 
age-old distinction between res and verbum. In order to understand the 
importance of the semiotic shift represented in Valla's work, it will first be 
necessary to review the Platonic semiotic model that he engaged with and 
supplanted. To begin with, in traditional Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions 
of language, res refers to a thing, for example a 'chair'. In opposition to this, 
verbum refers to the word 'chair' used to describe it. Therefore when a human 
names an object "chair", the word he uses refers ultimately not to a single chair 
80 
but to the category or idea of chair that exists above the human in the Platonic 
realm of universal archetypes. In his Dialecticae disputationes (1431-53), Valla 
presented a challenge to this system. As he notes: ' It makes no difference 
whether we say, what is wood ... or, what does "wood" ... sign@.,15 Waswo 
explains Valla's semiotic system in this way: 
Proceeding from the twin paradoxes that written words are themselves 
'things', and that the word 'thing' can signify any or all things and words, 
Valla collapses the entire discussion that allowed meaning to be exiled 
from language into some pre-constituted object-world ... There is no 
separate ontological realm to which words must correspond - for the use of 
the word constitutes that realm. 16 
Inevitably Valla's conception of the (non) relationship between res and verba 
brought into question the precise status of language as a referential medium, 
especially if language signifies from the standpoint of verba and not res. 
But while it is easy to stress the uniqueness of Valla's insights, in fact his 
work follows in a long line of Christian semiotics that stresses the fundamental 
distance between res and verba. Copenhaver and Schmitt explain: 
Augustine, Proclus, pseudo-Dionysius, the author of the Book of Causes, 
and many other medieval thinkers had developed a metaphysical scheme in 
which God at one extreme and matter or non-being at the other stood as 
two end-points against which the location of all other entities in the 
continuum of being could be plotted. 17 
The most extreme example of this form of Christian semiotics is of particular 
importance to early modem conceptions of language. The so-called Nominalist 
school promoted an approach to language that offered an identifiable alternative 
to the Platonic model outlined above. Like Valla, the Nominalists argued that 
universals existed solely in the human mind. I8 A universal is only ever a way of 
knowing an individual thing and not a Platonic archetype. There is a further 
significance to Nominalist semiotics. If the realm of res is associated with God 
and the realm of verba with fallen man, it is almost as if the gap between the two 
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semiotic realms mirrors the gap between God and His creation. It is noteworthy 
that in late medieval theology, the advance of the anti-voluntaristic school, 
which taught the unintelligibility of God and the weakness of human will in 
achieving salvation, corresponds to the rise of the Nominalist school. 19 It is also 
no surprise that the Nominalists had an influence on the Reformers with their , 
particular emphasis on man's incapacity to comprehend or reach the Divine.2o 
Indeed as Bryan Crockett has pointed out, 'One factor in the religious disquiet of 
Elizabethan England is the Reformation's indebtedness to the Nominalist 
movement of the late Middle Ages. ,21 
The most important figure of the Nominalist school was William of 
Ockham. In the first place, what is intriguing about Ockham' s semiotic theory is 
the way in which it replicates the conceptual paradigms he also uses in respect of 
God. In the first instance, Ockham does not deny that there are categories of 
mental concepts above verba in the same way that he does not deny the 
omnipotent existence of God. Nevertheless, these concepts are, like God, at odds 
with what humans can either predicate or know of them. As Heiko Oberman 
points out, for Ockham, 'analysis of God's nature and characteristics comes up 
against an impenetrable barrier in the form of God's peculiar and particular way 
of being and perceiving, divine activities which are not structured according 
to ... human logic' .22 This reading applies equally to Ockham' s semiotic theory. 
For example, in his Summa totius logicae (c. 1329), he observes: 
I say vocal words are signs subordinated to mental concepts or contents. By 
this I do not mean that if the word 'sign' is taken in its proper meaning, 
spoken words are properly and primarily signs of mental concepts; I rather 
mean that words are applied in order to signify the very same things which 
are signified by mental concepts. Hence the concept signifies something 
primarily and naturally, whilst the word signifies the same thing 
secondarily ... all authors who maintain that all words signify, or are signs 
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of, impressions in the mind, only mean that words are signs which signify 
secondarily what the impressions of the mind import primarily.23 
Fallen language is essentially a secondary mental construct that has no bearing 
on the primary order of signs. For Ockham, as Martin Elsky notes, ~the mental 
language prior to utterance in speech belongs to no spoken or written language 
and is separate from any vox made significant by convention'. In short, 'speech 
and thought are at odds. ,24 
However, although Platonic conceptions of language may have come under 
attack from scholars like Ockham and Valla, they did not fully succeed in 
eliminating the Platonic tradition. This is especially the case in relation to the 
work of Saint Augustine. Augustine's theory of language was, broadly speaking, 
Neo-Platonic. It was also extremely popular amongst humanists of all 
philosophical persuasions. So despite its debt to the Nominalist school, 
Reformed theology was also deeply influenced by an important humanist 
reading of Augustinian semiotics. This reading arises in relation to Augustine's 
De Doctrina Christiana (c. 397). In this text, he notes that 'Words have gained 
an altogether dominant role among humans in signifying the ideas conceived by 
the mind that a person wants to reveal. ,25 The saint's affective focus is on the 
interior ramifications of language: 'a sign is a thing which of itself makes some 
other things come to mind, besides the impression that it presents to the 
senses.,26 Combined with this internal imperative is Augustine's conception of 
language as a spiritual force leading to the gradual illumination of inward truth 
or caritas. However, as Martin Elsky observes: 'For Augustine, the word 
depends upon the quality of the mind that conceives it.,27 For this reason, there 
is always the possibility 'that one might misspeak because of the mind's fallen 
condition. ,28 Indeed, the last sentence quoted above from De Doctrina 
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Christiana was extremely popular with fifteenth and sixteenth century logicians 
and linguists precisely because of this problem.29 Because the Augustinian 
theory of language was primarily concerned with mental language, naturally 
enquiries came to be structured around the relation of that language to "reality·. 
As E. J. Ashworth has noted: 
Medieval and Renaissance philosophy of language is characterized by two 
central doctrines, which can only be fully understood in conjunction: the 
doctrine that spoken language is purely conventional and the doctrine that 
spoken language corresponds to a mental language that has signification.3o 
So what happens, therefore, when Augustine's neo-Platonic semiotics are 
combined with the insights of the Nominalistic project, denying the human mind 
a priori knowledge of universal mental concepts, and, ultimately, of God?3l 
In the first place, the possibility was raised of human misrepresentation, 
distortion, and falsification when man came to view the world. For English 
Protestant writers on language this meant stressing the essential artificiality of 
discourse. According to George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie (1589), 
'Speech is not naturall to man sauing for his onely habilitie to speake, and that 
he is by kinde apt to vtter all his conceits with soundes and voices diuersified 
many maner of wayes' .32 In The Art of Rhetoric (1553), Thomas Wilson 
explains the reasons behind Puttenham's assertion. Due to the Fall and 'by the 
corruption of this our flesh, man's reason and intendment were both 
overwhelmed.' But when God gave 'the gift of utterance' as Wilson calls it, it 
was not to all men but to the 'faithful and elect' .33 The logical question is: what 
of those who do not fall into this category? Secondly, when combined with what 
Arthur F. Kinney has called the humanistic 'method of imitatio - the art of 
writing by following specific models', 34 sixteenth century theoreticians, 
theologians and artists found themselves in something of a quandary when trying 
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to explain - or imitate - the most magnificent imago of them all, God's created 
universe. If mental language had no connection with 'reality' and if the fallen 
mind necessarily distorted any imago presented to it, could any representation, 
verbal or visual, have any connection to the divine? 
The key to these questions lies in the writings of the Roman rhetorician 
Quintilian, whose influence was so marked in humanist scholarship. In his 
Institutio Oratoria (c. 95 AD) he wrote: 
Whatever is like another object must necessarily be inferior to the object of 
its imitation, just as the shadow is inferior to the substance, the portrait to 
the features which it portrays, and the acting of the player to the feelings 
which he endeavors to reproduce.35 
According to Quintillian, any imitative/performative action must stand at one 
remove from the imitated subject. In this, he was of course repeating a classical 
mimetic commonplace.36 As Plato writes in The Republic (3 rd c BC): 'The art of 
representation is ... a long way removed from truth, and it is able to reproduce 
everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is of a mere 
phenomenal appearance. ,37 So while humanist neo-Platonists like Sir Philip 
Sidney might have asserted the power of representation over philosophy, it is 
important not to disregard a fundamental anti-Platonic strain present within 
Platonic thought itself which stresses the opacity of Platonic semiotics. 
Correspondingly, most early modem theories of language always come up 
against a maddening non-transparency of language, the knowledge that res and 
verba are simultaneously attracted to and repelled by each other. This 
phenomenon can be observed in action in Ben Jonson's Timber or Discoveries 
(1640): 
Language most shows a man: Speak that I may see thee. It springs out of 
the most retired and inmost parts of us, and is the image of the parent of it, 
the mind. No glass renders a man's form or likeness so true as his speech.38 
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Language always frustrates in its very opacity. In its genitive capacity, it is but 
an 'image' of a severely limited, fallible, and at the same time awesome~ human 
mind. But it is more than this. Language is a 'shadow', a 'glass', a mode of 
being which, through its generation, or rather iteration, discloses its paradoxical, 
fallen status. 39 
Calvin and God's 'Beautiful Theatre' 
How, then, did the divergent inheritance of Aristotelian Humanism, 
Nominalism and Platonic semiotics manifest itself in the work of the Reformers? 
In the first place as Debora Shuger has argued, 'The split between res and 
verba .. . parallels a separation of sign from signified dividing visible form from 
spiritual substance. ,40 A good example of this is found in the Reformed doctrine 
of the Eucharist.41 To begin with, the iconoclastic impulses of the Reformation 
were fuelled by a desire to rid worship of an over-reliance on Catholic forms of 
representation such as crucifixes, statues and stained glass. This point 
notwithstanding, in relation to Eucharistic doctrine Protestants actually reversed 
the terms of their own main argument by seeing signs as representations of the 
object in question where Catholics saw signs as the embodiment of the object. I 
am referring here to the figurative or literal status of the host at the mass and the 
interpretation of the words uttered by Christ at the Last Supper: 'hoc est corpus 
meum'; 'this is my body'. Whereas Catholics saw the host as the actual body of 
Christ most Protestants saw it as a representation of Christ's body. 
Paradoxically, Protestantism accused Catholicism of being a religion of 
representation. At the basis of this Reformed contradiction is a deeply 
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paradoxical semiotics as expounded here by Theodore Beza: 'wee confound not 
the signe with the thing signified nor abolish the substance of the signe, but 
make a distinction of that which is conioyned.,42 Or as Bishop John Jewel puts 
it: 'wee put a difference betweene the Signe, and the thing itselfe that is 
signified. ,43 In many respects, the story of the Protestant Reformation is an 
account of how thinkers tried to wrestle with this paradox at the centre of their 
semiotic system. 
A useful way of developing this issue further is in relation to the work of 
the French Calvinist philosopher Peter Ramus. Since the publication of Walter 
Ong's book Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue in 1958, scholars have 
connected the growing influence in the period of the work of Ramus with what 
has been called the visual, or rather spatial aspect of early modem linguistic 
pedagogy. Specifically, this refers to the pedagogical dominance of diagrams, 
tables and illustrations over the unadorned word in texts influenced by Ramus. 
Aside from his attacks on Cicero and Quintilian, Ramus's great insight was to 
re-fonnulate the relationship between logic and rhetoric. As Terence Hawkes 
explains: 
Aristotelian rhetoric was conceived in five parts: Invention, Disposition, 
Elocution, Memory, and Delivery. Each part was thought to make an 
indispensable contribution to the construction of good speech. Ramus 
simply split these into two groups, shifting Invention, Disposition and 
memory under a new heading of dialectic (i.e. logic), and leaving only 
Elocution and Delivery under Rhetoric. This effectively split logic from 
rhetoric, 'reasoning from speech', strengthening the former, and fatally 
weakening the latter ... The dichotomy seemed ultimately self-evident: and 
with logic separable from speech, Ramist 'logic' quickly became logic 
itse If. 44 
Ramus' 'Method', as it came to be called, soon became known and imitated 
throughout Europe and tended to find most favour with Calvinists as well as 
more hard-line Protestants.45 This was due to a number of factors. First, Ramus 
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was doubly attractive to many Protestants being both a Calvinist and a martyr 
(he was among those killed in the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in 1572). 
Secondly, his Method facilitated what Shuger has called an 'inner iconoclasm ... 
a verbal/textual account of cognition' .46 Reading became the key in the Ramist 
system to knowledge in/of the world. Clearly then, with their emphasis on the 
Word (both preached and read), Protestants could claim an intellectual 
confederate in Ramus' Method. 
However, Timothy Reiss has modified and developed somewhat the 
critically commonplace argument that the Method introduced a 'spatial' way of 
thinking. While asserting that 'No one can question that the presence of visual 
metaphors, diagrams and similar devices in Ramist writings is massive' ,47 Reiss 
nonetheless questions the pedagogic - and by inference, the affective - use to 
which Ramist Method was commonly supposed to have been put in the period. 
For example, he notes the 'importance of the visual in the [medieval] manuscript 
tradition' , and observes that 'visual devices of one kind or another had always 
been basic in teaching' .48 The emphasis on teaching is crucial because it allows 
for a distinction to be drawn 
between logic as a teaching process, at least touching the domain of 
rhetoric, and logic as a procedure for understanding reason and acquiring 
knowledge, as a process of discovery. The first made much of visual 
devices. The second had little or nothing to do with them.49 
F or Reiss, the essential point is 'that the spatial was not a way of thought, but a 
method of teaching. What it taught was inseparable from ordered language and 
ideas about such language.' However, 'The ground of discovery ... stilliay in 
language' .50 This conception of language operated on the premise that 'true 
knowledge concerned our conceptions of things, not res ipsas,.51 Until the 
advent in the late seventeenth century of what Reiss calls aesthetic rationalism, 
88 
human language, opaque and fallen, was to remain the central epistemological 
and affective barrier to knowledge of the world for early modem thinkers. 
However, one interesting area that Reiss does not explore is the possibility 
that the pedagogic and epistemological consequences of Ramus' spatiality 
might, in part, have been the result of his engagement with Calvinist 
metaphysics. To start with, it is worthwhile noting the similarities in the spatial 
metaphysics of both John Calvin and Peter Ramus.52 Interestingly, this similarity 
manifests itself in Calvin's work through the metaphor of the theatre, a metaphor 
that appears most frequently in his book of instruction, the Institutes. For Calvin, 
God was the divine 'Artificer'. 53 Indeed, for a thinker who is forever associated 
with the iconoclasm of Reformed religion, it is perhaps slightly surprising to find 
Calvin saying: 'We must therefore admit in God's individual works - but 
especially in them as a whole - that God's powers are actually represented as in 
a painting. ,54 God's powers are presented here in an admittedly high-powered, 
but nonetheless representative sixteenth century humanist vein. In another place, 
Calvin is positively effusive about God's mimetic skills: 'let us not be ashamed 
to take pious delight in the works of God open and manifest in this most 
beautiful theatre. ,55 But while Calvin is happy to examine what is put upon the 
stage, like a somewhat cautious post-structuralist he becomes worried when this 
mimetic mindset is applied to the dramatist himself. Or to put it in Ramist terms, 
when pedagogy is replaced with epistemological enquiry, the intellectual edifice 
reveals its precariousness. 
Calvin notes: • Every figurative representation of God contradicts his 
being' .56 This is deeply problematical. For if language and mimesis are taken 
within the traditional framework as the 'imitation of an object by a subject,5? 
89 
then representation or imitation is held within a metaphysic whereby the 
perception of an object also involves the perception that it refers back to 'a fIrst-
d 1 f .. 1 1" 58 or er rea m 0 empmca rea Ity. But as I have shown, even if this is the case, 
the fallen human mind has no direct knowledge of this 'fIrst order realm' and 
consequently we are obliged to make in Beza's words, 'a distinction of that 
which is conioyned.' Furthermore, by denying this possibility in relation to God, 
Calvin raises a terrifying prospect: that mimesis or imitation must always impel 
the viewer to acknowledge their status in constituting the 'reality' of the mimetic 
or imitated object. This is especially worrying for early modem Protestants. As 
Huston Diehl explains: 'For early Protestants the challenge of living in a world 
where human knowledge is partial, indirect, and limited centered on the need to 
curb the all-to-human tendency to mistake the sign for the thing it signifies. ,59 
To put it slightly differently, the challenge of interpretation was intimately 
bound up with the challenge of salvation. 
F or these reasons, it is fascinating to fmd Calvin going on to utilise the 
trope of the mirror in his discussion of human perception. He notes: 'although 
the Lord represents both himself and his everlasting kingdom in the mirror of his 
works with very great clarity, such is our stupidity that we grow increasingly 
dull towards so manifest testimonies, and they flow away without profiting us. ,60 
Here misrecognition becomes more than a trope; it becomes the focal point of 
Calvinist semiotics. Linda Gregerson has written of the interior, subjective 
ramifications of this system, noting: 'The self that properly sees the self as a sign 
reads in the self a double image: at once a likeness of God and the sin that has 
rendered that likeness obscure. In the book as in the mirror the self sees itself in 
error. ,61 Staring at the statue of God or gazing into the interior mirror become. 
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strangely and almost inexplicably, the same action. In both cases the subjective 
ramifications are frighteningly similar. As Calvin concludes, God 'represent[s] 
himself to us not as he is in himself, but as he seems to US.,62 
Bearing in mind the theatrical basis of this Calvinist metaphysic, the 
question arises as to what happens when the Calvinist subject gazes upon an 
actor? After all, the theatre brings together both res and verba, both spoken 
language and outward signs, and it does so through the potentially transgressive 
figure of the actor, a personage who is both the imitator and the imitated. 
Perhaps the most important point to note here is that imitation was a branch of 
rhetoric, and as Arthur F. Kinney remarks: 'In promoting the study of 
rhetoric ... language [was seen] as a logomachy, or contention, and promoted the 
study of antilogy, the ability to argue either side of a question with comparable 
ease.,63 In other words, an actor was dangerous precisely because he used the 
tools of rhetoric not to argue 'either side of the question', but to persuade the 
viewer of the veracity of the imitation, even to the point of making imitation 
seem more 'real' that 'reality' itself. A case in point is 'The Mousetrap' in 
William Shakespeare's Hamlet (c. 1601), which replicates Claudius' murderous 
actions on stage as he watches. Disturbed by the 'false fire', he abandons the 
play calling for light. 
In De Oratore (46 AD) Cicero explores the transgressive potential of the 
actor. He notes that the orators 'are the players that act real life' but that they 
have 'been taken over by the actors themselves. ,64 This is a hazardous shift for 
Cicero because the actors can be seen to be actively appropriating the wiles of 
the orators themselves. As he goes on to say of the art of the orator: 
all these emotions must be accompanied by gesture - not this stagy gesture 
reproducing the words but one conveying the general situation not by 
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mimicry but by hints ... everything depends on the countenance, while the 
countenance itself is entirely dominated by the eyes ... this is the only part 
of the body capable of producing as many indications and variations as 
there are emotions. 65 
What is so dangerous here is the attractive combination of rhetorical persuasion 
and physical gesture. In the case of the actor on the stage, the danger is 
heightened because the actor is both the imitator and the imitated, both the sign 
and the thing signified. In a Reformed context then, to be persuaded by an actor 
is, potentially at least, to fall even further from God. 
Unsurprisingly, this is the argument used by the anti-theatrical writers who 
attacked the Elizabethan stage. Writing in 1582 against Thomas Lodge, Stephen 
Gosson interestingly pulls his antagonist up on his supposedly faulty knowledge 
of Cicero. Responding to Lodge's suggestion that a play is a 'School mistresse of 
life' , Gosson says: 'It seemeth that Master Lodge saw this in Tulile [sic] with 
other folkes eyes, and not his owne' .66 Lodge is guilty of a false re-presentation 
of Cicero. It is also worth noting how writers like Gosson attacked the ability of 
the actors to 'committ euery sillable to memory,67 because in doing so, they 
were usurping the skills of the sixteenth-century rhetorician par excellence, the 
preacher. But to return to the combination of res and verba presented on the 
stage, Gosson observes: 
The perfectest image is that, which maketh the thing to seeme, neither 
greater nor lesse, then [sic] in deede it is. But in Playes, either those thinges 
are fained, that neuer were ... or if a true Historie be taken in hand, it is 
made like our shadows, 10nJ§est at the rising and falling of the Sunne, 
shortest of all at hie noone. 8 
Gosson's view is directly opposed to that of Sir Philip Sidney in his Apology for 
Poetry (1595).69 In that work, Sidney notes that the poet 'coupleth the general 
notion with the particular example. A perfect picture, I say, for he yieldeth to the 
powers of the mind an image of that whereof the Philosopher bestoweth but a 
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wordish description' .70 But for Gosson, the gap between the image and the 
shadow replicates the gap between God and fallen humankind. Spatially, a play 
and an actor throw this metaphysic into confusion by externalising the 
'distinction of that which is conioyned' through outward signs. 
In order to understand these issues better, I want to turn in the second half 
of this chapter to a specific topic, the semiotic significance of which takes 
further the debates outlined above: clothing. In particular, I intend to examine 
the interesting connections between the debates surrounding ecclesiastical 
apparel and the clothing worn by actors on the Elizabethan stage. Both debates 
arise in relation to questions of authority and they are very much concerned with 
the limits and propriety of what clothes might signify in certain contexts. 7l More 
interestingly than this, they also externalise the paradox at the centre of the 
Reformed conception of res and verba. 
Reformed Semiotics in Action: The Question of Apparel 
After Elizabeth I ascended the throne in 1558, almost her fIrst priority was 
to secure the theological and political unity of the Church.72 One of the most far-
reaching effects of the legislation passed by the Queen in order to achieve this 
aim was a vigorous and often poisonous debate as to the best form of Church 
governance. The question at the centre of this bitter divide within Elizabethan 
society was: how should the church be governed; along Episcopalian or 
Presbyterian lines? Since 1559, the official structure of Church governance had 
been Episcopalian. Essentially, this meant that at the head of the Church stood 
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the Queen and underneath her the Bishops who determined all aspects and forms 
of worship. All ministers were expected to subscribe to the Church's injunctions 
and faced expulsion from their posts if they did not conform. In opposition to 
this centralised system, the Presbyterian wing wanted an organisation whereby 
ministers and elected elders governed their own congregations, preached their 
own sennons and decided their own form of worship. 
Essentially the Presbyterians wanted, in the words of Donna Hamilton, • a 
model for church governance that bypassed royal authority.,73 In 1590, the 
Presbyterian John Penry outlined these opposing positions - not entirely without 
bias: 
To speake more plainly, by reformation we mean, first the rooting out of 
our Church, of al dumb and vnpreaching ministers, all nonresidents, Lord 
Arch - bishops and bishops, commissaries, officials, chancellors, and all 
the rest of the wicked offices that depend vpon that vngodly and tyrannous 
hierarchie of Lord Bishops, together with their gouernment ... Secondly, by 
refonnation we meane the placing in euerie congregation within England 
(as far as possible able men can be provided) of preaching pastors and 
Doctors, gouerning elders, & ministring Deacons ... And these are the onely 
matters that we meane by the reformation. 74 
What is noticeable in Penry's exposition is the division between the practical 
Elizabethan reality of an Episcopalian system, and an ideal, Calvinist, godly and 
Presbyterian structure. Indeed, as Patrick Collinson has written of the 
Presbyterian wing: 'They conducted themselves sometimes like separatists, 
sometimes like tenacious if aggrieved members of the establishment, and the 
discomfort of this ambiguous position was virtually chronic. ,75 It was also 
'chronic' because the frequent deprivations meted out to those on the 
Presbyterian wing led many of them to conclude that society did not contain any 
kinds of structures to validate their ideologies. Such feelings gave rise to the 
bitterly polemical tone that characterises much separatist discourse. 
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One of the requirements of Elizabeth's legislation was that all ministers 
conformed to the Prayer Book. Instituted in Edward VI's reign, but revived and 
revised under Elizabeth, it was considered by many clerics, especially those with 
Puritan leanings, to be 'an imperfect book, culled and picked out of that popish 
dunghill, the mass book full of all abominations.' 76 Issues of contention in the 
Prayer Book centred on the administration of the sacraments, holy days, and 
baptism, kneeling at communion, transubstantiation, and the order of the service. 
But perhaps the most factious issue of all was the injunction concerning what the 
minister could wear. The so-called Admonition controversy ran almost the 
whole length of Elizabeth's reign. 77 
The seeds of this dispute were sown early in the reign. As the Injunctions 
of 1559 state: 
her majesty being desirous to have the prelacy and clergy of this realm to 
be had as well in outward reverence ... willeth and commandeth that all 
archbishops and bishops ... or that be admitted into vocation ecclesiastical ... 
shall use and wear such seemly habits, garments, and such square caps, as 
were most commonly and orderly received in the latter year of the reign of 
King Edward the Sixth.78 
By wearing the prescribed clothing, ministers identified themselves with the 
centralised Church and legitimised its authority. More interesting than this is the 
idea that wearing a particular set of clothes imbues the wearer with an outward 
authority that he might not otherwise possess. Indeed, because clothes are 
nominally only outward signifiers, the possibility arises from a reading of the 
Injunction that the clothes themselves might be said to contain an inherent 
authority. This was precisely the possibility against which the Puritans railed. 
Published in 1572, The View of Popish Abuses says this of the prescribed 
ecclesiastical apparel: 
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There is no order in it, but confusion: no comeliness, but defonnity: no 
obedience, but disobedience, both against God and the prince ... these are as 
the gannents of the idol, to which we should say, avaunt and get thee 
hence. They are the gannents of Balamites, of popish priests, enemies to 
God and all Christians. 79 
By appropriating the discourse of obedience and inverting the authoritative 
correlations of official doctrine in relation to ecclesiastical garments, the View 
argues that authority resides not in clothes but in man-made laws. To wear these 
gannents is disobedience only if the outward signifier correlates with the inward 
'truth' of the law. Patently for many Protestants, it did not. 
In order to contextualise these comments, it will be useful to turn to two 
events in the ecclesiastical careers of the Puritan preachers Arthur Dent and 
Robert Cawdry. One account of Dent's life notes that in 1584, he 'was much 
troubled by Aylmer, his diocesan, for refusing to wear the surplice' .80 It is highly 
probable that as a noted Puritan, Dent would have objected to John Aylmer, the 
Bishop of London, along the same lines as the author of the View. Yet the 
question also arises as to whether like-minded ministers objected to wearing the 
surplice on account of its being prescribed by the sovereign, or because of the 
suspicion that the Queen's injunctions invested gannents with idolatrous 
signifying power? 
Writing in 1702, the church historian John Strype mentions a celebrated 
case in 1587 when the Puritan Robert Cawdry was brought before the High 
Commission under its head, Aylmer, for non-conformity. The trial became 
something of a cause celebre partly because it dragged on for four years, partly 
because Cawdry attempted to sue Lord Burghley, and partly because it marked 
the rise of James Morice, the Puritan lawyer famous for developing ways of 
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circumventing the ex officio oath.81 Of particular relevance here is the argument 
that Aylmer used in order to try and persuade Cawdry to wear the surplice: 
Suppose you were able to keep four or six servants in livery, and one or 
two should refuse to wear your livery, would you take it all in good part? 
Are we not the Queen's servants? And is not the surplice the livery which 
she hath appointed to be worn? And do you think she will be content if we 
refuse to wear it?82 
Effectively Aylmer takes his lead from the official sermon Against Excess of 
Apparel that states: 'all may not wear like apparel, but every one, according to 
his degree, as God hath placed him. ,83 Much excellent work has been done in 
recent years on the social, political, gender motivations behind such decrees. 84 
But what I want to concentrate upon are the religious frameworks underpinning 
such pronouncements, in particular the similarities between Aylmer's argument 
and those of the anti-theatricalists in respect of apparel. 
1583 was not a good year for Bishop Aylmer. As Strype notes, he 'was 
called before the [Privy] Council, and there chidden, and what not; as tho' this 
had been in respect of his severe Actings in the Commission.,85 More 
specifically, it seems that the main reason for the Bishop's summons was that by 
1583 he had removed almost all non-conformists from preaching posts within 
the city.86 Aylmer was not opposed to preaching per se or to lectureships, two 
things close to the heart of the Puritans.87 Rather, it appears that his zealousness 
was connected in no small part to his attempts to stifle the radical leanings of the 
city aldermen, magistrates, and possibly, the Lord Mayor. Sir Francis 
Walsingham's initiative of 1581 to have bi-weekly lectures in the city was 
ardently supported by Aylmer 'so long as candidates passed his scrutiny, and 
were authorized by his seal. ,88 Yet the plan went no further because radicals 
among the committee of aldermen and councilors set up to discuss it rejected the 
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initiative, presumably because it smacked of centralised - and therefore popish -
diktat. Being more and more occupied with Commission business, and with less 
and less time to spend on his diocesan duties, Aylmer did not pursue this matter. 
Indeed, perhaps because of their stance against the Privy Council and the 
Bishop, the city authorities came to be seen by certain sections of London 
society as the group to enfranchise the city from its 'abuses'. 
Aylmer's time as Bishop of London also runs almost precisely parallel to 
both the rise and expansion of the London theatre and the attacks made upon it. 
This is a fact that has, as far as I know, never been mentioned, let alone 
explored. As noted earlier, the anti-theatrical writers of the period were deeply 
concerned, as Aylmer was, with 'proper' standards of dress, and not just on the 
stage. For example, in The Schoo Ie of Abuse published in 1579, Stephen Gosson 
asked: 'How often hath her Maiestie with the graue aduise of her honorable 
Councell, sette downe the limits of apparell to euery degree, and how soone 
againe hath the pride of our harts ouerflowed the chanel?,89 And in his The 
Second Part of the Anatomie of Abuses (1583), Phillip Stubbes writes that 
ministers 'are knowen and discerned from others also, by exteriour habite, and 
attire, as namely by cappe, tippet, surplesse, and such like. ,90 There is something 
curious occurring in both of these examples. 
Stubbes was a well-known Puritan minister and, as Michel Massei has 
shown, Gosson's work 'clearly illustrates the Puritan manner of reasoning. ,91 
Therefore, why should these, to all extents and purposes Puritan writers utilise 
precisely the same arguments that were consistently being deployed against their 
non-conformist brethren in the High Commission? This question is further 
complicated by the fact that, in a reply to Gosson, Thomas Lodge - no Puritan 
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he - finds one of his few points of agreement with Gosson in his attitude towards 
clothing. As Lodge observes: 'as for the state of apparrell and the abuses therof. 
I see it manifestly broken and if I should seeke for example, you cannot but 
offend my eyes ... a simple cote should be fitted to your backe. ,92 What might 
these seeming contradictions signify? 
The answer lies in the common application of the term 'Puritan' to denote 
the anti-theatrical writers, ifby 'Puritan' is meant a zealous extremist opposed to 
any form of theatre. 93 Both Gosson and Stubbes assert that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with the theatre. Rather, the problem arises in the uses, or 
abuses to which the theatre is put, particularly in respect of its various signifying 
practices. Paul Whitfield White is surely correct when he argues that 'we need to 
resist the commonplace notion that the views of Gosson, Stubbes, and Prynne 
typified the mainstream or even 'the left wing' or so-called 'Puritan' segment, of 
Protestant opinion' .94 Rather, Aylmer, Gosson, Lodge and Stubbes utilise the 
same arguments in respect of apparel because each man was engaged in the 
same highly complex debates surrounding what Huston Diehl has termed the 
'iconoclastic agenda of the reformed religion' itself.95 For these reasons, I want 
to look in a little more detail at the works of a writer who brings together the 
Admonition and anti-theatrical controversies surrounding apparel; the Calvinist 
minister Phillip Stubbes. 
Stubbes and Cultural Exchange 
The public stage was a particular 'abuse' that the authorities both inside 
and outside the city were enjoined to do something about. 96 Indeed, there is 
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some evidence that the London city fathers actively encouraged polemics 
opposing the playhouses. For example, Anthony Munday's A second and third 
blast of retreat from plays and Theaters (1580) not only carries the arms of the 
corporation of London, it calls on the London magistrates 'to redresse the 
mischiefs that are likely to ensue by this common plague ... when a matter is 
knowen of them to be euil, it is there part to reforme it.,97 Nonetheless, a few 
years after writing this, Munday can be found penning plays for Philip 
Henslowe. Munday's ideological profligacy only serves to bolster my point 
about the difficulty of associating all anti-theatricalists with the radical 'Puritan' 
wing. When ideological configurations are as much a matter of opportunism and 
economic necessity as of 'belief, social, cultural and textual hegemony cannot 
necessarily be guaranteed. However, probably the most significant texts in the 
war against the playhouses were Phillip Stubbes's The Anatomie of Abuses 
(1583) and The Second Part of the Anatomie of Abuses (1583), books which can 
be seen less as the rantings of an extremist and more as the expositions of a 
'moderate', conformist Puritan. Furthermore, his are the only anti-theatrical texts 
to make an explicit connection between the controversies surrounding 
ecclesiastical apparel and the transvestite stage. For all these reasons, it seems 
that Stubbes' writings are uniquely positioned to offer an insight into the under-
explored connections between these two debates.98 
In The Anatomie of Abuses, Stubbes first addresses the signifying potential 
of clothing itself. Importantly, he does so in an explicitly religious context. He 
notes that there is 'No holynes in apparell', a view that would have certainly 
been held by Aylmer and the authors the View of Popish Abuses. Stubbes then 
goes on to ask: 'why do they than [sic] attribute that to the garments, which is 
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neither adherente to the one nor yet inherente in the other?,99 In the ecclesiastical 
realm, these semiotics appear fairly straightforward; in the context of the stage, 
they possess other resonances. As he writes: 
to weare the Apparel of another sex, is to participate with the same, and to 
adulterate the veritie of his own kinde. Wherefore these Women may not 
improperly be called Hermaphrodita, that is, Monsters of both kindes, half 
women, half men. 100 
The key phrase here is 'the veritie of his own kinde' which in Modem English 
might read 'the truth of his own nature'. For this reason, according to Whitfield 
White, Stubbes is able to argue that 'theatrical impersonation impiously subverts 
one's God given identity and place in the sexual and social order and counters 
the biblical mandate to imitate Christ in all things.' 101 This is certainly the case, 
but I want to focus on another aspect of Stubbes' s argument. 
Why should ecclesiastical garments have no effect upon the wearer, 
whereas garments worn upon the stage are said to have the power to radically 
unfix the self? The answer lies in Stubbes' s deeply contradictory (paradoxical 
even) epistemology in respect of outward signs. He acknowledges, as he must, 
that God 'created man, after his own similitude' .102 However, after the fall, men 
were given clothes - much in the same way that for Thomas Wilson men were 
given language - 'to couer our shame ... & not to feed the insatiable desires of 
mens ... luxurious eies!,w3 In practical terms, this means for Stubbes that 'the 
attyre of Adam, should haue beene & signe, or patterns of mediocritie vnto 
VS.,W4 But his problem is that to assert that clothes are a 'signe' of anything at all 
is necessarily to call into question the semiotic and affective divide between man 
and God instantiated by the founding narrative of the Fall. 
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This assertion can be made clearer by reference to the writing of William 
Perkins. Noting that Adam bequeathed to man 'a depravation of knowledge in 
the things of God', Perkins observes: 
The remnant of God's image in the conscience is an observing and 
watchful power like the eye of a keeper, reserved in man partly to reprove, 
partly to repress the unbridled course of his affections. That which the 
conscience hath received from Adam is the impureness thereof. This 
impurity has three effects. The fIrst is to excuse sin, as if a man serve God 
outwardly he will excuse and cloak his inward impiety ... The second is to 
accuse and terrify for doing good ... The third is to accuse and terrify for 
sin. lOS 
Perkins demonstrates that the divide between man and God in Refonned 
theology is deeply fraught. On the one hand, man is separated from God through 
sin. But, on the other hand, there is a 'remnant' within man of the deity that, 
however faint, institutes a supplementary connection between the two. At the 
semiotic level, this means that the signifier does potentially have the affective 
potential to alter the signified, both on the stage and in the pulpit. 'It is trulye 
said', observes Stubbes, that 'sublata causa, tollitur effectus: But not, subrepto 
effectu tollitur causa. Take away the cause, and the effect falleth, but not 
contrarylye' .106 Or as Othello more eloquently puts it in a rather different 
. h .. hi' (V . . 1) 107 context: 'It IS t e cause, It IS t e cause, my sou . 11. • 
For these reasons, it seems that there is perhaps a much stronger connection 
between the ecclesiastical debates concerning apparel and the scandal of cross-
dressing on the London stage. Indeed, it has also not been noted just how similar 
the anti-theatricalists' rhetoric is in respect of cross-dressing to those Protestant 
polemicists who railed against Catholic ecclesiastical clothing. This is Robert 
Crowley, veteran Puritan and editor of Piers Plowman, writing of Catholic 
apparel in 1566: 
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How these garments haue bene abused, is manifest to as manv as haue 
considered the doings of Idolaters, sorcerers, & coniurers. Fo~ all these doe 
nothing without them. The Idolater dare not appeare before his Idoll to 
offer any sacrifice, vnIesse he be in his sacrificing garmentes. 108 
The idolatrous stage and the idolatrous old faith go hand in hand in respect of the 
discourses used to attack them and in terms of their transgressive signifying 
power. Indeed, the influential Calvinist divine and Professor of Divinity at 
Cambridge, William Whitaker, states explicitly what Crowely only hints at: 'Our 
religion is not like yours [the Catholics], consisting in outward shew of gestures, 
garments, and behauiour: so that our external I Ornaments may be changed, 
without any alteration or change of our doctrine.' 109 The argument is 
unmistakable; certain clothes, worn in certain places, at certain times have the 
ability to 'alter' the inward state of the wearer. 
It is for these reasons that Stephen Greenblatt's notion of 'cultural 
exchange' in relation to early modern apparel requires to be reworked 
somewhat. As he writes in Shakespearean Negotiations, the physical space 
within which a particular piece of clothing was worn was paramount: 
The transmission of a single ecclesiastical cloak from the vestry to the 
wardrobe may stand as an emblem of the more complex and elusive 
institutional exchanges that are my subject: a sacred sign, designed to be 
displayed before a crowd of men and women, is emptied, made negotiable, 
d d fr ... th 110 tra e om one mstltutlOn to ano er. 
While agreeing generally with Greenblatt's thesis, the case of the anti-
theatricalists suggests the need for some shifts of emphasis in his argument. In 
the first place, Greenblatt associates 'negotiation' explicitly with exchange. But 
the problem here is that it might be presumed that only in and through exchange 
did clothes become subject to semiotic, and therefore cultural emptying and 
negotiation. Yet as I have demonstrated, exchange per se was not the immediate 
issue for writers such as Stubbes and Lodge: the cultural and ideological context 
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in which these clothes were appropriated, however, was. Undoubtedly the 
protean early modern marketplace threw the 'meaning' of clothing into doubt at 
all levels of society. Jean Christophe Agnew has noted that 
On the one hand, linguistic usage indicates that exchange had moved 
outward, as the expanded circulation of commodities; on the other, it 
suggests that exchange had moved inward, as a subjective standard of 
commensurability. III 
With the self as the arbiter of 'a subjective standard of commensurability' 
ineluctably bound up with the outward imperatives of exchange, the dialectic 
upon which subjectivity was fought out became all the more fraught as that 
market burgeoned. Quite simply, in this context the Church had so much more to 
lose in admitting both the potency of the market and, more importantly in this 
case, the potential for outward signs to alter inward subjectivity. 
Secondly, and leading on from this, if Greenblatt is correct in stating that, 
for the theatre, 'the acquisition of clerical garments was a significant 
appropriation of symbolic power' 112 then clearly it might be expected that 
writers like Gosson or Stubbes would have something to say about such flagrant 
misappropriation. They do not. In fact, the wearing of ecclesiastical garments on 
the 'secular' stage is very rarely, if ever, mentioned by Elizabethan anti-
theatrical writers. So while Greenblatt is undoubtedly correct in drawing 
attention to the malleability of semiotic correlations in relation to outward 
gannents, care needs to be taken not to make more of the appearance of old 
Church gannents on the stage than in fact existed. Indeed, when the anti-
theatricalists do discuss ecclesiastical clothing, it is rarely in direct relation to 
their main topic of discussion, the stage. 
In The Second Part of the Anatomie of Abuses, Stubbes highlights this 
realisation. In a reply to a query as to whether it is 'lawfull for a minister of th[ e] 
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Gospell to weare a surplesse, a tippet or forked cappe', one of the interlocutors 
replies: 
As they are commanuded by the Pope the great Antichrist of the worlde, 
they ought not to weare them, but as they be commaunded, and inioyned by 
a Christian Prince, they maie weare them without any scruple of 
conscience. But if they should repose any religion, holinesse or 
sanctimonie in them, as the doting Papists doe, than [sic] doe they 
greeuouslie offend, but wearing them as things meere indifferent (although 
it be controuersiall whether they bee things indifferente or not) I see no 
cause why they maie not vse them. 113 
For such a normally effective polemicist, Stubbes's tortured logic and strained 
equivocating only serve to highlight the faultlines within his argument. Although 
ostensibly a passage about the various authorities of secular and ecclesiastical 
rulers, the pith of the matter lies elsewhere. What Stubbes cannot get away from 
is the realisation that the inability to separate completely res from verba in the 
ecclesiastical realm always threatens to make the wearer a papist by proxy. The 
perception that clothes are not 'things indifferente' exposes a much wider 
cultural anxiety predicated upon the simultaneously decorous and rebarbative 
imperatives of language itself. To deconstruct the exigencies of Reformed 
theological semiotics is, ultimately, to deconstruct the Protestant God. It was this 
realisation, perhaps more than any other that terrified Protestant thinkers. 
With its iconoclastic impulse to distance res from verba, Reformed 
theology led, almost inevitably, to the conclusion that the divine could not have 
a visible locus on earth. 114 This discourse was not exclusive to the world of 
outward representations such as pictures, statues, and stained glass. It also 
penetrated the inner recesses of the human interior. 'But somewhat 
paradoxically', writes Debora Shuger, 'the Protestant impulse to deny the sacred 
a visible locus led to (or at least coexisted with) a massive endeavor to 
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instantiate the holy in some sort of institutional form. That is the essence of 
English Presbyterianism.' 115 Much as they tried to convince themselves to the 
contrary, Protestants of whatever ecclesiastical and political allegiance could 
never fully rid themselves of a deep cultural suspicion that res and verba were 
connected, if only in a supplementary sense. The Episcopalian and the 
Presbyterian wings employ the same discourse in relation to apparel because for 
each writer, to drive a final metaphysical wedge between res and verba, between 
the garment and its outward signification, would mean ultimately that Reformed 
semiotics could no longer be, in the words of Michel Foucault, 'coeval with the 
institution of God.' 116 The intemalisation of such a rationalist project would not 
be undertaken for perhaps another one hundred years. 117 So in practice, what 
Elizabethan discussions of apparel reveal is a deeply unsettled participatory 
consciousness, a mode of discourse that, according to Shuger, 'tends not to 
separate words from things', 118 jarring markedly against the Nominalist-inspired, 
iconoclastic impulses of Reformed theology. Foucault's assertion in The Order 
of Things that during the sixteenth century 'Things and words were to be 
separated from each other' 119 does not do justice, in my view, to the complexity 
of Reformed semiotics. 
In her study The Reformation of the Subject, Linda Gregerson fmds at the 
foundations of Reformed theological semiotics a deeply equivocal view of 
language. She writes: 
Language was at once the symptom of the Fall and its only plausible 
remedy, the reiterative trace of providential history and of the transgression 
with which history began, the instrument by which humans know (and 
make) their place in the created world. Language was the mirror in which 
the creature might behold his likeness and take the measure of exile. 120 
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In the ecclesiastical realm, to ponder the semiotics of apparel was also to 
confront the strange reality of an absent/present deity. And on the protean, 
verbose, often socially transgressive London stage, a man wearing woman ~ s 
clothing released the paradoxes of Calvinist semiotics by externalising the 
internal divisions of that discourse. Because they had to insist on the • distinction 
of that which is conioyned' through outward signs, Calvinist writers could never 
fully reform semiotics. This profound realisation inevitably affected Calvinist 
conceptions of subjectivity and in particular the subject's relationship to God. In 
the next chapter therefore, I outline in much greater detail the development of 
Calvinism in Elizabethan England before going on to look at how, in relation to 
the political and semiotic movements outlined in the first two chapters, the 
Calvinist subject might have signified. 
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Chapter Three 
The Development of Calvinism in Early Modern England 
Reforming Politics 
The history of religious change and development in England also suffers 
from the predicament posed by historiographical periodisation that I outlined in 
the Introduction. How is a phenomenon like the Reformation in England to be 
accounted for without at least some recourse to a split between 'medieval' and 
'Renaissance' periods? This difficulty is reflected in historical narratives of this 
perceived split. So while it is true to say that in 1400 the religion of England was 
Catholicism and that in 1600 it was Protestantism, accounts of the two hundred 
years that divide both dates differ markedly. As the historian Jack Scarisbrick 
points out: 
modem tastes have tended to prefer the grand, long-term explanations of 
big events (especially if they give pride of place to impersonal changes in 
social structures or aspirations) and partly from the fact that a basically 
Whiggish and ultimately' Protestant' view of things is still a potent 
influence on our thinking ... we still find it difficult to do without the model 
of late-medieval decline and alienation - followed by disintegration and 
then rebirth and renewal- just as we still find it difficult to believe that 
major events in our history have lacked beep-seated causation or have ever 
run fundamentally against the grain of the 'general will.' 1 
His reading of the Reformation as being 'only in a limited sense popular and 
from "below",2 has not been accepted by all scholars, but it is undoubtedly the 
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case that due to historians such as Scarisbrick, recent interpretations of the shift 
from Catholicism to Protestantism have been much more attuned to the vibrancy 
and complexity of the medieval inheritance. To take one particularly important 
example, Eamon Duffy's magisterial study The Stripping o/the Altars: 
Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580 demonstrates in great detail how 
'late medieval Catholicism exerted an enormously strong, diverse, and vigorous 
hold over ... the people up to the very moment of the Reformation.' As Duffy 
concludes, 'the religion of Elizabethan England was ... full of continuities with 
and developments of what had gone before.' This is because 'the Reformation 
was a violent disruption, not a natural fulfilment, of most of what was vigorous 
in late medieval piety and religious practice. ,3 In order, therefore, to explain 
how, in the light of these assertions, Elizabethan England adopted Calvinism at 
all, it will be necessary to examine briefly the events that most deeply coloured 
the establishment of the Elizabethan Church. 
It would be easy to assume that after Henry VIII's break with Rome in 
1534 one of the initial moves of the fledgling English Church would be to defme 
its opposition - unsurprisingly - in relation to its opponents. In reality, matters 
were rather more complicated. First, Henry's assertion of royal supremacy was a 
political act designed primarily to assert the primacy of an English king over his 
realm and its laws against the 'foreign' jurisdiction of the papacy. Yet the 
obvious consequence of Henry's actions - the adoption of theological reform-
was not pursued as vigorously as some had hoped. As Christopher Haigh notes, 
Henry 'was not willing to take his realm into schism. It was politic to have 
preachers and government pamphleteers attack papal pretensions, but Henry was 
slow to make formal rejection of the primacy of Rome. ,4 When that rejection did 
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come, once more it had defmably political consequences: Henry's most 
important legacy was the consolidation of a legal, theological and political 
bulwark that inscribed the English monarch as head of the English Church. The 
association of the monarch with an instituted programme of Reformed religion, 
however, would suffer many setbacks in the coming decade. 
The radical political restructuring of the nation state undertaken during 
Henry's reign, however it was conceived, did not easily translate into material 
practice and it was not helped by the personal vicissitudes of Henry's children. 
In the eleven-year period after the King's death, England reverted from radical 
Protestantism under Edward VI to militant Catholicism under Mary I and then 
back to Protestantism under Elizabeth 1. This instability, not to mention Mary's 
state-endorsed persecution of Protestants, had the effect of seriously weakening 
the political institution of the English state by the time that Elizabeth ascended 
the throne. One of the new Queen's great strengths was her ability to see that 
hegemony requires at the very least the appearance of political stability. Because 
Church and state were inextricably linked in the person of the monarch, the 
problem of defIDing the theological stance of the new Church was, for Elizabeth, 
paramount. As Donna Hamilton observes: 
the definitional problems included formulating the terms of the English 
monarch's power over the church (formulations that often also impinged on 
defmitions of his power over temporal affairs), as well as formulc~.ting an 
English church that would be united in liturgy and church polity.) 
With the passing of the Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy in 1559, Elizabeth 
had, at least in deed, secured the basis for a national Church polity. But as Haigh 
points out: 
Elizabeth and her allies had achieved their majority by the intimidation and 
imprisonment of bishops, and by buying off the nobles ... The Church of 
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England was established by the merest whisper, a margin of three votes: a 
margin achieved by political chicanery'. 6 
As a result of this political brinkmanship, the Church of England was never quite 
the institutional rock portrayed by many of its apologists.7 
Elizabethan Calvinism 
As I remarked in chapter one, Elizabeth adopted Calvinism for political as 
much as for religious reasons. It is undoubtedly the case that in the period 'The 
political setting of doctrinal evolution was above all monarchical.,8 But how, 
specifically, did Calvinism come to permeate early modem England and what 
were its theological constituents? The influence of John Calvin can be discerned 
in England as early as the 1530s in the acerbic anti-Catholic plays of John Bale.9 
It was not long before the actual writings of the Genevan reformer appeared in 
England. Elizabeth herself translated chapter one of the Institutes in 1545.10 Part 
of the same work (Book three, chapters six to ten) first appeared in 1549 in 
Thomas Broke's Communicacion of a Christen Man, and the whole of the 
Institutes were translated twelve years later in the important edition of Thomas 
Norton. Various abridgements of the Institutes soon followed, the first by 
Edmund Bunney in 1576. This was soon superseded in popularity by William 
Lawne's edition published in 1583. 11 However care needs to be taken here. It 
would be erroneous to see the Institutes necessarily as Calvin's most influential 
work in early modem England. After all the Institutes was not a medieval 
Summa but intended as a textbook for aspiring ministers. 12 Important conduits 
through which Calvin's thought were also disseminated were his biblical 
commentaries and especially his sermons. For example, his vastly popular 
120 
sermons on Timothy and Titus, first published in 1579, were almost certainly 
better known to a wider public that the Institutes. What this demonstrates is that 
the spread of Calvinism in early modem England was as dependent upon the ear 
as it was on the book. Indeed, it was in sermons preached from Paul's Cross in 
London and from pulpits across the country by Calvinist ministers and preachers 
that Elizabeth's subjects first encountered the practical application of Calvinist 
doctrine to their lives. 13 It is also worth noting that Calvinism was not only 
disseminated via the works of Calvin himself. Other Reformed theologians who 
were popular in early modem England include Philip Melancthon, Martin Bucer 
and Heinrich Bullinger. 14 In addition to these figures, doctrinal Calvinists such 
as Peter Martyr, Wolfgang Musculus and Girolamo Zanchius were widely read 
and helped to spread the Calvinist word. 15 
There are five main distinguishing theological features of doctrinal 
Calvinism as it was understood in early modem England: sola Scriptura, the 
denial of free will, the application of grace in the process of salvation, 
justification by faith and predestination. 16 For reasons of clarity I will discuss 
each of these theological positions in turn. In the first place, Calvinism shared 
with all other Reformed religions a focus on the doctrine of scriptura sola: the 
Bible as the central text of the Christian commonwealth. In Calvin's words: 'in 
order that true religion may shine upon us, we ought to hold that it must take its 
beginning from heavenly doctrine and that no one can get even the slightest taste 
of right and sound doctrine unless he be a pupil of Scripture.' 17 In England, 
though, this issue was somewhat complicated. Since Henry VIII authorised 
Miles Coverdale's so called 'Great Bible' in 1538, the Bible had officially been 
available in England in the vernacular. 18 Nevertheless, with the accession of 
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Mary, the vernacular Bible was discarded and the Latin Vulgate was once again 
favoured. As a result of this unacceptable Catholic modification, the exiled 
Protestant scholars William Whittington, Anthony Gilby and Thomas Sampson 
set about producing their own English edition, the so-called Geneva Bible. When 
Elizabeth came to the throne, this Bible became extremely popular in England, 
largely due to its explanatory notes, the scholarly formation of its text and the 
Calvinistic emphasis of its exegesis. Indeed, its appeal is reflected in the fact that 
the state-produced Bishops' Bible of 1561 failed to supplant the Geneva Bible in 
popular and scholarly affection. 19 
It is possible that, behind the enduring popularity of the Geneva Bible, lay 
a residual Calvinistic mistrust of any centralised power claiming primacy over 
the authority of Scripture.20 The Bible is of such importance for Calvin that he 
places its authority above that of the external institution of the Church. As he 
notes: 'because the church recognizes Scripture to be the truth of its own God, as 
a pious duty it unhesitatingly venerates Scripture. ,21 Furthermore Calvin also 
makes an important connection between the reading of Scripture and the inner 
life of the individual subject. He writes: 'If we desire to provide in the best way 
for our consciences ... we ought to seek our conviction in a higher place than 
human reasons, judgements, or conjectures, that is, in the secret testimony of the 
Spirit. ,22 The Bible is verified by the subject as well as through the connection 
between Spirit and conscience noted in chapter one. As such, the subject is able 
to apprehend 'manifest signs of God speaking in Scripture. ,23 However, if all 
can equally apprehend God through the Bible, is it not possible to conclude that 
all are equal before God? Not so says Calvin: 'God deems worthy of singular 
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privilege only his elect, whom he distinguishes from the human race as a 
whole. ,24 
More than any other major Reformed theologian, Calvin placed great 
emphasis on the depravity of the human subject before God. He explains: 
God would not have us forget our original nobility, which he had bestowed 
upon our father Adam, and which oUght truly to arouse in us a zeal for 
righteousness and goodness. For we cannot think upon either our fIrst 
condition or to what purpose we were formed without being prompted to 
meditate upon immortality, and to yearn after the Kingdom of God. That 
recognition, however, far from encouraging pride in us, discourages us and 
casts us into humility. For what is that origin? It is that from which we have 
fallen. What is that end of our creation? It is that from which we have been 
completely estranged, so that sick of our miserable lot we groan, and in 
groaning we sigh for that lost worthiness.25 
In what will come to be seen as a typically Calvinist move, the subject appeals to 
a particular locus of authority, in this case the condition of mankind before the 
fall, and in doing so reveals the fundamental groundlessness of Calvinist 
subjectivity. This principle also applies to free will for since mankind lost its 
original state due to the application of this faculty, so it cannot regain that state 
through the appliance of the very faculty that caused it to disappear in the fIrst 
place. Free will is fundamentally perverted and, unlike in Catholic doctrine, 'is 
not sufficient to enable man to do good works' .26 
How does the subject come to reconciliation with God? The answer is 
provided through Calvin's doctrine of grace, bestowed solely by God on those 
whom He chooses. If grace is given to the subject then through the workings of 
faith that subject may potentially come to knowledge of their justifIcation. This 
does not mean, however, that the subject has a voluntaristic influence over his or 
her own salvation. Calvin explains: 'as regards justifIcation, faith is something 
merely passive, bringing nothing of ours to the recovering of God's favour but 
receiving from Christ that which we lack.,27 To put it differently. through Christ 
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the Calvinist subject encounters the lack at the centre of its subjectivity. Franyois 
Wendel summarises this process in the following way: 'Christ, by bringing 
salvation to us, does not free us from external constraint but ... he has to renovate 
us in ourselves by rectifying our deformed will and orientating it towards 
righteousness. ,28 It is significant that Christ does not provide the subject with 
repletion but only orientates it towards the good. This is because of Calvin's 
conception of Christ as mediator; an Augustinian term fITst encountered in 
chapter one and of great critical importance in all Reformed theology. 29 
Although I go into greater detail concerning the specific function and application 
of Christ as mediator in chapter five, for the moment it is enough to say that 
through the figure of the mediator, man is forced to confront the possibility of 
his election or reprobation. 
As noted earlier, Christ's homoousia consists of the consubstantial divine 
and human 'natures'. Neither of these natures can be separated from the other in 
orthodox Christian theology. Yet as Wendel observes: 
Calvin affirms equally and more clearly still, that the distinction between 
the two natures is indispensable if we do not want to end by admitting a 
change in the divinity itself, brought about by the fact of the incarnation 
and necessarily equivalent to a diminution of it. This is a very important 
aspect of Calvin's theological thought, and perhaps what is most original in 
. jo It. 
Although this may seem like a relatively minor theological quibble, in fact it is 
crucial at a conceptual level to understanding the production and expression of 
subjectivity in early modem England. In relation to Christ, this doctrine is 
known as the extra Calvinisticum which, as Richard Muller explains, means that 
'the Word is never fully united to but never totally contained within the human 
nature [of Christ] and, therefore, even in incarnation is to be conceived of as 
31 I· h· beyond or outside of (extra) the human nature.' For Reformed theo oglans, t IS 
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facet of Christo logical existence was explained through the maxim Finitum non 
capax infiniti (the finite is incapable of the infinite).32 Or to put it another way, 
the divine always exists in a supplementary relationship to the human. I intend to 
demonstrate in this thesis that in the early modem period, this Christological 
maxim is reinscribed at the human level. For by allowing, with however many 
qualifications, a distinction to be made between Christ's divine and human 
natures, the Reformed Christ bears a striking similarity to the divided subject of 
early modem England who is made profoundly aware of the gulf between his 
divine origin and his fallen state, an awareness that often seems constitutive of 
subjectivity itself. To this end, it is the mediator who makes predestination a 
reality. For Calvin, 'we are all barred from God's presence, and consequently 
need a Mediator, who should appear in our name and bear us upon his 
shoulders ... so that we are heard in his person' .33 According to Calvin, 
humankind is predestined to either election or damnation and Christ's role as 
mediator is so important because He 'has rendered election effectual, for by his 
sacrifice he has appeased the wrath of God and has restored to its efficacy the 
love that God has dedicated to the elect of all eternity.,34 
Doctrinal and Critical Dissent 
What I have summarised above is an outline of all but one of the major 
points of the Calvinistic doctrine that comprised the official theology of the 
Elizabethan Church. The spread of that doctrine was certainly abetted by some 
influential support. Alistair Fox writes: 
Calvinist beliefs were espoused by many of the most powerful figures in 
the lay and clerical establishments, including the Queen's favourite, Robert 
125 
Dudley, Earl of Leicester and his circle (Philip Sidney among them), her 
Secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham, and her chief minister. William Cecil. 
Lord Burghley.35 - ~ 
And at both Oxford and Cambridge, Calvinist doctrine was taught to aspiring 
ministers.36 But although Calvinism had the imprimatur of political and 
educational respectability, it would be a mistake to see its development as one of 
unproblematic acceptance. As Peter Lake says of the Elizabethan Calvinist 
consensus, 'hegemony is not monopoly. Despite Calvinist predominance, there 
were anti-Calvinists in the Elizabethan and Jacobean church. ,37 Nonetheless, 
most of the objections of the anti-Calvinists did not begin to have serious 
political consequences until the final years of James I's reign and the accession 
of Charles I in 1625. As Nicholas Tyacke points out 'Calvinism was the de/acto 
religion of the Church of England under Queen Elizabeth and King James' .38 In 
doctrinal terms 'Calvinism remained dominant in England throughout the first 
two decades of the seventeenth century,39 and this was the Calvinism formulated 
during Elizabeth's time on the throne.40 
One of the major effects of the Calvinist consensus in religion was the 
development of personal piety; an advancement that, paradoxically, did not 
appear to offer comfort to many individuals but which instead manifested a 
feeling of profound anxiety within the self. Such was the importance of personal 
piety within the Calvinist schema of salvation that cases of what early modern 
writers called 'despair' rose markedly during the latter part of Elizabeth's reign. 
As John Calvin wrote: 'if a man be once desperate, he gieuth himself from euill 
to worse, and becometh voyde of all shame. ,41 In a society with an almost 
obsessive focus upon the ars moriendi, the art of dying well, the only thing 
worse than the thought of evil was the thought of an evil death.42 To despair was 
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to lose sight of God, and as such, was the theological and affective state believed 
to lead to suicide. Indeed, according to John Stanchniewski, by the beginning of 
the seventeenth century such was the proliferation of suicides in England that the 
situation was commonly believed to have reached 'epidemic levels. ,43 This 
anxiety was not just personal; it was also providential. As Robert Burton wrote: 
'It is controverted by some whether a man so offering violence to himself, dying 
desperate, may be saved, ay or no?,44 What Burton hints at is that the anxiety 
associated with early modem piety was, very often, precipitated by the inward 
debate as to whether one was elect in God or not. And the outward manifestation 
of this affective wrangling was, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
sometimes as likely to be self-violence as it was outward godliness. As Charles 
Taylor says of this system: 'Each person stands alone in relation to God: his or 
her fate - salvation or damnation - is separately decided. ,45 Within this 
theological and affective framework, subjectivity was negotiated and was 
negotiable. 
What I have said above refers to the last and undoubtedly the most 
contentious aspect of Calvinist doctrine in early modem England, namely 
predestination. Over the past twenty-five years or so there has been a long-
running and important debate as to what precisely this doctrine meant during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and how theologically central it was. In 
order to explain the topic fully, it will be necessary to outline the parameters of a 
debate that has been almost completely disregarded by literary scholars in 
accounts of early modem subjectivity. First, in 1979 R. T. Kendall published 
Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649, a book that was to playa critical role in 
the way in which scholars debated Calvin's reception in England. Fundamental 
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to Kendall's thesis is his reading of Cal vin' s doctrine of the atonement. 
According to Kendall, the Reformer believed 'that Christ died indiscriminately 
for all men. ,46 However, as he also goes on to note, even though 'Calvin ... thinks 
that Christ dies for all', it is the case that 'all are not saved.,47 This theological 
double bind in Calvin's work opened the way for his followers to develop the 
logical consequences of this theology in relation to predestination. 
Accordingly, argues Kendall, Calvin's successor in Geneva Theodore Beza 
promulgated the notion that 'Christ died for the elect only' ,48 a doctrinal 
distinction that has given rise to the scholarly notion of 'Calvin against the 
Calvinists' .49 In England, Kendall argues, theologians took up the Bezan 
position on predestination, the most noticeable of which was William Perkins, 
the pre-eminent Calvinist divine of the period. As a result of this shift, the debate 
turned dramatically to assurance of election or reprobation, or 'justification' to 
give it its theological name: did Christ die for all men or not? Did Christ die for 
me? Ifhe did, how might I know? If he did not, what shall I do? This is a 
notoriously slippery topic. In the first place, to offer unconditional assurance was 
to diminish the weight of both God's law and individual conscience. For 
example, in the middle of discussing the assurance of election amongst men, 
Perkins suddenly warns that in fact those who believe they are justified 'may be 
reprobates and ... no more true members than are the noxious humours in a man's 
body,.5o For this reason, the argument was often debated from the standpoint of 
reprobation. As Kendall goes on to note, the reprobate may believe that they are 
saved though in fact they are damned: 'The ineffectual calling of the non-elect 
is ... so powerful that the subject manifests all the appearances - to himself and 
others - of the elect.' As he rightly points out, 'The pastoral implications of such 
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t hi ,51 I . . a eac ng are enonnous. t IS Important to state at this point that it does not 
follow from this last quotation that assurance of reprobation was any easier to 
attain than assurance of election. If either of these possibilities were the case 
then Calvinism would not have held the great authoritative and affective power 
that it did. Uncertainty was a necessary constitutive element of personal piety: 
certainty of one's predestined status was only truly confinned after death. 
Kendall's reading of Calvin against the Calvinists has provoked fierce 
debate. On the one hand, scholars like Nicholas Tyacke who in Anti-Calvinists: 
The Rise of English Arminianism c.1590-1640 has argued that in early modern 
England, a Calvinist consensus focusing on limited atonement can be defmed 
along the same lines outlined by Kendall.52 On the other hand, scholars such as 
Paul Helm in Calvin and the Calvinists and Peter White in Predestination, 
Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the 
Reformation to the Civil War have rejected Kendall's argument. Noting that both 
Elizabeth and James legislated against the preaching of hard-line limited 
atonement, White argues that there was no 'Calvinist consensus' in the early 
modern period and that scholarly usage of the term predestination 'was usually a 
synonym for election, and excluded reprobation.,53 While this is true in a strictly 
defined theological sense,54 in practice, in the casuistry manuals and sermons of 
the period, White's literalist approach is not generally maintained as will 
become clear. More importantly than this, both White and Helm show that, as 
Helm puts it, 'Calvin taught that Christ's death procured actual remission of sins 
for the elect, and that in dying Christ died specifically for the elect.,55 HoweveL 
although Calvin says, 'the doctrine of salvation, which is said to be reserved 
solely and individually for the sons of the church, is falsely debased when 
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presented as effectually profitable to all' ,56 it would not be correct, in the light of 
his theology as a whole, to say that he advances a doctrine of limited atonement. 
Nonetheless, as with much else in Calvin's work, his exposition often seems to 
point in an altogether more radical direction: the logical consequence of 
statements like those above was an endorsement of limited atonement. This 
development, inspired by the work of Beza, is clearly reflected in the work of 
later Calvinists. 57 Wolfgang Musculus writes that' grace is geuen to the elect 
onely, whome God hath chosen in Christ Jesus before the beginning of the 
worlde, vnto that purpose, that the glorye of hys grace may be auaunced [sic] in 
them.,58 Or as Girolamo Zanchius argues, 'although the grace of redemption, 
saluation and etemalllife which God bestoweth, be earnestly ... offered vnto all 
men by the preaching of the gospell' it is only 'communicated ... vnto those who 
(being from the beginning chosen and predestinate vnto it in Christ, as in the 
head of all the elect, that they should bee his members and so made partakers of 
saluation),.59 For many of Calvin's followers, ifnot for Calvin himself, Christ 
died only for the elect and as John Pelling warned in a sermon of 1607, this 
. fl· b f . ,60 doctnne was 'not a matter 0 specu atlOn, ut 0 practIce. 
This doctrine has a number of important consequences. To begin with, the 
'Calvin against the Calvinists' camp are mistaken in their assumption that Calvin 
taught a doctrine of universal atonement and that later Calvinists departed from 
this teaching. Second generation Calvinists like Beza and Perkins did teach 
limited atonement but in so doing they were developing, not departing from, a 
particular strand of Calvin's theology. In relation to the question of justification, 
then, assurance of election becomes even more pressing if man is taught that, as 
Beza puts it, Christ 'is with his electe and shalbe vntill the ende of the world.,61 
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But this does not mean that man may ever be subjectively assured of election: 
'To be assured of our saluation by faith in lesus Christ, is nothing lesse than 
., B 62 arrogance or presumptIOn, notes eza. Nor can the reprobate ever fully be 
sure of their status. As Peter White observes: 'Beza agreed with Calvin that one 
could never be certain who belonged to the ranks of the reprobate.,63 It often 
seems that if the Reformers allowed the subject knowledge of their predestined 
status then this would, in some way, correspond to allowing them to actively 
participate in their own salvation, a possibility that could not be countenanced. 
The doctrine of limited atonement that was taught in Universities and preached 
from pulpits in early modem England inscribes subjective experience as the 
guarantor of the individual encounter with the stark binary of predestination. It is 
highly significant therefore that through Christ as mediator, this divine plan is 
made manifest. Indeed it might even be possible to say that the Calvinist 
conception of the mediator - a function neither fully of heaven nor fully of earth 
- seems to mirror the double bind of the subject, caught between the possibilities 
of election or reprobation. 
The Mirror of Conscience 
In order to explain how the tension engendered by the doctrine of limited 
atonement manifested itself in early modem writing, I want to further the 
examination of the trope of the glass/mirror that I initiated in the last chapter. As 
Calvin frequently states, Christ 'is the mirror wherein we must, and without self-
deception may, contemplate our own election.,64 However, this Christological 
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principle is complicated by the most famous presentation of the trope in the 
Bible, St. Paul's references in Corinthians. The first comes from 1 Corinthians: 
'For nowe we see thorow a glasse darkely: but then shall wee see face to face. 
Nowe I know in part: but then shall I knowe euen as also I am knowen. ,65 In 
Thomas Timme's 1577 translation of Calvin's Commentarie vpon S. Paules 
Epistles to the Corinthians, the Reformer observes that the saint's reference to 
the glass here 'is the application of the similitude, The manner of knowledge 
which we haue nowe, dooth belong to imperfection, as it were to childhoode. ,66 
Resisting the temptation to read this exegesis as a proto-Lacanian formulation of 
the mirror stage, it is clear that Calvin's glass is a mirror of optical 
misrecognition. 
Calvin's greatest difficulty is with Paul's contradictory and commonly 
disregarded alternative reading of the mirror in 2 Corinthians. In this reading, the 
saint says: 'we all behold as in a mirrour the glorie of the Lord with open face,.67 
This assertion stands in direct opposition to 1 Corinthians. Accordingly, Calvin 
notes: 
Paule sayth, that we behold the glory of God with his face open: and in the 
former Epistle hee sayde, that wee dyd not see God now, but as it were in a 
glasse, and in a darke speaking. In these woordes there seemeth t'o be some 
contrariete: yet notwithstanding they doo agree together very well. The 
knowledge of God now is obscure and bare, in comparison of that glorious 
light which shall be in the last commyng of Christ. Notwithstanding God 
offreth himselfe to vs now to be seene so farre foorth as is necessarie for 
our saluation, and as our capacitie will comprehende. Therefore the Apostle 
maketh mention of profyte and goyng forwarde, forsomuch as there shall 
be then a perfection, when Christ commeth.68 
Again, it is noticeable that the subject appeals to the defining source of authority, 
in this case God, and is only able to understand/identify with that authority 
partially ('as our capacitie will comprehende'). It is also significant that Calvin 
can only explain the Apostle's ambivalent stance by resorting to eschatological 
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discourse (,there shall be then a perfection, when Christ commeth'). This 
ideological mystification allows him to sidestep the very real contradiction of the 
'glasse' in Corinthians without ever satisfactorily explaining it: is man able to 
see in the 'glass' the reality of election or not? 
Behind Calvin's exegetical wranglings is a realisation of the ambivalent 
absent-presence of God. R. T. Kendall has noted that 'while Calvin says Christ 
is the mirror in whom we contemplate our election' , for later Reformers like 
Beza Christ does not fulfil this function because, as Kendall goes on, 
we have no way of knowing whether we are one of those for whom Christ 
died ... This makes trusting Christ's death presumptuous, if not dangerous: 
we could be putting our trust in One who did not die for us and therefore be 
damned. 69 
In line with my earlier comments on the second generation Calvinists developing 
Calvin's original ideas, the seeds of Beza's progression can be found in Calvin's 
work. As he declares in his Commentarie vpon S. Paules Epistles to the 
Corinthians: 'let our faith now behold God as absent. How: Bycause it seeth not 
his face, but the image only in the glass.' 70 Sir Walter Ralegh expresses the same 
sentiment slightly differently in his History o/the World (1614): 'God, which 
hath made him [man] and loves him, is always deferred.' 71 What both of these 
examples show is that in Reformed theology, similitude is a profoundly anxious 
condition.72 For this reason the 'great untroubled mirror in whose depths things 
gazed at themselves and reflected their own images back to one another' 73 that 
Michel Foucault fmds in The Order o/Things can only be a partial, indeed 
defective reading of what he calls the sixteenth century episteme. One-to-one 
correspondence was deeply ruptured in the Reformed tradition. Like so called 
'mimetic realism', the discourse of similitude would no longer be a matter of 
passive reflection (if indeed it ever was). The language of Calvinist similitude 
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became 'increasingly confined to subjective spaces' ,74 but this was not a 
comfortable retreat. Christ relinquishes his function as mirror of election. 
Instead, the trope of the mirror gets re-appropriated in early modem England by 
the subject.75 Unsurprisingly this re-fashioning cannot escape the contradictions 
of the model it supplants. Indeed in many respects, the internal functions of the 
subject become surrogate figures of identification that both embrace and 
repudiate the subject. 
As I mentioned earlier, early modem piety was a phenomenon precipitated 
by the inward debate as to whether one was elect in God or not. Works such as 
William Perkins's A Treatise Tending Unto A Declaration (1588), Robert 
Linaker's A Confortable [sic] Treatise such as are afflicted in conscience 
(1590), Arthur Dent's A Plaine Man's Path-Way to Heauen (1601), George 
Meriton's A Sermon of Repentance (1607) or Bishop Lewis Bayley's extremely 
popular The Practice of Piety (3fd edition 1613) all attest to a deep-seated 
cultural need for such works of personal edification.76 The dedicatory epistle of 
Bayley's work gives some idea of what was at stake: 'without Piety, there is no 
internal I comfort to be found in Conscience, nor externall peace to bee looked 
for in the World.,77 The pious can only be worldly (a fraught state) if they are 
first godly. Such a marked dichotomy often gave rise to violent metaphors of 
assault upon, and warfare within, the individual conscience. 'The combat is a 
mutual conflict of them that fight spiritually' , declared William Perkins.78 At the 
root of this outlook was a deeply antagonistic notion of the affective 
consequences of Protestant discourse. In a sermon on Simeon the Puritan 
preacher Henry Smith memorably expresses this antagonism. Observing that 
'Simeon feared God', Smith goes on: 'Religion may well be called feare, for 
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there is no religion, where feare is wanting: for the feare of the Lord is the 
b .. f· d ,79 eglnnmg 0 WIse orne. When such stark reductionism was put into practice, 
there was only one option for the religious Elizabethan: repentance. 
Repentance was the first and most difficult step on the road to potential 
justification. By far and away the most popular work offering guidance along 
that road was Arthur Dent's A Sermon of Repentance. From the year of its 
publication in 1583, it was reissued no less than twenty times up to 1638, and as 
such, can perhaps be viewed as a representative example of Calvinist piety in 
action. The paradoxical impulse of Calvinist rhetoric can be seen at work in 
Dent's exposition almost immediately. Ostensibly, the purpose of the sermon is 
to aid the hearer in his or her journey to becoming 'grafted into Christ by 
Faith' .80 But almost immediately, Dent begins to assail his audience: 'Doest thou 
thinke that God's mercy is common to all? And Christs death a bande for our 
sins: no, no, when it commeth to the upshot, thou shalt stop short. ,81 Here is as 
forceful an exposition of the Calvinist doctrine of limited atonement as it is 
possible to fmd in the literature of popular piety. It is almost tempting to ask 
why Dent feels the need to waste his breath on such obvious degenerates. But 
such a question would not only betray a misunderstanding of his theological 
objectives, it would also miss the affective purpose inherent in his rhetoric of 
division and assault. 
With their debt to Erasmian Christology, Debora Shuger has noted how the 
Calvinist passion narratives actively produce a 'self-divided reader' who is 'the 
rhetorical mirror of the Protestant psyche which, in turn, incorporates the 
decentered, chimerical selfhood of the late medieval Christ.' 82 This reading can 
also be broadened to incorporate the 'self-divided' Calvinist subject encountered 
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in mainstream works of popular piety such as Dent's. Indeed, structured as these 
texts are around a decidedly distant deity, the focus of attention is shifted onto 
the mediation the self perfonns between the meaning of interior existence and 
the meaning of exterior social subsistence. In Valentin Voloshinov's Marxism 
and the Philosophy of Language, as Raymond Williams notes, Voloshinov 
argues 'that meaning was necessarily a social action, dependent upon a social 
relationship. ,83 This insight can be applied to the texts under consideration. 
Meaning, or rather meanings are mediated in and around the dialectical 'sign', 
which, for Voloshinov, stands as an exemplar of subjective and social processes, 
both 'inward' and 'outward'. He observes that' The reality of the inner psyche is 
the same reality as that of the sign.' From this position, Voloshinov goes on to 
argue: 
By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized 
somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline 
separating these two spheres of reality. It is here that an encounter between 
the organism and the outside world takes place, but the encounter is not a 
physical one: the organism and the outside world meet here in the sign. 84 
The solipsistic and the societal are both united and separated by the liminality of 
the sign, contingent effects of the varied encounters between subject and self, 
subject and society, subject and God. What was 'given' in this system was the 
certainty that some would be saved and many would be damned; what was not 
necessarily given was the subjective reaction to these alternative positions 
precisely because knowledge of either of these outcomes was fundamentally and 
necessarily deferred. 
Dent offers his audience a rhetorical and conceptual division of his 
'subj ect' . According to the preacher, 
Repentance is an inward sorrowing, and continual I mourning of the heart 
and conscience for sinne, ioyned with faith, and both inward, and outward 
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amendement. Inwarde I say, in chaunging the thoughtes and affections of 
the heart: and outward in changing the woordes, and workes, from euill to 
good. 85 
Interestingly, Dent takes Calvin's Lutheran-inspired conception of 'a twofold 
government in man', 86 and applies it not only to the subject, but also to 
conscience. It is conscience that mediates the inward and outward 'amendement' 
of the subject. But whereas Calvin develops his notion of the 'twofold' subject 
in relation to the broader question of political jurisdiction, for Dent the issue is 
somewhat different. 87 He says of the repentant conscience: 
Here then we haue a glasse to behold our selues in, whether euer we haue 
repented, or no. For if we fmde not this change and alteration in vs, we 
haue not repented, and so consequently remaine vnder damnation. 
Therefore let euery man looke vnto himself for marke how much he is 
changed and altered from his former euill wayes, so much hath he 
repented. 88 
Drawing upon the humanist tradition of the body as the fiber naturae,89 this 
interior gaze would appear to provide, for Dent, a reflexive checklist of the 
individual's state of repentance. But that gaze rarely if ever provides comfort. It 
seems that perception always comes up against an impediment, a lack at the 
centre of subjectivity. As John More wrote in 1596: 'The consience [sic] is lyke 
a Chyrstall Glasse, wherein (if we will) wee may lyuely viewe our selues. It will 
shewe euery thing that is amisse in soule and body.,9o Quite simply, the internal 
faculties of the Calvinist subject seemed unable to offer that subject concord. 
In many respects, these internal faculties came to function rather like the 
Lac ani an point du capiton, a utility that can be equated with the Christo logical 
function of the mediator, so important in questions of justification. In Slavoj 
Zizek's formulation, the point du capiton 'totalizes an ideology by bringing to a 
halt the metonymic sliding of its signified' .91 In Christ, Reformed doctrine 
constructed a figure that was both the guarantor of that ideology as well as the 
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sliding mediator. In other words, Christ totalises Himself. But as point du 
capitan or as the manifestation of the extra Calvinisticum, Christ cannot be a 
guarantor of final meaning. Rather He 'is the element which represents the 
agency of the signifier within the field of the signified. ,92 As one of the central 
paradigms of early modem selfhood, the mediatory Christ as ideological and 
elemental point du capitan does not signify directly in the early modem subject. 
To take one example, as Henry Smith says his sermon The Wedding Garment, 
'to put on Christ, is to put on the new man with all his virtues, vntill wee be 
renued to the image of Christ. ,93 Man is only capable of attaining an Image. It is 
for this reason that Christ inscribes His mediatory presence in the inability of the 
subject to account for itself to itself. 
In order to explain this a little further, I want to turn finally to three 
examples of the mirror from the plays of William Shakespeare. As Richard 
Hillman has observed, 'the motif of the mirror appears to ... possess greater 
complexity and symbolic potency than have yet been critically recognized.' 
Moreover, as Hillman goes on to suggest, 'This under-recognition may be 
related to the received history of SUbjectivity.' 94 To this end, each of these 
examples show how Calvinist notions of selfhood fmd their way into all aspects 
of early modem discourse, not just those concerned with explicitly 'religious' 
issues. My first example comes from Julius Caesar (c. 1599). In Act One, scene 
two, Brutus asks of Cassius: 
Into what dangers would you lead me, Cassius, 
That you would have me seek into myself 
For that which is not in me? 
Cassius responds: 
Therefore, good Brutus, be prepared to hear. 
And since you know you cannot see yourself 
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So well as by reflection, I, your glass, 
Will modestly discover to yourself 
That of which you yet know not of. (1. ii. 53-60)95 
By becoming Brutus's 'glass', it is possible that Shakespeare envisaged 
Cassius's body as the book of nature in which Brutus would 'read' himself. But 
the problem with this reading is that Cassius knowingly utilises Brutus's stoic 
discourse of autonomy and combines it with an interior humanist reflexivity to 
turn Brutus's gaze back upon himself.96 Crucially this is a gaze mediated by and 
through Cassius. Brutus's interiority is no longer self-constituted, but constituted 
by being objectified. 
What precisely is it that the interior gaze sees when it attempts to look 
through the glass? Bearing in mind Cassius's position as his friend's 'mirror', I 
argue that the exchange between the pair also owes a significant debt to the 
insights of Refonned theology, largely because it is an exchange predicated 
upon a fonn of introspective misrecognition. The following exchange will help 
to clarify this point. Cassius asks Brutus, 'can you see your face?' (1. ii. 53) To 
this rather unusual question Brutus replies, 'No, Cassius, for the eye sees not 
itself/ But by reflection, by some other things.' (1. ii. 54-55) Brutus 
acknowledges the principle of interior reflection but, importantly, his somewhat 
strange reference to 'some other things' might suggest that in fact he does not 
see the inward gaze as, fundamentally, a matter of a one-to-one reflexivity. 
Perhaps recalling Brutus's admission that -like the Protestant subject - he is 'at 
war' (1. ii. 48) with himself, Cassius makes his move. He observes that it is 
'much lamented' that Brutus has 'no such mirrors as will turn! Your hidden 
worthiness into your eye,! That you might see your shadow.' (1. ii. 58-60) Unlike 
139 
Dent and More, Cassius invites his friend not to regard his 'self' but his 
'shadow. ,97 What are the reasons for this? 
Throughout his dramatic career, Shakespeare viewed the shadows of 
human interiority with deep suspicion, as, for example, in the following 
exchange from King Lear: 
LEAR. [ .......................................... ] 
Who is it that can tell me who I am? 
FOOL. Lear's shadow. (1. iv. 227-8)98 
In this, Shakespeare was reflecting an intense cultural tension between the 
humanist inspired exhortation to 'know thyself and a tradition of Refonned 
theology that all but denied humankind's capacity for unmediated knowledge of 
anything except perhaps their fallen state.99 A good example of this tension is 
found in Fulke Greville's poem 'Down in the depths of mine iniquity': 
And in this fatal mirror of transgression 
Shows man as fruit of his denigration, 
The error's ugly infInite impression, 
Which bears the faithless down to desperation; 
Deprived of human graces and divine, 
Even there appears this saving God of mine. (7_12)100 
God saves man, but only when man has reached his most abject 'denigration'. 
For Greville as for Shakespeare, gazing into the mirror threatens to reveal what 
Hillman has termed 'the self-beholder's evanescence' .101 A further 
Shakespearian example is found in Richard II (1595). In one of its most 
memorable and well-known scenes, the deposed monarch gazes into a looking 
glass and then shatters it. Bolingbroke observes: 'The shadow of your sorrow 
hath destroyed! The shadow of your face.' (IV. i. 282) Richard agrees that his 
'grief lies all within', and goes on to state that 'these external manner of laments/ 
Are merely shadows to the unseen grief! That swells with silence in the tortured 
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soul.' (IV. i. 285-8) Observing both a sharp dichotomy as well as a marked 
connection between his inward state and its outward manifestations, Richard 
attempts to conceptualise the liminal imperatives of these two states and the 
connections between external lament and shadowy similitude. In doing so, he 
only succeeds in drawing attention to the paradox that while the inward and the 
outward manifestations of his interiority are connected, they also divide, as 
Calvin noted, because of the insufficiency of the gaze into the mirror, into the 
self. 
It is also worth noting the way in which Shakespeare prefigures both of 
these examples in his earlier play Richard III (c. 1591). Richard has arranged the 
death of his brother the Duke of Clarence and shortly afterwards in Act two, 
Queen Elizabeth announces the death of Richard's other brother, King Edward. 
Responding to this news, Richard's mother, the Duchess of York, says: 
Ah, so much interest have I in thy sorrow 
As I had title in thy noble husband. 
I have bewept a worthy husband's death, 
And liv'd with looking on his images: 
But now two mirrors of his princely semblance, 
Are crac 'k in pieces by malignant death; 
And I, for comfort, have but one false glass, 
That grieves me when I see my shame in him. 
(II. ii. 47_54)102 
What the Duchess of York's speech points up is the way in which the mirror 
stands as both an affirmation and a negation of early modern subjectivity. Her 
sons were all 'images' of her husband that sustained her after his death. But after 
the death of both Clarence and Edward, only Richard, the 'false glass', remains. 
Interestingly, when his mother gazes on him, she does not see his wickedness 
but a reflection of her own 'shame'. Similar to Greville's 'fatal mirror', Richard 
is dangerous because both here and elsewhere in the play, he is 'Cheated of 
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feature by dissembling Nature,! Defonn'd, unfinish'd, sent before my time/ Into 
this breathing world scarce half made up'. (I. i. 19-21) His own de-formation 
allows him to 'moralize two meanings in one word' (III. i. 83) and in this way 
Richard returns the gaze of the court by remaining for as long as he can a figure 
of profoundly ambiguous signification. Nonetheless, this position cannot be 
maintained indefinitely. Before he was King, Richard negotiated the master 
signifier of kingship but was not tied to it. However the moment he assumes the 
crown he becomes the mirror of his nation and people as well as the mirror of 
his own self. Richard becomes the master signifier and as a consequence, 
intemalises its political imperatives. This is too much for him to bear as he 
comes to realise that it was his indistinct signifying status that gave him real 
power, not the fixity of monarchy. On the night before the battle of Bosworth, 
Richard's physical de-formation is manifested in a speech of terrifying 
subjective dissolution: 'What do I fear? Myself? There's none else by;/ Richard 
loves Richard, that is, I and 1.1 Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am!' (Y. iii. 
183-185) The third glass now lies' crac 'k in pieces' . 
The shattering of the physical mirror in Richard 11 and the subjective 
'glass' in Richard III also serves to draw attention to the gap between materiality 
and similitude, between trope and rhetoric. For example, on the one hand 
Thomas Salter could affirm the mirror as marker of self: 'the Mirrhor I meane 
[i.e. one 'meete for vertue'] is made of an other manner of matter, and is of 
muche more worthe than any Christall Mirrhor.,103 But on the other hand, as I 
noted earlier, the conscience might itselfbe said to be 'a Chrystall Glasse' that 
will 'shewe euery thing that is amisse in soule and body.' 104 In short, the glass as 
interior trope both affirms and negates the subject. The problem for both Richard 
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II and Brutus is that this 'authorizing ground' lies deep in the interior 'shadows· 
and for Richard III, it is that he cannot remain indefInitely in 'the shadow of the 
sun' (I. i. 26).105 Richard II's shattering of the glass points up the materiality of 
interiority - or rather the indivisibility of interiority from the material body _ 
while at the same time showing the impossibility of cohering or materially 
unifying that very interiority. After all, the internal glass must remain, like 
conscience, a trope, an agonisingly intangible effect of fallen language. 
In Richard III, Richard II and Julius Caesar, Shakespeare interrogates a 
Calvinist inspired discourse of interiority structured around that internal point 
which the inward gaze either cannot focus upon or see, or else which it tries to 
appropriate but fails. The mirror or glass is the trope of this misrecognition, this 
'unseen grief. While the divided, reflexive self was still the primary locus of 
subjective association as I noted earlier, the revenant that holds it all together 
behind conscience, behind the interior gaze is the 'shadow', the absent/present 
gaze of a nebulous deity. Reformed theology may have distanced God from 
man, and the downgrading of human volition might have left man hanging to the 
deity by a thread, but Calvinist interiority could not 'work' without God, and 
especially not without Christ. His 'contradictory' subject position, if it can be 
called that, is replicated in the interior workings of the early modern subject. As 
surrogate fIgures of identifIcation that both embrace and repudiate the subject 
the internal functions of the subject mediate between a centred subjectivity that 
is rarely if ever achieved and its lack which is more commonly felt. The 
functions of the self, like Christ, become the point du capiton; shadows that fail 
to offer the subject concord and which reveal the irredeemable lack at the centre 
of that subject. If the ultimate aim of the Calvinist Christ is to justify His elect, 
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then the early modem subject is, in Zizek's words, 'incapable of translating this 
desire of the Other into a positive interpellation, into a mandate with which to 
identify.' 106 The Calvinist Christ remains, lurking in the interior shadows, gazing 
upon the divided Calvinist subject, gazing upon itself. 
This chapter has been concerned with the internal Other: in the next chapter 
I want to examine the external early modem Other so crucial to the formation of 
both individual and national identity during the period, namely the Catholic. In 
many respects, constructions of this figure were fantasies that say more about the 
half-expressed fears and desires of early modem subjects than they do about 
what Catholics were 'actually like'. For this reason, the following chapter will 
consider the question of fantasy, especially in relation to what might be 
designated the early modem unconscious. In this way, it will be possible to 
extend and develop the theoretical examination of Calvinist interiority begun in 
this chapter as a necessary preparation for my examination of early modem 
drama. 
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Chapter Four 
Catholics and Fantasy: The Early Modern Unconscious 
Fantasising the Unconscious 
I want to begin this chapter with a quotation from Dr. Timothy Bright's 1586 
tract A Treatise of Melancholie. Writing of the 'melancholick humour' he notes that 
it 'counterfeteth terrible obiectes to the fantasie, and polluting both the substance, 
and spirits of the brayne, casueth it without externall occasion, to forge monstrous 
fictions,.J For Bright, as for many other early modern thinkers, 'fantasie' was not 
the vaguely creative, illusory concept that it is understood as today, but rather a 
deeply unsettling aspect of subjectivity.2 Part of the reason for this is related to 
Galenic physiology.3 Unlike, for example, melancholia, which could be traced back 
to a humoural imbalance in the body, 'fantasie' was part of a second order of 
psychological taxonomy such as dreams, memory or imagination, which could not 
be directly explained in relation to the body. There was, of course, nothing new 
about this in so far as these faculties were certainly understood and explicated in 
various ancient and medieval psychological schemata.4 But in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, these aspects of the self gradually became more and more 
problematic for many writers. I have noted some of the reasons behind this shift in 
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the previous chapter, but in this chapter I would like to broaden the scope of my 
enquiry further. 
First, it is interesting that Timothy Bright should use the adjective 'monstrous' 
to describe the effects of 'fantasie'. As Patricia Parker has shown, the discourse of 
the monstrous in early modern writing is very often constructed around a desire 'to 
bring before the eye something unseen, offstage, hid[den].'5 Parker connects this 
desire to three elements in early modem culture. In the first place, she associates it 
with 'the function of the delator or infonner as secret accuser'. Secondly she 
equates it with 'the anatomical context of uncovering, dilating, or opening the secret 
or "privy" place of women' . And lastly she connects the monstrous with the 'early 
modem fascination both with monster literature and with narratives of the 
"discovery" of previously hidden worlds,.6 I agree with Parker's analysis in each 
case, but it is also possible to situate this discovery of hidden, frightening aspects of 
the self within a fourth discourse. This can be explained in relation to Bright's 
construction of the 'fantasie' as a faculty that offers various 'fictions' to the self. 
The Greek root of the word 'fantasy' means 'to make visible' but Bright's faculty 
also hints at the possibility that the self may be eclipsed in some way by internal 
counterfeits. It also intimates that the 'fantasie' might reveal something that should 
have otherwise remained hidden from view. 
In Freudian psychoanalysis these hidden aspects of the self would be 
reconfigured as the unconscious. This point notwithstanding, in this chapter I want 
to turn not to Freudian but to Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to understand better 
the 'early modern unconscious'. Through his reinterpretation of Freud's own 
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reading of the unconscious,7 Lacan argued that it manifests itself by and through 
language. Underlying Lacan's famous dictum that 'the unconscious is structured 
like a language,g is a realisation that language is predicated on lack. As Elizabeth 
Wright notes, 'every word indicates the absence of what it stands for' and because 
of this, 'Language imposes a chain of words along which the ego must move while 
the unconscious remains in search of the object it has lost.,9 As a result, the fantasy 
of the subject is for repletion, for that wholeness that language fails to provide. That 
this fantasy is unattainable is a constitutive element of the unconscious. As Lacan 
notes, 'the unconscious is always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the 
subject'. IO In other words, fantasy operates by (unsuccessfully) papering over a 
fundamental 'split in the subject'. 
I want to suggest that, like the Lacanian unconscious, the early modem 
unconscious is not strictly realisable in a taxonomic sense. It never manifests itself 
directly. It goes without saying that the 'unconscious' is not a term that early 
modem writers would have used or recognised. However, this is of secondary 
importance because I argue that, in Lacanian terms, the early modem unconscious 
manifests itself indirectly through the language used to describe the interior 
processes of the self, such as 'fantasie'. Antony Easthope's assertion that 'The 
Lacanian unconscious is not the Other itself but is rather a function of it and is 
included in it as its discourse' 11 is broadly validated by the texts I will examine in 
this chapter. Indeed, it is striking how close Bright's account of 'fantasie' is to this 
Lacanian principle. He notes: 'fantasie' 'forgeth disguised shapes, which giue great 
terror vnto the heart, and cause it with the liuely spirit to hide it selfe as well as it 
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can ... from those counterfeit goblins, which the brayne ... fayneth vnto the heart.,12 
According to Bright, the early modem self is full of manifestations that the subject 
can neither contain nor understand. In the case of 'fantasie', this faculty is also 
intimately bound up with memory, a faculty that, as will become clear, charts the 
limitations of this form of early modem selfhood. It is this 'unconscious' aspect of 
the self that I am interested in and which I will return to at the end of this chapter. 
With their emphasis on what Bright calls in another place this 'intemall 
darknes' 13 perhaps the texts examined in this chapter might be said to contribute in 
some way to a pre-history of the unconscious, an unconscious manifested by and 
through fantasy (or 'fantasie'). I intend to show that this pre-history has a definable 
basis by arguing that the fierce disputations between Catholic and Protestant, which 
are all too often ignored in scholarly accounts of early modem interiority, are in fact 
central to the production of subjectivity in writings like Bright's. By setting these 
debates in their historical and theological contexts, it will be possible to explain a 
certain crisis in the taxonomy of self that characterised much of the writing of this 
period. In this context, I read the term 'fantasy' both as an aspect of the early 
modem subject and as a theoretical proposition that underwrites much of what 
follows. I suggest that much of the so-called 'historical' debate between Catholic 
and Protestant is actually anything but historical and in fact, closer to fiction on both 
sides. In accordance with Slavoj Zizek's argument that 'fantasy is the means for an 
ideology to take its own failure into account in advance', 14 I propose that the 
historical and ideological instability of these debates between Catholic and 
Protestant created a space for writers in both camps to fantasise various 
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subjectivities in a number of intriguing and under-explored ways. More than this, I 
demonstrate how in early modern writing, 'the subject is never able to assume his or 
her fundamental fantasy' .15 As a way into this issue, I begin with a number of these 
central texts through which early modem society constructed and understood its 
sense of nationhood. 
Early Modern Apocalypse 
Protestantism had extreme difficulty as a movement in reconciling its 
adherence to divine, authoritative paradigms of history with the realities of material 
and political praxis. This is reflected in the two most popular political genres of the 
period, the apologetic and the apocalyptic. As Richard Helgerson has observed in 
his book Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England, 'both are 
internally cleft. Apologetic is split between rational transcendence and polemical 
engagement, between the ideal of stasis and the reality of change. Martyrdom and 
imperium, suffering and power, divide apocalyptic.' 16 Both forms of writing are 
also crucial to the construction of the Elizabethan nation. If Helgerson is correct 
when he suggests that 'in all national self-writing, self alienation and self-
aggrandizement are one' 17 then it is also reasonable to suppose that in these writings 
may be found an important source for the self-divided early modem subject. So 
while the oppositional nature of Protestant discourse may have been fuelled by its 
opposition to all things Catholic, soon this oppositional stance was translated at a 
structural, linguistic and philosophical level into a constitutive given of nearly all 
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Protestant writings. It is also important to note in this context that early modem 
writers 'inherited two traditional methods of managing diversity' . As Debora 
Shuger points out: 
The first and more familiar erases history, subordinating diversity to repetitive 
pattern, whether exemplary or typological. Augustine's two cities, Protestant 
ecc1esiology, and the moralized history of humanist pedagogy all construct the 
past as proleptic repetition rather than linear sequence. The second method 
derives from Aristotle's biological works (including the Problems), which 
record the almost limitless variety of habitats, social organizations, sexual 
preferences, morphological structures, and domestic arrangements found in 
nature. Aristotle's approach is singularly amoral; he is not interested in animal 
behavior as evidence of a normative jus naturale or as a model for human 
society. 18 
I want to suggest that these two methods were not exclusive. Instead they existed in 
a mutually derivative and generative tension. This is particularly the case in the 
early modem apology and apocalypse where writers had to construct Protestant 
England as unquestionably God's chosen realm while at the same time outlining the 
history of how this seemingly unquestionable fact came about. As a way of 
exploring this tension, it will be useful first to tum to what might be termed urban 
apocalypticism. 
The rapid growth of London's urban landscape during Elizabeth I's reign 
jarred with a number of Protestant thinkers. As Margot Heinemann has observed, 
'No other town had more than 20-30,000 people - this huge amorphous city was 
something quite new. A high proportion of London's people had been there for a 
generation or less, or lived there only part of the year.' 19 Compared to the godly 
example of Calvin's Geneva, London must have seemed to many Protestant thinkers 
like a place of dangerous increase, of unfettered movement and fluidity. If urban 
Protestantism was a religion concerned, in the main, with regulating subjective 
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positionalities within a broadly defined social • order' , then the ever-expanding 
liminality of England's capital threatened to undermine that polity and actively 
engulf the unruly subjects living within its confines. But who was to blame for this 
urban confusion: man or God? 
This was the question uppermost in the minds of Protestant thinkers when, in 
April 1580, an earthquake struck the city. 'Few episodes', notes Alexandra 
Walsham, 'left a more enduring impression upon the collective memory of late 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England' .20 In a tract written not long after 
the quake, Thomas Twyne tried to account for the cause of the disaster. In the first 
place he wrote: 
Among the manifold sygnes and tokens whereby it hath pleased our most 
gracious God, and mercifull Father, in these the later times of the worlde, and 
very ripen esse of our sinnes, to call vs to repentaunce, we may not accoumpt 
[sic] as least this most dreadfull & daungerous Earthquake.21 
The order of this sentence is interesting. Where we might expect Twyne to say that 
the earthquake occurred as a result of man's sins, in fact he sees it as part of an 
inevitable apocalyptic process. God has caused the earthquake in order to 'call vs to 
repentaunce' but there is a sense that, in these 'later times of the worlde', man's 
sinfulness is secondary concern in respect of the apocalyptic teleology unfolding in 
the capital. Indeed, as Twyne says of the earthquake: 'the effect must be 
acknowledged to rest in Gods hands only.,22 The tension in the argument becomes 
more apparent. Twyne writes: 
I beeseeche you in the bowels of his deare Sonne Jesus Christ, euery one to 
powre out his complaint beefore the fountaine of mercy, and to call upon him 
to turne from vs those plagues of Pestilence, Sword, & Famine, which by")~uch 
quakings are euermore foreshewed, and our sinnes doo worthily deserue.--' 
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The friction between typological commonplaces ('fountaine of mercy' or 'plagues 
of Pestilence') and causality ('our sinnes') soon becomes apparent. Twyne's 
rhetoric appears to be caught between two conflicting poles. On the one hand he 
wishes to attribute London's impending doom to man's sinfulness, yet on the other 
hand he attempts to negate any causal reason for the disaster by locating it within a 
predestined metaphysic of which his apocalyptic ism is an expression: these 
earthquakes along with other signs are 'euermore foreshewed'. But to call this 
position illogical would be to betray the fundamentally secular, twenty first century 
'logic' of modern enquiry. The city might be ever expanding and under attack from 
God, but for most Protestants, faith was the bulwark against the supposedly illogical 
polarities of providential doctrine as well as providing an internal refuge from the 
frightening liminality of the city. 
This last point has long been recognised, and as expressed by Jonathan 
Dollimore, contextualises Twyne's position. Dollimore writes that 'Protestantism ... 
intensified religious paradox. In a sense this was intentional: for Calvin faith was 
generated on the axis of paradox and from within experienced contradiction. ,24 
While I agree with Dollimore, I think that his argument can be developed a stage 
further to suggest that 'experienced contradiction' as he terms it, was in fact 
necessary to the internalisation of a Calvinistic subject position. Perhaps the only 
way to reconcile oneself to a project that advocated hardline limited atonement as 
well as the utter negation of free will is to embrace at an affective level the very 
contradictions that structure Calvinist theology. In effect, the Calvinist subject 
becomes the very 'contradictions' that he or she internalises. Therefore, when it is 
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manifested in Calvinist writings, interiority is, I suggest, produced in the subjective 
dialectic structured between divine paradigms, what Protestant being and practice 
should aspire to, and the reality of social praxis. It is the failure of the latter to 
achieve the standards of the former that gives Protestant writing in general its 
fraught, oppositional intensity. Urban apocalypticism charts this dialectic 
relentlessly, commenting on the impossibility of achieving a synthesis that would 
adequately contain these imperatives. In the words of Patrick Collinson, 
'Protestantism was supposed to recreate that Jerusalem whose outstanding feature, 
according to the Psalmist, was that it was at unity in itself. In fact it brought division 
and accentuated political conflict. ,25 London was no more Jerusalem than it was 
Geneva and many of the more sceptical writers of the period realised this only too 
well. Commenting on the futility of the search for the godly city, Thomas Nashe 
observes in that apocalyptic work par excellence, Christs Teares Over lerusalem 
(1593) that 'There is no perfect societie or Citty, but a number of men gathered 
together. ,26 
As a way of examining more directly how the Protestant subject internalised 
these contradictions, I want now to tum to a different kind of apocalyptic writing, 
namely John Foxe's Acts and Monuments of the Christian Church. First published 
in English in 156327 this magisterial polemic is nothing less than a history of, and 
justification for, the Protestant cause. Charting the lives and deaths of those who had 
sacrificed all for the Protestant faith, Acts and Monuments is a narrative that 
'through repeated readings and te1lings, helped to shape the English people's 
understanding not only of the Reformation but of the world they inhabited as 
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well.,28 The centrality of Foxe's text to the political impetus of Protestantism cannot 
be denied - a copy was ordered to be placed in every church in the land. But what is 
of particular relevance in this context is the way in which Foxe constructs the figure 
of the martyr. Within Foxe's narrative strategy, the Marian martyr in particular is a 
contradictory figure, at once human, afraid and individual as well as being in some 
wayan exalted exemplar, bound up in a divine comedy not of his or her making. 
The martyr is most commonly presented in the Christian tradition as a heroic, 
almost superhuman figure. Traditional iconography, whether of St. Sebastian 
pierced by arrows or St. Catherine on the wheel, has always augmented this 
perception. In the theological/literary tradition, the martyr's death is most 
commonly described as miraculous and edifying. The first century Martyrium 
Policarpi speaks of the moment when Polycarp, burning at the stake, is stabbed by a 
guard to hasten his death: 'when he had done this there came out a dove and 
abundance of blood so that it quenched the fire, and all the multitude marvelled at 
the great difference between the unbelievers and the elect' .29 The focus here is not 
so much on the actual death, but on the transformative effect of the sacrifice. In 
marked distinction to this somewhat fantastical narrative, Foxe's account of the 
same martyrdom is much more prosaic: 
Then they cried again all together with one voice, that he would bum Polycarp 
alive. And the proconsul had no sooner spoken than it was at once 
performed ... His hands were then bound behind him and he was sacrificed, 
saying, "0 Father of thy well-beloved and blessed Son Jesus Christ ... 1 give 
thee thanks that thou hast vouchsafed to grant me this day that I may have my 
part among the number of the martyrs in the cup ofChrist".3o 
It is almost as if time has lent a certain grandeur to Po I ycarp 's death. This is not 
quite the case in respect of the Marian martyrs, but even in Polycarp's case it is 
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clear that Foxe has refashioned and re-appropriated the traditional narrative in a way 
that inscribes the (proto-Protestant) martyr within a textual field not of his own 
making. 
By assuming the mantle of the martyrologist in a Protestant context, Foxe is 
presented with a series of narratological and ideological problems. In opposition to 
the sainthood often conferred on martyrs in the Catholic tradition and the idolatrous 
detritus that went with this, a large portion of Foxe's text is concerned with a very 
different kind of 'saint'. These are the Marian martyrs, those often 'ignorant, 
unlearned and foolish,31 peoples whose deaths struck such a chord within large 
sections of Elizabethan culture. Interestingly, the presentation of the martyr as 
'ordinary' was not the preferred rhetorical strategy of other authorised Protestant 
narratives. For example, in the third part of the official Sermon Against the Fear of 
Death (1562), it is written: 
we see by holy Scripture, and other ancient histories of martyrs, that the holy, 
faithful, and righteous, ever since Christ's ascension .. .in their death did not 
doubt, but that they went to Christ in spirit, which is our life, health, wealth, 
and salvation.32 
But Foxe's Marian martyrs frequently experience both doubt and fear; by 
demystifying martyrdom, presenting the martyrs as normal people, Foxe was 
constructing a textual community of believers with whom the populace could 
identify. Nonetheless, in order to valorise the martyrs who did die, to create 
Protestant exemplae, Foxe needed necessarily to construct them in some way as 
figures out of the ordinary. John Knott writes that 'Foxe's emphasis is on the heroic 
faith of the individual and the poignancy of the scene rather than on the fusion of 
the human and the divine.,33 While this is true, I want to suggest that Foxe has to 
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emphasise heroism precisely because he fails in his attempt to fuse the human and 
the divine in the figure of the Marian martyr. Yet the way in which he does this is 
not to dehumanise, but rather, to present the martyr as a figure embodying and dis-
bodying the dialectic between divine and contingent narratives. This movement can 
be illustrated by looking in some detail at Foxe's account of the death ofCicely 
Ormes on the 23rd September 1557. 
Ormes was arrested in Norwich and sentenced for denying the doctrine of 
transubstantiation. It is Foxe's account of her last moments that is especially 
revealing. He writes: 
looking at her hand, and seeing it black with the stake, she wiped it upon her 
clothes, for she was burned at the same stake Simon Miller and Elizabeth 
Cooper was burned at. Then after she had touched it with her hand, she came 
and kissed it, and said, "Welcome the sweet cross of Christ", and so gave 
herself to be bound to it. After the tormentors had kindled the fire, she said, 
"My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit rejoiceth in God my Saviour"; 
and in so saying, she set her hands together right against her breast ... [and] she 
gave up her life unto the Lord, as quietly as if she had been in a slumber, or as 
one feeling no pain.34 
Immediately noticeable is Foxe's strange conflation of divine and contingent deaths. 
The issue here is manifestly not one of historical 'truth'. Rather, it is one of 
rhetorical and ideological persuasiveness. As constructed by Foxe, Ormes becomes 
a symbolic conduit for the attempted re-formation of the Protestant martyr as 
simultaneously exceptional and ordinary. Ormes greets the 'sweet cross of Christ' in 
a movement that is both local and universal. At a local level, Ormes' putting-on of 
Christ can be read as an attempt to implicate and possibly convert the spectators. To 
this end, her cry, 'Good people, as many of you believe as I believe, pray for me' is 
instructive. By attempting through an appeal to belief to connect the transformative 
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power of prayer with the immolation she is about to suffer, Foxe attempts to unify 
the divine exemplar with contingent reality positing, like Christ, a redemptive 
connection between victim and beholder. 
However, like many of the other narratives examined so far, Foxe's project is 
seriously undennined at a structural and an ideological level by the inherent 
oppositional status of the divine/contingent dialectic. According to Knott, Foxe's is 
a language 
celebrating a new kind of protestant saint who seems beyond human weakness 
at the approach of death, yet whatever the rhetorical excesses ofFoxe's 
characterization of his "blessed martyrs" they are rooted in the words and acts 
of those whose stories he tells.35 
No matter how hard Foxe tries to focus on the heavenly signification of the deaths, 
the gaze of the reader and the spectator is always drawn to a pathetically human 
detail such as fear, barefootedness or tears. There is good reason for this. First, and 
it is a necessary if obvious point to make, the martyr is not Christ. As I have shown 
in previous chapters, Calvinist subjectivity comes about when the contradictory 
signifying chain between man and the deity is internalised by the subject. In a 
slightly different context, Robert Weimann explicates this phenomenon when he 
notes that 
the irresolutions between the transcription of actual events and the language of 
pure fiction, between voice and text, historiography and fabulation are 
projected into the structure of ... figuration and, from there, into the ambivalent 
circuit of ... signification.36 
A good example of this process can be found again in Thomas Nashe's Christs 
Teares Over Ierusalem. Commenting on his necessary adoption of human nature in 
order to effect the salvation of man, Christ cries: 'It is a debasement and a 
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punishment to me, to inuest and enrobe my selfe in the dregs and drosse of 
mortality. I would resemble the similitude of the meanest, to gather the meanest 
vnto me. ,37 The contrast with Ormes' death is instructive. Where Christ becomes, 
the Protestant martyr can only appropriate. No one present at Cicely Ormes' 
execution would claim that she died 'as one feeling no pain'. Yet by playing Christ. 
by invoking his sacrifice at the point of death, the martyr gets drawn into a field of 
signifiers where signification for 'ignorant, unlearned and foolish' humans becomes 
simply impossible. For this reason, Foxe's otherwise unremarkable reference to 
Simon Miller and Elizabeth Cooper who both died at the same stake can be read as 
an attempt to give Ormes' death some referentiality, to tie the signifier to a (any) 
signified. But as Zizek writes of the saint, or in this case the Protestant martyr, he or 
she' occupies the place of object petit a, of pure object, of somebody undergoing 
radical subjective destitution. ,38 Ultimately, when viewed through the prism of 
Christ's sacrifice, Ormes' act of martyrdom can only be an empty mimicry, a 
signifier without a signified and an evacuation of both body and metaphysics. 
These points notwithstanding, the second way in which Foxe's narrative of 
Cicely Ormes' martyrdom undermines itself is, to my mind, the most striking. As 
the unfortunate Ormes burns, she supposedly cries out 'My soul doth magnify the 
Lord'. This is, of course, a transliteration of the hymn Magnificat anima mea sung 
by the Virgin Mary when she was told of her pregnancy.39 Foxe probably wants his 
readers to assume that Ormes has consciously appropriated this Marian rhetoric, 
presumably in order to identify her death as a sacrifice in praise of the Lord. In 
short, her internalisation becomes His glorification. However, if Valentin 
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Voloshinov is correct when he notes that' consciousness itself can arise and become 
a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs' ,40 then a different 
interpretation ofFoxe's narrative might be posited. The Magnificat may well be a 
hymn of praise, but it is also a hymn of birth, of origins and of emergence. Yet the 
very signifier that gives voice (and birth) to this hymn, the body, is in the very 
process of being materially obliterated, of being removed from signification. 
History may well be made in a cultural negotiation between conscious and 
unconscious processes, between martyrs and their apologists. But if it is correct to 
assume, as many early modern thinkers did, that consciousness emerges 'only in the 
process of social interaction' ,41 then the figure of the martyr, ostensibly dying for 
the good of 'society', radically embodies as it dis-bodies the desire for signification 
at the very moment of the sign's brutal extinction. 
To a great extent, Foxe's Acts and Monuments retrospectively defined the 
Protestant godly community through the stories of men and women who, unlike 
many of the Marian martyrs, could never have been doctrinal Protestants.42 But this 
apparent anomaly did not disturb Foxe who, in common with other Protestant 
polemicists, had a much larger ideological aim. Writing of the Church Fathers like 
Augustine and Jerome who had written in praise of the Catholic Church, Foxe says: 
'whoever will understand rightly their authorities must learn to make a distinction 
between the church of Rome as it was and as it is'. He goes on: 'It is not true, then, 
that we [the Protestants] are removed from the church of Rome; but rather ... that the 
church of Rome has utterly departed from the church of Rome' .43 For the 
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martyrologist, Protestantism is the hidden master signifier standing behind the false 
Church of Rome and all those whose actions correspond to what is defined as godly 
Protestant behaviour are retrospectively constructed as rightful Protestants. To put it 
polemically, Catholicism could be seen as Protestantism's unconscious. For this 
reason, the threat of Catholicism in Reformed countries like early modem England 
might well be viewed in psychoanalytic terms as the return of the repressed. So if 
Jacques Lacan's assertion that 'the unconscious is the discourse o/the Other,44 is to 
be taken seriously, then it will be necessary to examine in this light the various ways 
in which writers 'apologised' for the Protestant Church in opposition to Rome. For 
in such writings, it is possible to see that the 'return of the repressed' denied early 
modem writers a vision of a unified English Church. In fact, it opened up acute 
fissures in the dominant ideology's account of itself, fissures that saw the Other not 
as a figure emerging from without, but as a more nebulous set of images 
materialising from the interior of the nation and, ultimately, the interior of the self. 
Apologising for the Church 
Even a perfunctory examination of the anti-Catholic polemics produced in 
early modem England would underline how vehemently most Protestants were 
opposed to a centralised Church dominated by the Papacy. But while it is easy to 
dismiss these often-voluminous writings as the rantings of zealots, the truth is 
subtler, and resolutely ideological. The political roots of anti-Catholic discourse lay 
with those second and third generation Lutherans who had propagated and 
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developed the master's notion of the faithful congregation. As Quentin Skinner has 
observed: 
the Lutheran assumption that the Church must be regarded as nothing more 
than a congregatio fidelium ceased to be treated as a heresy, and came to be 
accepted as the basis of a new and official view of the proper relationship 
between ecclesiastical and political power.45 
In the turmoil of Reformation Europe, clear-headed distinctions such as this were 
sorely needed. Nevertheless, communities constituted like this in the face of 
external assault often develop, unsurprisingly, an acute sense of persecution: to 
believe in one's social group as 'the faithful' is often also to construct those outwith 
that group as a threat to the wholeness of the community. This cultural movement 
had two closely related effects. The one was the cultivation of an acutely inward 
gaze. The other effect, and the one that I will focus on first, was an ideological 
revision of temporal and, by implication, divine history. 
The problem for the Protestant thinker was to defend his Church from 
Catholic attacks that a Refonned Church could have no legitimacy in historical 
tenns. According to the Catholic Richard Bristow, 'Whether they [the Protestants] 
haue in their Seruice, or any wher els, any thing to be commended ... they haue, like 
Apes, taken it ofvs by imitation.,46 For Bristow, the Reformed Church was only a 
poor simulation of the Roman Church. In Protestant nations across Europe, attacks 
like these required a vigorous political programme that would negate this kind of 
popular Catholic accusation. In England, however, as Donna Hamilton has 
observed, this project had deeper ramifications: 
Originally developed for the purpose of justifying English political and 
religious autonomy in relationship to Rome, anti-catholic polemic was the 
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central rhetorical tool for constructing and defending the value of the English 
state and for constructing new narratives of English history.47 
England's sense of itself as a godly and politically secure nation depended in large 
part on the success of the re-formed narratives it told itself. One of the most 
important writers to take up the cudgels and attempt to construct these 'new 
narratives' was Bishop John Jewel. In his Defence of The Apologie of the Church of 
England (1567), Jewel attacked Catholic claims that theirs was the original faith of 
the English peoples by effectively disregarding what might be understood as a 
'normative' historiography. As he argues, Augustine of Canterbury, who brought 
Catholicism to England, was not 'the fIrst Planter of the Faith within this Hand [sic]. 
For the faith was planted heere many hundred yeeres before his coming.,48 The 
godly faith, which the Catholic Church had departed from, was there well before 
Augustine and in breaking away from the Catholic Church the Reformed movement 
was merely reinstating the 'original' faith, the master signifIer that had been 
obscured by the errors of Rome. Regardless of doctrinal affiliation, arguments such 
as these require the suspension of certain critical faculties on the part of the reader. 
In this respect, Catholic polemicists were on stronger ground, and they knew it. In 
the words of Jewel's adversary, the Catholic proselytiser Thomas Harding: 'As for 
the church of this land of Britaine, the faith hath continewed in it thirten [sic] 
hundred yeres vntill now of late. ,49 Harding also lays claim to the original faith of 
the British peoples, only this time 'faith' equals Catholicism. In breaking from 
Rome the Protestants have not only abandoned history; they have abandoned God. 
The only real response that Protestant polemicists had to this charge was to 
embellish Jewel's line of attack ad nauseum. So, for example, in his Discovery of 
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the Dangerous Rock of the Popish Church (1580), William Fulke observes that "all 
ancient histories, that write of the primitive Church, make mention of the same faith 
which we profess. ,50 Or as William Perkins argues in A Reformed Catholic (1597), 
the Protestant Church 'hath been always a church and did not first begin to be in 
Luther's time, but only then began to show itself, as having been hid by a universal 
apostasy for many hundred years together.,sl As in Foxe's account quoted earlier, 
Protestantism is the hidden master signifier standing behind the false Church of 
Rome. For a Church that took especial delight in criticising the Egyptians for 
extending their antiquity to six thousand years before the creation of the world, 
assertions like this seem more than a little expedient. 52 
But the issue here is not one of historical or religious veracity, of re-forming 
erroneous narratives, or even of 'objective truth'. This is an unashamedly 
nationalistic project for as Patrick Collinson notes, 'religious myths have often 
made the most critical contribution to the nation as an idea.,s3 More than this, the 
historiography of these Protestant divines is concerned in the words of Janet Smarr, 
with 'the symbolic constructions of reality, including its own. ,54 In effect, they 
deconstruct the 'old' Catholic narrative by appealing at once to a retroactive 
Protestantism that was always already there, as well as a transcendental notion of 
'faith'. Both have the effect of aligning the Protestant cause and its peoples within 
an avowedly symbolic discourse, namely Protestant history. This movement can 
also be seen as an example of what Slavoj Zizek has called the 'logic of 
transference', an 'illusion that the meaning of a certain element (which was 
retroactively fixed by the intervention of the master signifier) was present in it from 
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the very beginning as its immanent essence. ,55 Foxe, Jewel, Fulke and Perkins may 
well associate the Protestant nation with a transcendental faith but this is an 
ideological and textual project fraught with difficulty. 
The most remarkable aspect of the Catholic attacks that I have outlined so far, 
and one that is rarely if ever commented upon, is the construction of their Protestant 
opponents as self-divided subjects. Here is Harding once more writing about the 
leaders of the Reformed movement: 
But what neede I to speake of the strifes and debates, that were and be in our 
time betwixt the chiefe Maisters of this new Religion? They were at debate, 
not only side against side, men against men, Preachers of one Churche against 
Preachers of an other Churche: but also many of them, and that of the most 
famous were at debate with them selues. Bucer with Bucer, Melancthon with 
Melancthon, Luther with Luther, Caluine with Caluine, Peter Martyr with 
Peter Martyr. What a doo had Bucer to keepe him selfe in credite with any 
side, who, after he ranne out of his Cloister, and tooke vnto him a Yokefellow, 
frrst became a Lutheran, after that a Zwinglian, and againe a Lutheran, and 
last of all, after he came into England, as it is weI knowen, nor perfite 
Lutheran, nor perfite Zwinglian, but an vncertaine, and ambiguous Mongrel 
between bothe? 
Melancthon, as the worlde hath seene, and as may be proued by sundry his 
editions of his Common places, and other writings, was so mutable in his 
Faith, that he seemeth to haue made him selfe a slaue subiecte to a1 occasions 
of mutations. As he was neuer stable in his life time, so a little before his 
death, he turned wholly from his olde Maister Luther, and became a Caluinian 
Sacrementarie, as his Epistle witnesseth written to the Palsgrave of Rhene, 
and so he died in the worst change of al. 
To declare how Luther disagreed with him selfe, bothe in deedes and 
writings, it would require a whole booke. The same hath ben at large set forth 
by Cochleus, and other learned men of our time. What be the contradictions, 
wherein Caluine fighteth with him selfe, and other his infmite errours, and 
confusions, Nicholaus Villagagno ... hath diligently discoouered. 
As for Peter Martyr ... it may be doubted, whether Peter Martyr of Oxford, 
agreed with Peter Martyr of Zurich. What confusion is this?56 
This is highly effective polemic and it had an identifiable effect. Protestants were 
not only in danger from the external Catholic adversary, but from a much more 
nebulous, interior enemy that might be associated with Catholicism, but equally, 
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might not be.
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The very adoption of Protestantism caused division in the state and 
in the self. This tension is everywhere in English writings of the period. According 
to John Foxe, 'the visible church has, unhappily, within it, not only those who are 
Christ's inwardly and truly, but many who are his only by profession.,58 What 
Protestant writers of the period seemed to fear most was that the Protestant subject 
position, its interiority, could never be totally secure because beneath the 
countenance of, supposedly, godly Protestant practice may well lie the complete 
opposite of godliness, whatever that might be. 
It is useful to recall at this point that in 1569, eleven years into Elizabeth's 
reign, there was a significant Catholic rebellion in the north of England. Although 
the cause of the uprising was initially political rather than specifically religious, 
nevertheless it generated considerable religious enthusiasm. Indeed, at least one 
authority has called the rebellion 'the only significant Elizabethan attempt to 
overthrow Protestant religion' .59 Ultimately the rising failed because of the 
ineptitude of its political leaders. But it demonstrated to the Protestant state that its 
religious hegemony was susceptible to attack not just from external enemies. 
However, the increasing numbers of seminary priests and Jesuits in England during 
the 1570s and 1580s along with the ever-present threat of an external Spanish 
invasion only helped to accentuate the instability of the political situation.6o This is 
Richard Bancroft preaching against the Catholics at St. Paul's Cross in 1588 at the 
height of Armada fever: 
They [i.e. the Catholics] are resembled in Scriptures, and in the ancient fathers 
unto diverse things; as unto painted walls and sepulchres, because they are 
hypocrites: to trees which have nothing but leaves, bicause they are 
fruitelesse: to the mermaides bicause they hid their errours under their 
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counterfeit and faire speeches: to Helena of Greece, for that they moove as 
great contention in the church as she did troubles betwixt the Grecians and the 
Troians: to the diseases called the leprosie and the cankar, in that their 
corruption taketh deepe roote and spreadeth so farre: to a serpent that is 
lapped up togither, bicause they have so many windings and contradictions.61 
And so it goes on. What is remarkable about Bancroft's argument and lexis is the 
way in which what starts of as an exegetical deconstruction of Catholicism soon 
descends, quite literally, into an interior anatomy, charting the slippery progress of 
the 'cankar', papistry, into the self. Bancroft's concern seems to be less with the 
Catholic enemy without and much more with the 'cankar', the 'serpent' and the 
monstrous within. This is important because as Peter Stallybrass and Allon White 
point out: 
The logic of identity formation involves distinctive associations and switching 
between location, class and the body, and these are not imposed upon subject-
identity from the outside, they are the core terms of an exchange network, an 
economy of signs, in which individuals, writers and authors are sometimes 
perplexed agencies.62 
For Bancroft, the monster does not simply exist on the margins of the Protestant 
nation: it appears to be actively engaged in a dialogic and potentially metamorphic 
negotiation with the ideological centre. Moreover, it threatens to reveal that centre 
to be nothing more than a spurious ideological construct, rather more volatile than 
its apologists would allow. 
Nevertheless, the defeat of the Armada in 1588 along with the systematic and 
centralised oppression of Catholic practices throughout the 1580s and 1590s marked 
a retreat, for the time being at least, from the external, from the rhetoric of the 
universal Catholic enemy. It also had the combined effect of gradually reducing the 
old religion, as Christopher Haigh puts it, to 'the faith of a small sect. ,63 
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Nevertheless, the discourses of internal opposition did not go away. In fact they 
became, if anything, more widespread. There are two reasons for this. First, 
Catholicism in early modem England, though never especially visible, went 
underground. Catholics had to be literally rooted out, from priest holes, secret 
chapels and, most famously in James I's reign, from underneath the House of 
Parliament. Secondly, the dampening down of the Catholic threat both internally 
and externally forced the Protestant gaze inwards. The slow recession of 
Catholicism as a political threat perhaps allowed Protestants to focus in more detail 
on the affective ramifications of Protestant theology. As Patrick Collinson has 
argued: 
The Calvinism which dominated the English church after the mid-sixteenth 
century retreated from universalism. By stressing and elaborating the doctrine 
of exclusive election and the correlative principle of covenant, Calvinism 
tended to restrict the divine plan of salvation to a single nation or people, 
Israel.64 
As demonstrated in the discussion ofNashe's Christs Teares, the apocalyptic 
mindset of the period tended towards associating London with Jerusalem and Rome 
with Babylon. Although the London/Jerusalem association was rarely a comfortable 
one, what is important in the context of the development of English Calvinism is 
that the connection was made at all. In addition, the lack of a coherent, identifiable 
enemy also fractured the Protestant gaze. If Zizek is correct when he writes that 
'imaginary identification is always identification on behalf of a certain gaze in the 
Other,65 then it was a much more nebulous, secret enemy, an opposite within 
perhaps, who could be found at any time in the recesses of the Protestant interior. 
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This is a fear that is acutely mirrored in the dramatic literature of the period~ 
especially at the level of language and dramatic structure. Plays such as, for 
example, John Marston's The Malcontent (1604), William Shakespeare's Othello (c. 
1604), Cyril Tourneur's The Revenger's Tragedy (1607) or Middleton and Rowley's 
The Changeling (1622) are all deeply concerned with secret locations, peoples or 
identities. Alison Shell has recently argued that the presence of anti-Catholic 
rhetoric and imagery in plays such as these can be seen as 'the intaglio of the true 
church, with the true church defining itself in the process of establishing an other.,66 
But the point about Catholicism is that, despite what the polemicists said, the old 
religion had 'been there first'. Even if they accepted the assurances of Foxe or Jewel 
about the historical veracity of Protestantism, at the very least the refusal of 
Catholic practices to die out once and for all left a nagging doubt as to the 
ideological stability of the Reformed faith. Unlike Shell, therefore, I see 
Catholicism in these plays and elsewhere not as a loosely defined Other but as a 
constitutive element, indeed a dialectical function of the processes of identity 
formation at this time. Catholicism is dangerous precisely because it can never be 
adequately 'othered' in the project of Protestant identity formation. Concerned as 
they are with the literal and metaphorical ramifications of discovery, the rhetoric of 
these plays engages with the Protestant paranoia of what might be called the 
opposite within. More than this, these plays are troubled with the terrifying inability 
to contain this opposite. 
The 'cankar' and 'serpent' of Bancroft's sermon is not too far removed, then, 
from Iago's 'green-ey'd monster which doth mock! That meat it feeds on.~ (III. iii. 
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170-1 )67 Remaining with the example of Othello, it is also worth considering the 
way in which Shakespeare constructs thought in the play both as something 
monstrous and as something that can never be shown. This is Othello's speech to 
lago in Act three after the ancient, echoing his master's words, flrst plants the seeds 
of doubt in the Moor's mind: 
Think, my lord? By heavens, he echoes me, 
As if there were some monster in his thought, 
Too hideous to be shown; thou didst mean something; 
I heard thee say but now, thou lik'st not that, 
When Cassio left my wife: what didst not like? 
And when I told thee he was of my counsel, 
In the whole course of wooing, thou criedst "Indeed?" 
And didst contract and purse thy brow together, 
As if thou then hadst shut up in thy brain 
Some horrible conceit: if thou dost love me, 
Show me thy thOUght. (III. iii. 110-120) 
The relationship between concealment and interiority is extremely suggestive in this 
speech. Here, the thought that Othello desires to see is, paradoxically, not a thought, 
but lago's sordid fantasy life. As Antony Easthope observes, 'Desire is an 
unconscious search for a lost object, lost not because it is in front of desire waiting 
to be refound but because it is already behind desire and producing it in the flrst 
place.,68 To this end Iago is Othello's external opponent, but the ancient's thoughts 
are his master's internal antagonist. Othello's interior life is dominated by an 
interiority to which he has no access, namely lago's. For this reason, lago's 
interiority is both a fantasy and Othello's fantasy. 
The last point is critical for as Zizek notes, 'the moment the subject comes too 
close to its fantasmatic core, it loses the consistency of its existence. ,69 It is no 
mistake that lago' s last words - spoken to all the flgures on stage but directed to 
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Othello - 'what you know, you knowj From this time forth I never will speak word' 
(V. ii. 304-305) constitute both a denial of interior access and an affirmation that his 
machinations have acted as Othello's unconscious and have forced him to construct 
his own fantasy narrative, finding Desdemona false without 'ocular proof. What 
this example and those that have preceded it show is that the transmutatory potential 
of this opposite within was, like Iago, already always there. The opposite within is a 
constitutive given of Protestant discourse, be that discourse historiographical or 
subjective in focus, and in many respects it acts as the unconscious of these 
Protestant texts. In this respect, fantasy is both the means of negotiating that 
subjectivity as well as being that subjectivity's end. In Zizek's words, 'It is never 
possible for me to fully assume (in the sense of symbolic integration) the 
fantasmatic kernel of my being.' 70 As will become clearer, when the opposite within 
returns, it brings with it a profound fragmentation of the Protestant subject. 
The Turn Inwards: Casuistry and the Fragmented Self 
Around the 1590s as Patrick Collinson has observed, 'there was a profound 
alteration in religious culture, amounting to the full internalization of the theology 
of John Calvin ... Religion was an act of continual and deliberate submission to the 
divine will and purpose.' 71 Writers such as William Perkins, Richard Greenham or, 
to a certain extent, Timothy Bright, charted the movements of this cultural 
internalisation, providing for the godly (or rather, the would-be godly), a nascent 
Calvinist psychological schema in their popular works of casuistry. It may be useful 
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at this point to give a brief outline of how this schema operated.72 In the first place, 
a perception or cogitation was believed to originate in the heart, the centre of being 
in this predominantly Aristotelian schema. Often the cogitation emanated at the 
behest of the brain. As William Perkins puts it, 'there is a concord and consent 
betweene the heart and the braine, the thoughts and the affections: the heart 
affecting nothing but that which the minde conceiueth.' 73 Then, through the 
presence of an excess of one of the four humours, the conception moved through the 
body to contaminate the perceptory faculties of the subject. But when a malign 
perception entered the 'minde' , a number of faculties could be affected that were in 
themselves not a direct consequence of humoural imbalance. There were perhaps 
two faculties that were considered more important than any other. The first was the 
fantasy, a faculty that, to repeat the earlier quotation from Timothy Bright, 'forgeth 
disguised shapes, which giue great terror vnto the heart' .74 The use of the word 
'disguised' is of some interest here: like crypto-Catholics who outwardly professed 
the new religion but secretly adhered to the old, the inner workings of the fantasy 
were often masked. Nonetheless, unlike any of the other internal faculties, it was 
considered possible that a shape forged by the fantasy could materialise externally. 
But these external visions were external only in so far as they appeared to the 
subject, for as one contemporary commentator, Antony Nixon, observed, fantasy 'is 
alwaies occupied in dreaming and doting; yea, euen about those things which neuer 
haue beene, can, or shall bee'. 75 
The other important faculty that might be affected is the imagination. Perkins 
noted: 'Now when the minde hath conceiued, imagined, and framed within it selfe 
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fearefull thoughts; then comes affection and is answerable to imagination. And 
hence proceed exceeding horrours, feares, and despaires' .76 The self works against 
the self, in other words. Similar to the fantasy, this faculty allows the subject to see 
things internally that are not. Both faculties can be used to explain Macbeth's vision 
of the dagger in Act two of Macbeth (1605). At first, he seems to see the dagger 
outwith him as a fantastical 'fatal vision'. But then he calls it a 'false creation' an , 
imaginary 'dagger of the mind' (II. i. 38).77 In this Calvinist understanding of self, 
both language and experience resolutely fail to offer the subject emotional or 
epistemological certitude. Perhaps what terrifies the writers of these texts most is 
the failure to achieve a unified feeling of fixity within the self. 
The most popular English works of early modem casuistry, those by William 
Perkins, are also those that are most commonly examined by scholars concerned 
with early modem subjectivity, and rightly so. Nevertheless, there is another more 
amorphous group of works that appeared around the same time as Perkins' most 
well known manuals and which were, broadly speaking, concerned with similar 
issues of interior processes and religious justification. But there is one important 
difference between these two bodies of writing. Perkins' style has often been noted 
for its pastoral tone, and to this end his use of a third person narrative voice is an 
important rhetorical strategy in his works, guiding his readers along the path to 
possible justification. Yet a small but important sub-group of writers abandoned this 
approach altogether. They utilised instead both at a literary and an affective level the 
trope of the interior voice/monologue. Perhaps as a self-conscious development of 
the popular repentance and casuistry tracts, what these writers present to their 
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readers is the self-divided Calvinist subject. Is it also too much to conjecture that the 
writers of these texts borrowed a trick or two from the theatre, that arena of studied 
polyvocality? For if what Mikhail Bakhtin calls 'Internally polemical discourse,78 
has the power when voiced as theatrical monologue to move its hearers to 
distraction, how much more rhetorical and affective power might an internal 
religious monologue read to the self have? 
One such text concerned with these questions is Richard Kilby's The Bvrthen 
Of a loaden conscience Or The Miserie Of Sinne: Set forth by the confession of a 
miserable sinner, printed in 1608 and reprinted many times up to 1630. The most 
noteworthy feature of Kilby's title is his use of the word 'confession', a term that 
accurately describes the narrative structure of a text which constructs the narrator as 
repentant sinner and the reader as beneficent listener. This is noteworthy since the 
Reformed community viewed the Catholic practice of auricular confession with 
considerable suspicion. As William Bouwsma points out, 'The burdens of the 
confessional figured centrally among the original complaints of the Reformers 
against the papal church' .79 But away from doctrinal disputation, the confession was 
a religious and literary trope with a rich heritage. Specifically, it finds its 
provenance in classical texts such as Marcus Aurelius' Meditations (1 st c AD) and, 
of course, in Saint Augustine's highly influential Confessions (c. 397-8). During the 
European 'Dark Ages', scholars have suggested that the affective temper of 
Augustine's work did not appeal to thinkers of this period.80 Yet after the twelfth 
century watershed in philosophical and cultural thought, the Confessions became the 
focus of medieval concerns with the interior life. Its popUlarity waned during and 
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after the Reformation, no doubt due to the theological associations noted earlier. 
Indeed, its first early modem translation by Sir Toby Matthew did not appear until 
1620. Significantly its next translator (William Watts in 1631) seems to have been 
moved to take up his pen because he found Matthew's long prefatory introduction 
'so arrantly, partially Popish' .81 An early modem writer like Kilby appropriating the 
trope of the 'confession' would almost certainly have been acutely attuned to the 
ideological, theological and literary ramifications of such a choice. Indeed, it is 
possible to say that what we can see in narrative choices such as these is a shift in 
focus, concurrent with Collinson's Calvinist intemalisation, away from histories of 
the realm onto histories of the subject. In the case of Kilby's text, he makes a virtue 
of the oppositional thrust of Protestant discourse, fashioning from it an interior 
voice that is both accusatory and reformatory. 
By using the trope of the confession, Kilby engages simultaneously with the 
Augustinian presentation of self that is found in the Confessions and the Catholic 
inspired fear of the self being overwritten from within. The hybrid narrative that this 
produces is intriguing but in order to understand it better, a brief Augustinian 
excursus is required. In book ten of the Confessions, Augustine constructed a guide 
to interior existence that differed radically from anything that had gone before. 
Charles Taylor observes that the saint 'was the first to make the first-person 
standpoint fundamental to our search for truth. ,82 But unlike in modem 
psychoanalysis, the Augustinian search was not for truth about the self per se, but 
instead for God: 'Let me know you, for you are the God who knows me' .83 Where 
Augustinianism does perhaps connect with psychoanalytic models of the self is in 
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its presentation of the subject in a perpetual state of unsatisfied desire or in 
Augustinian terms, caritas. Augustine declares: 'It is you [God] whom I love and 
desire, so that I am ashamed of myself and cast myself aside and choose you 
instead, and I please neither you nor myself except in yoU.,84 Crucial here is the idea 
of the self as something to he overcome. The reason that this is not possible is, 
according to the saint, due to the affective power of memory. He says of this 
faculty: 'In it I meet myself as well. I remember myself and what I have done ... 
Although it is part of my nature, I cannot understand all that I am.,85 Memory 
constitutes the self at the point that memory fails. This apparent contradiction is, in 
fact, central to the Augustinian understanding of self. For Augustine, memory 
renders an acute awareness of the presence of sin. Or to put it slightly differently, in 
encountering sin, the subject is also made aware of the aporia at the 'centre' of 
memory, an aporia that creates a 'space' for sin to signify. It is in this way that the 
subject undergoes an intemalisation of the absence of God. As Augustine goes on to 
say, memory 'is in my mind: it is my self. What, then, am I my God? .. Where am I 
to find you? If I find you beyond my memory, it means that I have no memory of 
you. How, then, am I to find you, if I have no memory of you?' 86 The Augustinian 
epistemology of self in book ten of the Confessions constructs memory, in tandem 
with sin, as that which animates self, as well as that faculty which renders the 
subject divided from his maker. It is this epistemology that Kilby appropriates and 
develops. 
Like Augustine, Kilby's narrator begins his account at the originary state of 
subjective development, childhood. He remembers: 'When I was a child, and first 
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began to vnderstand, and speake, then was the foundation laide of my miserie. ,87 He 
then goes on: 'As I grew in age, so I increased in sinne.,88 While this narrative 
might be read simply as a variation on a theme of original sin, there is more to it 
than this. For many early modem Protestants, the status of childhood only served to 
remind adults of their own fallen state. Indeed, as John Stachniewski has noted, 'It 
was the puritan view that children (since even elect children were as yet 
unregenerate) were limbs of Satan. ' 89 The reasons for this cultural belief are 
certainly complex. Yet it is fair to state that the deeply ambivalent patriarchal 
figures of the period (John Donne's punitive and loving 'three-personed God' for 
example)90 reflect a cultural and emotional difficulty that many Protestants had in 
deciding whether the rod or a kind word would best bring the child out of its sinful 
state. Effectively what was at issue here was the embodiment of original sin. 
For John Calvin, original sin is not an imitation of the first transgression, nor 
is it caused by a lack of righteousness in man. It is rather a disease that infects the 
whole of man's being: 'the whole man is overwhelmed - as by a deluge - from head 
to foot, so that no part of him is immune from sin and all that proceeds from him is 
to be imputed to sin.,91 Or as one English Calvinist puts it, 'Sinne is such a canker 
that it spreadeth secretly.,92 Again, the rhetoric of something internal overwhelming 
the self is striking. Sin, as signifier of the human condition actively constitutes man, 
and children only served to remind many Protestants of this fact. By beginning his 
text, so to speak, at the beginning, Kilby sets up a number of oppositions central to 
his narrative strategy. In explicitly associating childhood with transgression, loss 
and division, he actively impels his readers to embrace this dichotomy. Reading the 
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text becomes almost the same as regarding the unregenerate Protestant child. 
Moreover, Kilby knew that by calling his text The Burthen of a Loaden Conscience 
he would attract those readers interested in, or perhaps wishing to attain, 
sanctification. His title is deliberately similar to popular casuistry manuals like 
Perkins' The Cases of Conscience or Greenham's A Sweet Comfortfor an Afflicted 
Conscience. Yet what Kilby gives his readers is something very different, 
something potentially subversive. Significantly, he eschews the conventional 
narrative form of the casuistry manuals by consistently returning throughout the text 
to remember either his childhood or his parents. This is no accident. So when the 
narrator admits later in the text that 'I horriblie dishonoured my father and mother 
even from my birth untill they were dead' ,93 he is admitting to more than 
conventional filial ingratitude. He is showing by his adoption of the child's subject 
position within patriarchy that the memory of sin and the sin of memory is the 
essence of Protestant being. Furthermore in his use of the trope of the' confession' , 
he also engages simultaneously with the Augustinian presentation of self that is 
found in the Confessions and the early modem fear of the self being overwritten 
from within. 
Kilby is not just concerned with making the Protestant subject a child of sin. 
His aim is more ambitious than this. In fact, throughout the text he fantasises a fonn 
of subjectivity in which all the most rebarbative aspects of Calvinist theology and 
politics coalesce. He goes on: 'I became a recusant, was receiued into the church of 
Rome by a Seminarie Priest, and did what I could to perswade manie others to leane 
that waie.,94 And then a couple of lines later: 'I doe often wonder at my self, how 
187 
feruent 1 was, first a Protestant, then a Roman Catholike, afterwards a Prescian, so 
that 1 tooke vpon me to rebuke many.,95 The connections with the earlier quotation 
from the Catholic polemicist Thomas Harding are striking. Kilby's fantasy narrator 
effectively becomes the self-divided Protestant and in so doing invites the reader to 
embrace his or her opposite within. The varying subject positions that the narrator 
lays claim to are in themselves a function of this mode of fantasy. As Zizek notes, 
fantasy 'creates a multitude of 'subject-positions' among which the (observing 
fantasizing) subject is free to float, to shift his identification from one to another. ,% 
This is certainly the case in Kilby's text. But fantasy also does more than this. The 
awful weight of Augustinian memory in a reformed context (' 1 doe often wonder at 
my selfe') along with the Protestant-inspired fear of the opposite-within ('I was first 
a Protestant, then a Roman Catholike') shows that this form of Protestant 
subjectivity allows a space for fantasy to flourish, and in doing so, renders that 
subject open to the return of that which had been repressed. 
This last point accounts for the schizophrenic narrative of Kilby's text. One 
moment the narrator is telling the reader that he 'Neuer kept holy the Sabbath day' 
or that he 'was once a naughtie servant' .97 Then, almost in the next breath, he 
exhorts 'Meddle not with state-matters above your calling', or 'Striue to Hue 
quietly: So shall you escape many troubles, preuent much mischeefe, and inioy 
many blessings.,98 These narrative juxtapositions signify a writer at the centre of the 
Reformed tradition offering a radical critique of the way in which Protestantism 
produces subjectivity. When the narrator says, 'Desire not to be singular, not to 
differ from others: for it is a signe of a naughtie spirit' 99 , the paradox inherent both 
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in Kilby's text and in early modern culture at large is foregrounded. It appears that 
to be singular is also to be forced to face the unconscious of the Protestant self and , 
the possibility of that self being overwritten by the opposite within. Yet not to be 
singular, to embrace community and conformity, is paradoxically to adopt those 
very spheres of reality such as politics, ideology and religion, which divide the 
subject in the first place. Kilby's schizophrenic narrator violates any sense of 
subjective fixity or symbolic consistency. He fragments, like the narrative into a 
series of statements and positionalities that ultimately lack both cohesion and 
coherence. 
To develop this disintegration further, it is necessary to return to the question 
of memory and fantasy. If memory is, according to Sir John Hayward, 'a storehouse 
of corruption, whereon my wicked fantasy hath always fed' 100 then where exactly 
does the subject find refuge? The answer in the case of Calvinist subjectivity is that 
it finds a perverse haven in what might be called interior apocalypticism. IfFoxe's 
Acts and Monuments was concerned with outlining the politics of the faithful to the 
faithful then this sub-genre is concerned with performing the politics of the subject 
to the subject. The literature of the early seventeenth century is filled with often-
lurid examples of this apocalyptic self. Writing in 1616, Antony Nixon speaks of 
those who 'have perswaded themselves to have homes or Serpents in their bodies, 
or to be made of glass, and so imagined, that whosoeuer pusht against them would 
strike them in peeces.' 101 More gruesome than this, Richard Greenham tells of a 
man who began to 'mislike his calling' . He goes on to recount what happened to 
this unfortunate: 
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He felt ~n a time a great paine in his leg, and being desirous to goe from his 
bed to hIS table for a booke, he could not, his leg remaining sore: then 
remembering that it was said in the Scripture, if thy foote offend thee cut it 
off; he straight way laying his leg on a block, and taking a hatchet in his hand, 
stroake off his leg, not feeling paine, the veines bein~ so tome, hee could not 
but bleede to death: howbeit he died very penitently. 02 
Both of these examples illustrate what happens when the delicately achieved 
balance between 'inner' and 'outer' existence implodes, often due to a crisis of 
faith. The subject ruptures, as it were, ending up in terrible outward violence done to 
the self. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the internalisation of Calvinist 
doctrine in the period led to the discovery or recovery of internal demons that left 
many early modem Protestants deeply fearful, and some unfortunates dead. In fact 
even the godly, according to Greenham, 'shall be assaulted with euill motions, 
suspitions, delusions, vaine fantasies and imaginations' .103 
One of the most baroque examples of this tradition is found in Sir John 
Hayward's The Sanctvarie of a troubled Soule (1604). Again, the narrative voice 
takes on an ostensibly Augustinian tone. The narrator notes that he had found 'a few 
sparkes' of Christ's 'image within me' but that 'they were few indeed, and of little 
force.' He continues to address God: 'Alas, how am I deformed? How am I 
defiled? . .1 would faine intreate thy mercie to heale me, but I am loath to offend thy 
maiesty in beholding me' .104 For this narrator, the gaze of God is simultaneously 
desirable and horrifying. Also noticeable here is that, unlike Augustine's reflective 
narrator who seems to stand both for the saint and for human nature, Hayward's 
narrator is an accusatory voice and also an egotistical voice. The focus is on the' I' 
far more than it is on God. In some respects, God almost becomes a secondary 
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player in this internal drama: 'Alas, what have I done? whom have I offended? 
whom have I prouoked?, 105 
This grand egotism, a process that John Stachniewski has identified as central 
to the Protestant 'process of self-formation' 106 is perhaps best expressed in the 
narrator's imaginative account of himself at the last judgment. The ovemrrought 
rhetoric of internal and external assault is painful in its intensity: 
Who, where, what thing shall then be my comfort, when shall I bee included 
in these extreme streites? hauing, on one side, my sinnes accusing me; on the 
other Iustice threatening me; aboue, an angrie Iudge condemning me; 
beneath, hell open, and the boiling furnace readie to deuoure me; before, the 
deuils with bitter scoffes and upbraydings hay ling me; behind, the Saints and 
my nearest friends, not onely forsaking me, but reioycing, and praising God 
for his iustice in my damnation; within, my conscience tearing me; without, 
the powers of heauen shaken and dissolued, the elements shiuered in pieces, 
the whole world flaming, and all damned soules crying and cursing round 
about me. 107 
In this extraordinary scene, memory plays no part and temporal markers of place 
and space no longer have any resonance. If the rhetoric concerned with discovering 
or confronting the opposite within focuses on memory and looking in and back, then 
these new modes of discourse emphasise what has been called the persecutory 
imagination,108 a trope bound up with a strange looking-forward to the predestined 
moment when the subject learns of his salvation or damnation. The cultural shift 
that this signals - the gradual establishment of a Calvinist consensus and the 
internalisation of that doctrine by the early modern subject - finds graphic 
expression in Hayward's text. More than this, it produces a subjectivity that 
confronts a fundamental absence, the lack at the centre of the subject with which I 
began. The narrator says that 'the paine of sense, is farre surmounted (as diuines 
hold opinion) by another paine, which they terme the paine of losse; and that is to be 
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depriued, both of the societie and sight of God.' 109 But this is not the end. The 
narrator goes on to advise the subject: 'Withdraw thy selfe into thy selfe, euen into 
the most secret closet of thy conscience; shut out all things but onely God, who both 
filleth and encloseth all things.,llo With this instruction, then, it seems that the only 
way to come to terms with the early modem unconscious, the opposite within, is to 
desire a relationship with the ultimate opposite, the punitive Deity himself. This is 
surely a type of death drive whereby what the subject desires is not in fact 
subjective repletion but a perverse relationship with the Law itself. As Zizek writes: 
In contrast to the 'normal' subject, for whom Law functions as the agency of 
prohibition that regulates (the access to the object of) his desire, for the 
pervert, the object of desire is the Law itself; the Law is the Ideal he is longing 
for, he wants to be fully acknowledged by the Law, integrated into its 
functioning. 111 
To come face to face with God is perhaps the ultimate Christian fantasy, a fantasy 
that generates the axis of identification and repudiation upon which the Protestant 
subject is produced. Furthermore, if fantasy is fundamentally a political category as 
Zizek suggests, then perhaps what Hayward's narrator reveals is the political 
consequences of this aspect of early modern subjectivity. Stressing as Calvinist 
theologians did the unworthiness of man and the transcendence of God, it is 
consequently the subject's knowledge of his distance from the deity, not his 
proximity that determines the success of Calvinist internalisation. Fantasy, 
therefore, can be read as a function of early modern subjectivity that seeks to 
account for that lack, to negotiate the theological Real within the fallen realm of 
human transactions. Ultimately, to desire to be 'shut up' with God within the self is 
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to desire the Law. And the Law is what reveals as it destroys the early modem 
unconSCIOUS. 
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Chapter Five 
'Consummatum est': Calvinist Exegesis, Mimesis and Doctor 
Faustus 
The relationship between Christopher Marlowe and the discourses of later 
Elizabethan Protestantism remains one of considerable complexity. Two closely 
connected factors have contributed towards this difficulty. The first is, broadly 
speaking, cultural. As I have shown, during Elizabeth I's long reign the gradual 
establishment of a Calvinist consensus in religion facilitated a renewed 
theological and affective emphasis on the inner life. The Calvinist subject was 
instructed in popular religious manuals and exhorted from the pulpit to cultivate 
an acutely inward gaze, a solipsistic turn unremitting in its intensity. Only in 
doing interior battle with the self could the subject come to terms with the 
possibility of their election or reprobation. Nonetheless, that subject was also 
made painfully aware of the accusatory gaze of the divine, a gaze that saw and 
judged all. In the words of Katherine Maus, 'the inwardness of persons is 
constituted by the disparity between what a limited, fallible human observer can 
see and what is available to the hypostasised divine observer'. 1 This is what 
might be called the relational model of early modem selfhood and it is an 
important cultural paradigm, applicable to the dramatic literature of the period, 
especially Marlowe's Doctor Faustus (c. 1588-9). 
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However, and leading on from this~ the second difficulty in determining 
Marlowe's engagement with early modem Protestantism is that many traditional 
readings of his dramatic achievement have sought to locate his work somewhat 
outside this cultural mainstream. Originating with Harry Levin's influential 
study Christopher Marlowe: The Overreacher, a significant number of critics 
have drawn attention to the striving, overreaching hero of Marlovian drama, in 
particular Faustus, Edward II or Tamburlaine. According to these critics, figures 
like these are heroic because they reach the boundaries of permitted thought, 
knowledge and action in the fields of, for example, learning, love, and conquest. 
But rather than engaging with the limitations of these boundaries or fashioning a 
new subject position in relation to them, these critics commonly find that the 
heroic figure transcends these structures by various means. For example, Levin 
writes that for Faustus at the end of the play, 'Damnation is an unlooked-for way 
of transcending limits and approaching infinity; it is immortality with a 
vengeance' .2 It is noticeable that Levin and the critics who follow him also seek 
to foreground the individual, but they do so in a very different way from scholars 
like Maus. Levin's is not the liminal subjectivity produced through an 
engagement with the discourses of late Elizabethan Protestantism but rather a 
form of subjectivity associated with post-Enlightenment liberal humanism. The 
exigencies of religion, politics and social existence are overwritten by the 
transcendent humanity of the central character and the argumentative strategy of 
the humanist critic fmds its terminus ad quem in that individual humanity. 
Much work has been done in recent years to dismantle such critical 
methodologies.3 But in respect of Doctor Faustus, it would be wrong to dismiss 
readings such as this out of hand. Clearly, such a large group of scholars must be 
'0 .... 
- -' 
responding to something potent in the play's makeup. Indeed~ I will argue that 
this appeal by many critics to a freestanding, transcendent hero is an important 
consequence of Doctor Faustus' unusually powerful rhetorical strategies. But I 
intend to approach this issue from a rather different angle. Forceful though it 
undoubtedly is, the play's emphasis on the individual should not be taken as an 
excuse for adopting a similarly solipsistic approach to criticism of Marlowe' s 
dramatic achievement in the play. Indeed, the presentation of interiority in 
Doctor Faustus offers a powerful critique of the relational model of early 
modern selfhood outlined above. Yet it does so by fore grounding a crucial and 
neglected aspect of religious discourse, namely the way in which relationality is 
dealt with in Calvinist theology. In short, where other critics of Doctor Faustus 
might read metaphysical transcendence, I emphasise an urgent and contingent 
engagement in the play with the exigencies of late sixteenth century Calvinism 
and in particular with the conception of Christ as mediator, introduced in 
previous chapters. 
Calvin and many of the Protestant Reformers who followed him were less 
inclined than some medieval theologians had been to draw a sharp exegetical 
distinction between the events of the Old Testament and those of the New. 
Rather the Calvinist tradition understood the New Testament as an unbroken , -
affirmation of what the Old had promised.4 For this reason, Faustus' exclusive 
engagement with New Testament texts in his opening soliloquy might be seen as 
an exegetical move that shifts the focus towards endings, towards divine 
completion. He says: 
Jerome's bible, Faustus, view it well, 
Stipendium peccati mors est. Ha! 
Stipendium, etc. 
The reward of sin is death. That's hard. 
20-+ 
Si peccasse negamus, fallimur 
Et nulla est in nobis veritas. 
If we say that we have no sin, 
We deceive ourselves, and there's no truth in us. 
Why then belike we must sin, 
And so consequently die. 
Ay, we must die an everlasting death. 
What doctrine call you this? Che sera, sera, 
What will be, shall be? Divinity, adieu! (1. i. 38-50)5 
What is crucial is that Faustus quotes here incompletely in Latin from two New 
Testament texts, St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans and the First Epistle of S1. 
John. The complete verse of Romans 6: 23 is 'For the wages of sinne is death: 
but the gift of God is eternal life, through Iesus Christ our Lord.' And 1 John 1: 
8 which Faustus quotes is followed by two verses that read, 'If we acknowledge 
our sinnes, he is faithfull and iust, to forgiue vs our sinnes, and to cleanse vs 
from all vnrighteousnesse. Ifwee say, we haue not sinned, wee make him a liar, 
and his word is not in vs. ,6 This omission has the striking effect of bringing 
together two biblical passages which, taken out of context, offer the sinner little 
hope of salvation within a predestined metaphysic. In both cases, the doctrinally 
softer, antithetical alternatives to the harsh message of the verses Faustus quotes 
are left out. But to what end? 
Traditionally, scholars have resorted to what might be termed the 
'character flaw argument', seeing this omission as evidence of Faustus' 
personal/biblical ignorance. For example, Wilbur Sanders finds that Faustus' 
rejections represent 'the mental history of a shallow mind - a sophist's 
mind ... the investigation is no more than a fayade.,7 Or as G. M. Pinciss has 
argued more recently: 'Despite all of his advanced studies and perceptive 
questions, Faustus is completely unaware of his ignorance and blinded by self-
conceit. ,8 Both of these readings, similar as they are, present a number of 
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difficulties. Like Levin, these critics explain away Faustus' flaws by appealing 
to chinks in the magician's sUbjective annoUI. But as A. D. Nuttall has recently 
pointed out, 'To suggest that Faustus simply forgets the remainder of the 
quotation is to make Faustus into an ignorant fool. .. Could we be missing 
something?,9 Nuttall's own proposition is that the magician's exegetical error 
brings together 'certain moral opposites' 10 within a Calvinist context and that 
Faustus is placed at the centre of these paradoxical forces. While this is certainly 
true, it is equally important to draw attention to what in exegetical terms Faustus 
might be trying to occlude in this structurally important speech. 
As I remarked earlier, the beginning of the play focuses on endings, a 
rhetorical turn where according to one scholar, 'every telos is realized as a 
finis' .11 In his opening soliloquy, Faustus fIrst rejects logic: 
Is to dispute well logic's chiefest end? 
Affords this art no greater miracle? 
Then read no more; thou hast attained the end. (I. i. 8-10) 
It soon becomes apparent that whatever subject position the magician had 
previously fashioned for himself is no longer tenable. The apparently unbounded 
intellectual possibilities available to the early modem humanist scholar seem to 
have been exhausted. He goes on to renounce medicine: 'The end of physic is 
OUI body's health.! Why Faustus, hath thou not attained that end?' (I. i. 17-19) 
Finally, he rejects law: 
Exhaereditare filium non potest pater nisi -
Such is the subject of the Institute 
And universal body of the Church. 
His study fIts a mercenary drudge 
Who aims at nothing but external trash -
Too servile and illiberal for me. (I. i. 31-36) 
The elliptical Latin tag from Justinian's Institutes, 'a father cannot disinherit his 
son unless-', may be read as an ominous portent of what is to come, but again, 
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scholars have not agreed as to why Faustus systematically rejects all these areas 
of enquiry. 12 One possible reason is that this opening speech is concerned \\ith 
the pathological ramifications of the ending as well as its relationship to the 
magician's construction of a new subject position. Writing about endings, 
Jacques Derrida has observed that 'Plenitude is the end (the goal)' and this is 
certainly the case for Faustus in his first soliloquy. '0, what a world of profit and 
delight,/ Of power, of honour, of omnipotence,! Is promised to the studious 
artisan!' (1. i. 55-57) But, as Derrida also goes on to note, if this plenitude was 
attained, 'it would be the end (death).' 13 This is exactly the premonitory 
divination that Faustus finds when he returns to the most important area of 
intellectual enquiry that he will attempt to disavow, namely theology. 
Alan Sinfield has argued that the theological and affective scope of 
Faustus' exegetical omission in his opening soliloquy is well in keeping with 
mainstream Calvinism. He writes: 
Faustus' conclusion is bold in form, but it catches correctly the 
consequences of Reformation theology. Just these passages of Scripture 
were offered as evidence of election and reprobation ... God chooses to save 
the elect despite their depravity; the others go to hell. Faustus' summary, 
"What will be, shall be", is doctrinally satisfactory. 14 
Sinfield is correct that the two passages quoted by the magician were associated 
with the debate surrounding election and reprobation, but it is also important to 
keep in mind the broader context within which they were utilised. Traditionally, 
Protestant exegesis of both of the New Testament texts that Faustus quotes from 
was deeply concerned with what Franyois Wendel has called 'the relation 
between the redemptive work of Christ and predestination.' 15 This is particularly 
the case in relation to the biblical commentaries of John Calvin, which were 
extremely popular in early modem England and would have been available to 
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Marlowe during his time at Cambridge. 16 The importance of the theological 
relationship mentioned by Wendel is outlined in the frrst words of Calvin's 
Commentary on 1 John (1551) when he notes that throughout this text the 
apostle 'puts forward the life exhibited to us in Christ.' 17 Clearly this is a model 
of selfhood that places Christ at the centre of the Christian life. Such a strategy is 
important because Calvin then goes on to write that 'Christ's intercession is the 
continual application of His death to our salvation.' 18 Both these quotations 
emphasise that Christ, and more specifically the doctrine of His atonement, are 
at the forefront of the doctrine of election; the two cannot and should not be 
viewed in isolation from each other. Interestingly, inA Case of Conscience 
(1592), William Perkins explores in a dialogue between John (loh.) and Church 
(Ch.) the ramifications of 1 John: 8-10 for the Calvinist subject. The similarities 
with Faustus' speech are intriguing, as is its Christological focus: 
Ch. Some among vs are come to that page, that they say they haue no 
sinne: and that this estate is a signe offellowship with God. 
Ioh. Ifwe say we haue no sin, we deceiue our selues, [imagining that to be 
true which is otherwise] and truth is not in vs. 
Ch. How then may we know that our sinnes are washed away by Christ? 
Ioh. If we confess our sinnes [namely with an humbled heart desiring 
pardon] he is faithfull and iust [in keeping his promise,] to forgiue vs our 
sinnes, and to cleanse vs from all vnrighteousness. If we say [as they before 
named do] we haue not sinned, we make him a lier [sic] [whose word 
speakes the contrarie], and his word is not in vs [his doctrine hath no place 
in our harts ].19 
It is the connection made here between Christology and election that is missed 
by critics who focus on predestination exclusively and fail to see this doctrine in 
the play, and elsewhere, in relational terms.20 
Moreover, if Barker and Hulme are correct when they observe that 
'different readings struggle with each other on the site of the text, and all that 
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can count ... as knowledge of a text is achieved through this discursive 
conflict' ,21 then surely it is equally unhelpful to focus only on the gloss that 
Faustus puts on his selective quotations. He quotes incorrectly not because he 
has a bad memory but because he is offering one reading of these biblical texts 
in the course of trying to occlude another. Indeed, this scene might well be read 
as a meditation on the complex ideological and affective processes of early 
modern internalisation. But the occluded reading is, in cultural and theological 
terms, the dominant one. In order to bring this reading to light, what must be 
de instituted is Faustus' own exegetical appeal to subjective interpretation, an 
appeal replicated by many critics in their own theoretical readings of the play. 
The first text that Faustus quotes from is Romans 6: 23, the first part of 
which notes that 'the wages of sinne is death'. His comment on this is a rather 
blunt 'That's hard'. But the exegetical gloss on this text is far wider than this 
limited reading, as is shown in the classic Protestant reading of John Calvin. At 
the beginning of his interpretation of this passage Calvin notes that 'Throughout 
this chapter the apostle maintains that those who imagine that Christ bestows 
free justification upon us without imparting newness of life shamefully rend 
Christ asunder.,22 The last three words are the key here. What Calvin insists 
upon, justification and new life in Christ, is precisely what Faustus omits in his 
speech. It is also wryly ironic that in a soliloquy concerned with endings it 
should be the endings of each biblical quotation that the magician omits. But 
more than this, Faustus denies the centrality of Christ, rending Him asunder in 
his reading of the Calvinist doctrine of justification. Significantly, Calvin goes 
on to warn of the perils of just such a move: 
We ought not to be astonished if, when the flesh has heard of justification 
by faith, it strikes so often against different obstacles, since every truth that 
is pr~a~hed of Christ is quite paradoxical to humanjudgement ... [but] 
Chrzst IS not to be suppressed because to many He is a stone of offence and 
a rock of stumbling. As He will prove to be the destruction of the ungodlY, 
He will likewise be resurrection for the godly.23 -
What is contained in this passage is the contextual and exegetical field that 
Faustus attempts to airbrush out of his first soliloquy. The magician suppresses 
any conventional engagement with the saviour, substituting instead subversive 
parody. It is no mistake that the moment in Act Two when he identifies through 
parody most strongly with Christ's sacrifice crying 'Consummatum est' (II. i. 
74) is also the point in Christ's life that institutes the historical reality of election 
and reprobation. At this moment his flesh 'strikes against' him most violently, as 
the mysterious writing on his arm appears exhorting' Homo luge!' (II. i. 77) It is 
deeply ironical, then, that the state Faustus aspires to, a subjectivity unbound by 
the exigencies of Calvinist metaphysics, is attained by denying Christ, the very 
guarantor of those metaphysics.24 He cannot fully deny divinity, but the rhetoric 
of denial, both particular and universal, is that which inscribes Faustus as a 
pathetically human parody of Christ bound to eternal solipsism. 
My contention, therefore, is that scholars of the play like Alan Sinfield 
underestimate the fact that the doctrine of election and reprobation, as it was 
most commonly understood in early modem England, was a deeply 
Christological doctrine. In order to explain more fully the ramifications of this 
realisation I want to tum now to Jonathan Dollimore's important discussion of , 
Doctor Faustus in his book Radical Tragedy. Noting that the play is 'an 
exploration of subversion through transgression' , Dollimore goes on to observe: 
'Faustus is constituted by the very limiting structure which he transgresses and 
his transgression is both despite and because of this fact.,25 While I agree with 
this conclusion, I disagree with the way in which Dollimore reaches it. His 
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position moves beyond that of Sinfield in that he sees a total cultural collapse of 
the structures that separate God and man as the prime cause of Faustus' stark 
solipsism. He writes: 
Fa~stus' ?act .with the devil, because an act of transgression without hope 
of lIberatIOn, IS at once rebellious, masochistic and despairing. The 
protestant God ... demanded of each subject that s/he submit personally and 
without mediation. The modes of power formerly incorporated in mediating 
institutions and practices now devolve on Him and, to some extent and 
unintentionally, on His subject: abject before God, the subject takes on a 
new importance in virtue of just this direct relation?6 
The difficulty with this reading is the assertion that any kind of mediator, be it 
the early modem conscience, the institution of the Church or Christ is not 
important to the Calvinist conception of SUbjectivity that is interrogated in the 
play. To adopt this critical position is surely to disregard the fact that the 
ubiquitous word used by Reformed theologians to describe Christ is the very 
term that Dollimore rejects: 'mediator,.27 
In an important development for scholars concerned with the relationship 
of Protestantism to early modem literature, contemporary theologians have 
begun to reconsider the importance of Christology within early modem 
Calvinism. In his seminal study Christ and the Decree: Christo logy and 
Predestination from Calvin to Perkins, Richard Muller has noted that 'the work 
of Christ as mediator occupies the center of Calvin's thought' and that 
'Protestant orthodoxy did not depart from this emphasis,?8 For example, Calvin 
wrote in his popular Catechisme (1563) that 'if Christ had not been a partaker of 
our nature he had not been a meete Mediatour, to make vs at one with God his , 
Father.,29 Or as William Perkins notes inA Golden Chaine (1591), 'The 
foundation [of the decree] is Christ Iesus, called from his Father of all eternity, 
to performe the office of the Mediatour, that in him, all those which should bee 
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saued might be chosen.,3o What both of these theologians show is that the idea 
of Christ as mediator is important because it operates at the level of subjective 
engagement with this aspect of Calvinist doctrine; it is this element that 
Dollimore misses in his discussion of Doctor Faustus. Nevertheless, in the play 
this identification is also predicated upon a fundamental lack, what Slavoj Zizek 
calls a 'radical alienation in the Other. ,31 It is only when the Calvinist mediator, 
Christ, is internally displaced (or even denied) that the magician achieves the 
apogee of being, of overreaching subjectivity that has fascinated critics of the 
play for so long. Ironically, though, it is this dislocation of Christ that spells the 
end of Calvinist interiority in the play. 
Zizek sums up the importance of this realisation when he writes that 'every 
element in a given ideological field is part of a series of equivalences' .32 Of 
course, this relationality also has a structural function. As Zizek goes on to note, 
this process 'is possible only on condition that a certain signifier - the Lacanian 
One - 'quilts' the whole field and, by embodying it, effectuates its identity.,33 In 
terms of early modem Calvinism and especially within the discursive fields that 
are invoked during the play, this 'One' is Christ. This explains in part the almost 
masochistic assertion in Calvin's Commentary on Romans (1540) that 'we die in 
ourselves, that we may live in Him. ,34 This passage calls on the Calvinist subject 
to intemalise the desolation of death as a prerequisite of selfhood. Faustus 
refuses to do this and in so doing, effectively attempts to efface the 
Christological context of the theological discourses he has conjured. But to 
invoke death in this way is also to invoke what is supplementary, namely Christ. 
and as the play progresses, that supplement comes back to haunt Faustus. 
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Zizek's work is central to my argument, but that argument can be 
developed a stage further by drawing on the work of a related thinker, 
Emmanuel Levinas. In his extraordinary essay 'A Man-God?' Levinas explores 
the philosophical ramifications of the incarnation in relation to subjectivity. This 
discussion provides another important framework within which to situate Doctor 
Faustus. 'On the one hand', Levinas writes, 'the problem of the Man-God 
indicates the idea of a self-inflicted humiliation on the part of the Supreme 
Being, of a descent of the Creator to the level of the Creature. ,35 1bis is the idea 
of the atonement, literally at-one-ment, whereby God 'puts on' mortality in order 
to save mankind. But on the other hand, as Levinas continues, 'the problem 
includes ... the idea of expiation for others, that is, of a substitution. ,36 For the 
divine to take on the mantle of man is in many respects, to quote Thomas Nashe 
in Christs Teares Over Ierusalem, a 'debasement'.37 It is this second problem 
that provides the focal point of the essay. Levinas goes on to note that 'the idea 
of substitution .. .is indispensable to the comprehension of subjectivity.'38 The 
important point is that substitution is not just a reality in terms of divine 
existence. Substitution is also experienced in human terms as that most intimate 
of senses, consciousness. Paradoxically though, it is the very proximity of 
consciousness that alienates the subject from itself. As Levinas observes, 
'Proximity is not consciousness of proximity. It is not overenlarged 
. .. ,39 B t th consciousness but counterconscIOusness, reversmg conSCIOusness. u e 
most radical aspect of this essay is that in this movement away from 
consciousness, the subject empties 'itself of its being' initiating a form of 
internal sacrifice that sets in motion the production of divine subjectivity. ,40 
Levinas provocatively concludes the essay by stating "Messianism is that apogee 
213 
in Being ... which begins in me. ,41 It is the subject who creates the space for God 
to signify, a movement that is at once generative and apocalyptic. This is 
especially the case as the magician's diabolically allotted span draws to a close 
and the pressures of his interiority become unbearable. 
Pompa BaneIjee has written that 'Faustus is reduced to a caricature 
, 
diabolically parodying the divinity he can never attain, emulating Satan who is 
himself a failed imitation of God. ,42 I concur with this aspect of Banerjee's 
brilliant article and will return to it shortly. Yet the feeling remains that 
throughout her essay she underplays some of the more overtly Christo logical 
aspects of the play. Faustus' selfhood may well be achieved 'in a subversive 
coalition with Mephastophilis [sic]' but it is surely going too far to suggest that 
the magician's subjectivity 'may be said to originate in satanic emulation' .43 If 
Faustus' subjectivity originates anywhere then it is in his problematic 
relationship with his putative saviour. Christ and Calvinist theology inscribes 
Faustus and the Devil as supplements to His originary plenitude. Yet, as Derrida 
notes, 'The sign is always the supplement of the thing itself.,44 Christ is the 
permanently displaced derivation of the play's metaphysic, and the mimetic 
chain He institutes inscribes the origin of either divine plenitude or human 
subjectivity as a painfully shifting supplement, one from which the magician 
cannot extricate himself. 
So when Mephistopheles appears to Faustus, it soon becomes clear that 
whether or not the magician 'confounds hell in Elysium' (I. iii. 61), the focus of 
the drama shifts from the outward world of learning and advancement to an 
inward, solipsistic realm where the mimetic function of Christian signs and 
actions begins to assume a higher importance in the play. In an extraordinary 
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exchange, Faustus and his tempter share a disquisition on the relationship 
between hell and interiority: 
MEPHISTOPHELES [ 
..................................... ] 
Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed 
In one self place, for where we are is hell. 
And where hell is must we ever be. . 
And, to conclude, when all the world dissolves, 
And every creature shall be purified, 
All places shall be hell that is not heaven. 
FAUSTUS. Come, I think hell's a fable. 
MEPHISTOPHELES. 
Ay, think so still, till experience change thy mind. 
(II. i. 124-131) 
The ontology of hell presented here appears to be very similar to that found in 
Calvin's Commentary on 1 John.45 The passage in question runs as follows: 
It is very important to be quite sure that when we have sinned there is a 
reconciliation with God ready and prepared for us. Otherwise we shall 
always carry hell about within us. Few consider how miserable and 
unhappy is a wavering conscience. But in fact, hell reigns where there is no 
peace with God.46 
What is most noteworthy about Marlowe's closeness to Calvin's work is the 
avowedly supplementary discursive field it invokes. In the first place, Calvin 
comments relatively infrequently on hell in any extended way, either in his 
commentaries or in the Institutes. Moreover, he remained somewhat outside the 
Reformed mainstream by preferring to stress the metaphorical basis of any 
biblical references to hell.47 Marlowe made much of this difference, as John 
Milton was to do in Paradise Lost (1667).48 But more interestingly, Calvin is 
commenting in the above quotation on 1 John 1: 9, 'If we acknowledge our 
sinnes, he is faithfull and iust, to forgiue vs our sinnes, and to cleanse vs from all 
vnrighteousness.' Crucially, this is the biblical verse that Faustus neglects to 
quote in his Act One soliloquy when he recites only 1 John 1: 8 CSi peccasse 
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negamus, fallimurl Et nulla est in nobis veritas'). By abjuring 1 John 1: 9, 
Faustus not only offers a partial reading of the biblical text's message, but he 
also commits himself to the individual hell that Mephistopheles sets before him. 
By having Mephistopheles describe a Calvinist hell from Calvin's own exegesis 
of the very passage that Faustus selectively ignores, both text and sub-text are 
set against Faustus in a movement that will lead to his destruction.49 In this way, 
Calvin's exegesis of 1 John 1: 9 becomes rather more than a straightforward 
borrowing. It can also be read as an example of a writer utilising his intertextual 
sources interactively, so to speak, in a way that replicates the cultural conditions 
of an Elizabethan subject's internalisation of Calvinist doctrine. 
Another important aspect of Mephistopheles' vision of the underworld is 
that it points to an underlying connection made in Protestant daemonology 
between devilish subjectivity and mimesis. In his Discourse of the Damned Art 
of Witchcraft (1608), William Perkins says this of the Devil: 'Now that hee 
might shewe forth his hatred and malice, he takes vpon him to imitate God, & to 
counterfeit his dealings with his Church. ,50 In this mimetic schema, the Devil is 
a threat precisely because of his lack of distinctness. This is why Perkins warns 
in another text that 'we must bee as unlike the Devill as may be' ,51 Devilish 
subjectivity is a parody of divine subjectivity, But it is terrible not because the 
Devil is, as Banerjee puts it, 'the great demonic Other,52 of the age, as this 
implies a complete metaphysical and affective separation of God and the Devil 
that is not really congruent within the play's Calvinistic framework. Rather, 
devilish subjectivity is terrible because the demon must suffer the pain of his 
unlikeness to Christ while at the same time desiring to be like Christ and to be 
reconstituted within the corpus mysticum.53 When Mephistopheles says that 
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Faustus' demands 'strike terror to my fainting soul' (1. iii. 84), it seems more 
likely that the intention is to explore this mimetic order from the inside out that , 
is to say, from the position of the devilish subject, or would-be devilish subject. 
Interestingly this intention fIrst appears as parody. At his fIrst appearance, 
Faustus asks Mephistopheles to 'return an old Franciscan friar', noting that 'That 
holy shape becomes a devil best.' (1. iii. 26-27) Apart from making use of a 
popular if somewhat cheap anti-Catholic gag, Mephistopheles' ironic religious 
apparel underlines that it is not his distance from the Godhead that is so terrible, 
but his very proximity. So when Faustus claims, 'Had I as many souls as there 
be stars,/ I'd give them all for Mephistopheles' (1. iii. 104-5), he is doing more 
than simply identifying with the Devil. He is identifying with Mephistopheles' 
subject-position and mimicking the Devil's paradoxical desire for repletion 
within this mimetic order. Mephistopheles' warning that 'this is hell nor am lout 
of it' (1. iii. 78) is more than a portent of what is to come; it is a warning to the 
magician. Separation from the saviour is not nearly as terrible as the desire for a 
dimly recalled plenitude. 
Perkins writes that when a witch makes a pact with the Devil, 'he gives to 
the deuill for the present, either his owne handwriting, or some part of his blood, 
as a pledge and earnest penny to bind the bargaine. ,54 Faustus gives both, 
conflating signifIer and signifIed within his own material body. Signing in his 
own blood, Faustus says in a daring parody of Christ's dying words 
'Consummatum est. This bill is ended,! And Faustus hath bequeathed his soul to 
Lucifer.' (II. i. 74-75) This is clearly a wicked, transgressive act. But Faustus is 
not, as both Pompa Banerjee and Alan Sinfield argue, 'wicked because he is 
damned. ,55 As I demonstrated in chapter three, there is no way that he could 
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definitively know this according to most mainstream Protestant thinkers. Rather, 
the decree is always deferred. As Franc;ois Wendel notes, it is not possible to 
'clearly distinguish the righteous from the reprobate' .56 Or as Martha Rozett puts 
it, knowledge of election or reprobation 'cannot be externally validated or 
confirmed. ,57 For this reason, our attention is surely being drawn elsewhere. 
According to Calvin, Christ's last words were spoken in order to show that 
'by his own sacrifice all that pertained to our salvation has been accomplished 
and fulfllled.,58 Christ's sacrifice redeems man from sin and death because He 
was able ultimately to transcend death through His divine and human natures. 
This is a large part of what Protestant theologians meant when they referred to 
Christ as the mediator. Yet by imitating Christ at the moment of His death, what 
Faustus does is to assume the role of devilish parodist prepared for him by 
Mephistopheles. In this way he effectuates his own spiritual death. But as Calvin 
argues in his Commentary on Romans, Paul specifically exhorts man not to 
imitate Christ's death because 'Our death .. .is not the same as Christ's but 
similar to it, for we are to notice the analogy [analogia] between the death of 
this life and our spiritual renewal.' 59 For analogy, read supplement. Denied to 
Faustus is Calvin's 'spiritual engrafting' to Christ and what opens up before him 
is a vision of unremitting solecism. 
Now the extent of Faustus' actions becomes clear. His body becomes a 
marker of his terrible offence as he asks: 
But what is this inscription on mine arm? 
'Homo fuge!' Whither should I fly? 
If unto God, he'll throw thee down to hell.-
My senses are deceived; here's nothing writ.-
I see it plain. Here in this place is writ 
'Homofuge!' Yet shall not Faustus fly. (II. i. 76-81) 
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Faustus has staked a claim through parodic representation to imitate Christ at the 
moment of His death. The writing on Faustus' body exhorts him to fly from this 
delusion, yet he has negotiated a position where, of necessity, the only entity he 
can fly to is himself. Jacques Derrida has shown that 'Writing is dangerous from 
the moment that representation there claims to be presence and the sign of the 
thing itself.,6o As such, the writing on his arm becomes a representation of an 
Other which is, paradoxically, himself. The repudiatory inscription on his arm 
constantly defers the plenitude of the magician's desired subjectivity by refusing 
to allow him to fully centre the Other in himself as Christ does via his 
homoousia. This is central for as Zizek points out, 'the subject emerges via the 
externalisation of the most intimate kernel of his being (his fundamental 
fantasy)' .61 In other words, the writing on Faustus' body becomes an 
externalisation of the cultural and sublimated internal fantasy of Christ as 
mediator and of the desire for that unattainable subject position, pinning the 
magician on an axis between transcendence and contingency, between being a 
man and being a God. 
It is clear that the broader issue I am exploring complicates the oft-repeated 
critical view that the Reformation brought in its wake a wholesale cultural 
renunciation of the imitatio Christi. But before going on to look at the end of 
Doctor Faustus, it might be useful to offer a little more in the way of cultural 
evidence for my claims so far. One way of doing this is to isolate two very 
different readings of Christ which are central to the tradition that I am drawing 
attention to. The first is from St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans and reads: 'put 
yee on the Lord IESUS CHRIST, and take no thought for the flesh, tofulfill the 
lust of it. ,62 Contrasted with this traditional Pauline ideal of Christian 
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identification and imitation is a second quotation which comes from A 
Declaration Of The True Manner ofknowing Christ Crucified (1596) by 
William Perkins. It reads: 'Christ crucified must be used ofvs as a myrrour or 
looking glass, in which we may fully take a viewe of our wretchednesse and 
misery, and what wee are by nature.,63 These two very different approaches to 
subjective identification with Christ throw into relief the pathology of a rather 
problematic theological and cultural movement. 
In the medieval period, the affective (and often erotic) temper of much 
mainstream, Franciscan inspired theology actively encouraged the subject to 
identify with and, in Pauline terms, to 'put on' Christ. 64 In literary discourse, this 
often meant filling in some of the narrative gaps in Christ's life by creating 
alternative narratives for Him.65 But the Reformation changed all this. 
Foregrounding, as it undoubtedly did, the individual's relationship with the 
divine, the way in which a number of the Reformers privileged the personal 
drama of salvation has led many critics to conclude that early modem 
conceptions of subjectivity became, as Stephen Greenblatt puts it, 'separated 
from the imitation of Christ' .66 In short, Christ is commonly said to assume, at 
best, a marginal position in relation to the construction of the early modem self. 
Clearly the issue is not as straightforward as this, particularly in respect of the 
drama of the period. This is not to tum the plays into religious allegories, but it 
is to recuperate a set of important discourses at work in these texts that is often 
glossed over. In the words of Debora Shuger: 
Calvinist anthropology ... mirrors (and may derive from) its Christology 
... ifthe various Reformed discourses of experiential inwardness ... 
duplicate the passion narratives, they also suppress them; they suppress the 
appalling sacrificial subtext of the Calvinist subject. 67 
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This Calvinist pathology of masochistic Christo logical identification is 
expressed well by William Perkins: 
if thou wouldest be revived to euerlasting life, thou must by faith as it were 
set thy selfe vpon the crosse of Christ, and applie thy hands to his hands, 
thy feete to his feete, and thy sinnefull heart to his bleeding heart~ and 
c?ntent not thy selfe with Thomas to put thy fmger into his side, but euen 
dIve and plunge thy selfe wholly both bodie and soule into the woundes 
and bloode of Christ. 68 
This form of Christian identification with the saviour is rather different from 
Calvin's more restrained approach. Here it might even be possible to glimpse a 
faultline between the Genevan Reformer and his foremost English follower. 
Whereas Calvin was more likely to accentuate a Pauline Christology in line with 
Romans 13: 14 and associated with SUbjective privation, English Calvinists like 
Perkins seemed more willing to bring to light the suppressed 'sacrificial subtext' 
of this Christology.69 But they did not do this simply by repudiating Calvin's 
Pauline emphasis. Rather, they set masochistic identification in stark contrast to 
Pauline privation in a way that is dialectical in function. And the locus of this 
dialectic is the interior of the Calvinist subject. 
To put it another way, subjective privation and masochistic identification 
with Christ are not necessarily opposing Christological positions in the English 
Protestant tradition and many early modem thinkers, including dramatists such 
as Marlowe, battled with the ramifications of this subjective dialectic. Such a 
reading also demands a reconsideration of the ways in which an intellectual 
movement like Christology is periodised. For example, Richard Halpern had 
noted that the medieval mode of imitation aimed 'asymptotically it is true - at 
the ideal of perfect imitation, so that the individual subject was ultimately 
absorbed or cancelled by Christ as ideological model.' In contrast, he argues, 
early modem imitation 'posited and even encouraged an irreducible difference 
between model and copy, and thereby tended to redistribute some cultural 
authority to the latter.' 70 But perhaps the difference between early modem 
mimetic model and copy is not as marked as Halpern perceives it to be. It is not 
that there is no divergence between medieval and early modem Christo logy, far 
from it. But it is possible that in England at least, the adherence to older, 
medieval paradigms of Christo logical selfhood is more marked than is often 
allowed. As the earlier, somewhat 'medieval' quotation from Perkins emphasises 
and as Faustus' story shows, the 'difference between model and copy' did not 
necessarily prevent the subject from trying to breach the supposedly 
'irreducible' divide. Certainly what stops the subject making this leap is Christ's 
divinity that in early modem Calvinism sets in motion the supplementary logic 
that I have been invoking. Nonetheless, the idea of the imitation of Christ must 
have held for many, real affective currency despite the divisions that the 
Reformation brought with it. Therefore, the attempted appropriation of 
Christo logical mimesis by the subject in early modem culture can be read as a 
pathological drive towards a masochistic 'union' with the deity that the subject 
knows s/he will not achieve.7l Yet this subjectivity is constituted by and through 
the intemalisation and expression of that very drive. In Faustus' case it is a drive 
that points ultimately towards death. 
It is not until the final act of the drama that the ramifications of this 
diabolic inscape are made clear. The magician is given the opportunity to repent 
by the Old Man who tells him that 'mercy, Faustus, of thy Saviour sweet' is 
necessary for salvation and, importantly, that Christ's 'blood alone must wash 
away thy guilt.' (Y. i. 46-7) But Faustus cannot bring himself to beg for Christ's 
mercy because he can only identify with the parodic subject position that he has 
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negotiated. This is evinced in his 'despair', which as I noted in chapter three is 
understood by Protestants as an utterly subjective theological state that only 
comes about when the individual loses sight of God: 'Damned art thou, Faustus, 
damned! Despair and die!' (Y. i. 49) The end is upon the magician and in a 
speech where time seems to contract towards the solipsism Mephistopheles 
outlined in Act One, Faustus cries: 
The stars move still; time runs; the clock will strike 
The devil will come, and Faustus must be damned. 
0, I'll leap up to my God! Who pulls me down? 
See, see where Christ's blood streams in the fmnament! 
One drop would save my soul, half a drop. Ah, my Christ! 
(Y. ii. 75-79) 
These extraordinary lines are perhaps the cruellest in what is a cruel play. 
Whereas Christ was able to transcend death because of His homoousia, all that 
constitutes Faustus is Faustus. It is therefore he that pulls himself down. He does 
not see Christ, only an image, or in Perkins' words a 'myrrour' of his own 
terrible interiority. His Christ is himself. This is the final and grandest parody of 
the discourse of mediation and the supplementary logic it implements. Faustus is 
caught between himself and God but his entry into death will not save him only 
destroy him. Yet even at this desperately late stage he does not abjure imitation. 
This is perhaps the most daring moment of all. Faustus cries 'My God, my God, 
look not so fierce on me' (Y. ii. 120) replicating what Christ says in the Gospel 
before he says 'Consummatum est.,72 Why then does the magician continue to 
imitate Christ right up to the moment of his death? He does so, surely, because 
imitation is a mode of interior and, ultimately, ideological creation. But it is not 
Christ who must die in order to save Faustus; it is Faustus who must perish in 
order to create Christ. In the words of Emmanuel Levinas: 
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The infinite is unassimilable otherness, absolute difference in relation to 
everything that can be shown, symbolized, announced and recalled - in 
relation to everything that is presented and represented, and hence 
"contemporised" with the fInite and the same. 73 
Faustus and Christ are one and the same and yet they are profoundly not. The 
magician has now entered a symbolic fIeld within which he can no longer be 
symbolised. Indeed, his tragedy could also be read as an instance of a powerful 
epochal trauma for which he stands as sacrifIcial scapegoat. This is why his last 
words 'Ah, Mephistopheles' (Y. ii. 123) are so necessary. Faustus' death cruelly 
illustrates that unlikeness to Christ is the most radical conclusion of Reformed 
Christology. For at the moment of the magician's death, the Devil seems less of 
a representation than Christ does. 
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Chapter Six 
'Am I far enough from myself?' Avenging Lineage in The 
Revenger's Tragedy 
Western Christianity is a religion based upon division, loss and absence. As 
I have demonstrated, it is also at a deep-rooted, structural level predicated upon a 
division from an authoritative father figure. From the primal scene in the Garden 
of Eden, to Abraham's promise of filial sacrifice, to King David's exquisite 
laments, there is an important form of Christian subjectivity that is underwritten 
by a traumatic hiatus between father and son. This hiatus is made all the more 
painful because repletion, (re )union with the father can never usually be attained 
within the span of a Christian's mortal existence. It is only after death that the 
trauma of that split is overcome. Indeed, the sole way that this alliance occurs in 
orthodox Western Christianity is via the expiatory sacrifice of the mediator, 
Christ, whose death unites the temporal and the spiritual realms. More 
importantly than this, for Protestants, Christ's death, prefigured in the three Old 
Testament examples above, marries the often-competing exegetical imperatives 
of the Old Law and the New. This is a crucial factor in the development of 
Christian subjectivity in the West during the early modern period. A central 
aspect of this development is Protestantism's legalistic focus on the covenant 
between man and God outlined in various Old Testament injunctions including, 
most importantly, the Ten Commandments. Protestant theologians were 
''''1 
--' 
sensitive to the fact that in textual terms, these injunctions are somewhat 
inconsistent in the way in which the Bible presents them. For example, Martin 
Luther asks, 'why does Moses mix up his laws in such a disordered way? Why 
does he not put the temporal laws together in one group and the spiritual laws in 
another'. 1 The Reformer's answer to this question is interesting. Moses, he 
notes, 'writes as the situation demands, so that his book is a picture and 
illustration of governing and of living ... the writing of Moses represents a 
heterogeneous mixture.,2 For Luther, the laws of the patriarch Moses are to be 
understood less as immutable theological monuments and more as a set of 
discourses produced in relation to contingent social demands and dictates. By 
refusing to see these discourses as monolithic sanctions, Luther's reading, 
potentially at least, allows the subject the space to negotiate his or her 
relationship with the law of the father. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty with the Protestant focus on the contingent 
production of Old Testament dictates is that theologians similarly could not 
avoid emphasising the universality of the covenant as it was bequeathed to them 
and hence the applicability of these laws to their own times. This problem 
manifested itself in an intriguing cultural tension. On the one hand Christianity 
has always depended upon the memorialising function of its central texts, 
buildings and rituals as a means of social cohesion. The obvious example is the 
symbolic function of the Church. When a community comes together to 
celebrate a mass, for example, they are bound together in an act of worship 
whose primary objective is to acknowledge the ritual function and historical 
significance of the host. That ritual also has a cohesive purpose. Firs~ the 
community of the faithful re-enact the last supper, aligning themselves in history 
with the disciples. Secondly they acknowledge through the ritual that the host 
signifies the expiatory sacrifice of Christ, an act whose significance will 
hopefully be extended to the community celebrating the mass. Membership of 
the society of believers is in this way contingent upon individuals 
acknowledging the precise signifying function of these various social symbols. 
On the other hand, Protestants in the sixteenth century had to effectively 
generate new meanings of their own by renegotiating and rereading these 
memorials in opposition to the Roman Church. In order, therefore, to explore the 
tension between tradition and self-definition, in this chapter I want to argue that 
Protestant theologians turned to the metaphor of the father and reinvigorated it 
with new cultural and social resonances. A particularly important example of 
this rewriting can be found in John Calvin's Institutes. Commenting on the part 
of the second commandment that refers to visiting 'the iniquity of the fathers 
upon the children', Calvin observes: 
it is to be understood that the Lord's righteous curse weighs not only upon 
the wicked man's head but also upon his whole family. Where the curse 
lies, what else can be expected but that the father, shorn of the Spirit of 
God, will live most disgracefully? Or that the son, forsaken by the Lord on 
account of the father's iniquity, will follow the same ruinous path? Finally, 
that the grandson and great-grandson, the accursed offspring of detestable 
men, will rush headlong after them?3 
For Calvin, lineage and especially masculine lineage, is to be understood as a 
curse. Of course in theological terms this Old Testament curse is 
counterbalanced by the promise of the New Testament. However, as befits the 
patriarchal strictures and structures of the Old Testament, the masculine 
inheritance is a distinctly mixed blessing. The law of the ever-distant father is 
'no brief and simple revenge, but one that will extend to the children, the 
grandchildren, and the great-grandchildren, who obviously become imitators of 
their fathers' impiety.,4 According to Calvin, the subject is caught between the 
memory of a defining imperative (the curse) that he is forced to imitate and the 
reality of facing the arbiter, the patriarchal figure of authority (in this case God). 
More than Luther, Calvin restates the tension between tradition and self-
definition in terms of the individual subject's relation to an authoritative father 
figure. This characterisation was to prove extremely influential in the early 
modem period. 
Mitchell Greenberg has offered a cogent analysis of the place of the father 
figure in early modem culture. He writes: 
In patriarchal societies, such as those in which monotheism as a religion of 
the father was born and as it was being reaffirmed in seventeenth-century 
Europe, the blind spot of ideology is any direct attack upon the father in 
any of his legal, theological, or merely familial avatars. This does not mean 
that the intense feelings these social organizations carry with them simply 
do not exist. Rather, the more intense the attachments, the more intense the 
love that is demanded, the more intense the feelings of aggressivity and of 
guilt that must be repressed or sublimated into acceptable outlets. 5 
One of these 'outlets' was revenge tragedy, a dramatic genre that offered writers 
a particularly powerful set of narrative structures within which to explore these 
peculiarly masculine relationships. While it often adheres powerfully to 
Greenberg'S model, revenge tragedy also transgresses it by constantly 
articulating new and different ways in which the operations and structure of 
revenge might be regarded. Effectively, these plays offered early modem 
audiences a version of cultural catharsis. For while much of the signifying force 
of these plays arises as a result of the cultural ubiquity of early modern religion, 
these plays often utilised the signifying potential of the sacred by translating it 
into a 'secular' signifying realm. As Andre Green observes: 
One cannot forget that the sacred, which is the implicit aim of the tragic, is 
not. .. a primary reference, or an ultimate one ... but is itself the memory, the 
recall of an act that it commemorates, the murder of the primal father. The 
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sacred a: t~~ fundamental. expression of the religious is inseparable from 
the prohibItIOn that establIshes a particular category of objects to which 
sexual reverence is due because in them the presence of the dead man is 
signified. The dead man is given once more the power that death took 
awa~, a pow~r to which homage must be paid in order to obviate any 
possIble hostIle act of revenge on his part. 6 
The memory of the father is for these reasons the sublimated memory of the 
sacred, a signifier that, while it may not be reconstituted in drama, nonetheless 
leaves traces of its vestigial presence. The two texts that perhaps fulfil these 
criteria better than any others are Hamlet (c. 1601) and The Revenger's Tragedy 
(c. 1607). It is to these plays that I now turn. 
In Hamlet, the audience has to wait until Act Five of the drama to get a 
glimpse of the skull beneath the skin; in The Revenger's Tragedy the skull is 
unapologetically revealed to the audience at the very beginning of the play. This 
is just the first of a number of well-known and self-conscious borrowings from 
Hamlet in the later play.7 But unlike in Hamlet where the sight of Yorick's bones 
leads the Prince into a philosophical disquisition on mutability, the presence of 
the skull at the start of The Revenger's Tragedy is part of a complex strategy of 
memorialisation that self-consciously reflects the practices of the earlier play but 
which also differs radically from those practices. Just as Hamlet has rightly been 
seen as the progenitor of The Revenger's Tragedy, so Hamlet retains its own 
shadowy begetter in the shape of the text known as the Ur-Hamlet, an earlier 
version of Shakespeare's great tragedy.8 The exact status and authorship of this 
Ur-text are of secondary importance. What is relevant, however, is the nature of 
the relationship between the Dr-Hamlet, Hamlet and The Revenger's Tragedy. It 
might be possible to view this bond as a familial triad: the Ur-Hamlet as ghostly 
'father' of Hamlet and The Revenger's Tragedy as offspring ofShakespeare's 
play. Because the latter two plays are indebted to their predecessor they are also 
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forced to acknowledge their parentage, their dramatic lineage, through 
similarities of language, theme and plot. However, the two later texts are plays 
in their own right and as such also evince a strenuous textual and thematic 
attempt to efface this lineage, to re-write the story they were bequeathed. 
This tension between memorialisation and generation is crucial in both 
Hamlet and The Revenger's Tragedy. Significantly it manifests itself at a 
structural level in terms of a familial triad that mirrors the relationship between 
the texts. In Hamlet, for example, the triad consists of Old Hamlet, Hamlet and 
Claudius. Interestingly, the Ghost's injunction to Hamlet, 'Remember me' (I. v. 
91)9 serves to highlight the ambiguity of this masculine triad. In the first place, it 
is only by hearing the Ghost's story that Hamlet (and the audience) understands 
that what has come to pass since his father's death is essentially a false narrative. 
Claudius should not be where he in fact is. Conversely, the Ghost's tale runs 
against the narrative thrust of the play itself. His is a retrospectively recounted 
narrative that, until his son acts upon it, only really signifies in Hamlet's 
memory. The Prince says that he will 'wipe away all trivial fond records' from 
'the table of my memory' and that the Ghost's 'commandment all alone shall 
live/ Within the book and volume of my brain,! Unmix'd with baser matter.' (I. 
v. 98-104) Until he translates memory into action, Hamlet is unable to generate a 
narrative that will counter Claudius'. The false father will continue to dominate 
and the ghostly father will remain dis-membered. 
There is a long tradition of Hamlet criticism that seeks to understand the 
play's familial wranglings in terms of Freudian psychoanalysis. These readings 
also draw attention, as I have not yet done, to a fourth figure, Gertrude, whose 
place in the play's symbolic order is so important. Perhaps the most well known 
of these critical accounts is Ernest Jones' study Hamlet and Oedipus. In this text, 
Jones reads Hamlet's relationship to both Gertrude and Claudius as manifesting 
an essentially unconscious 'anguish at the thOUght of his father being replaced in 
his mother's affections by someone else.,lo In this Freudian family romance, 
Hamlet 'can forgive a woman neither her rejection of his sexual advances nor, 
still less, her alliance with another man.' II What Jones outlines here is a model 
of triangulated Oedipal desire where the female is the figure by and through 
which the masculine symbolic order is constructed. Hamlet desires Gertrude but 
in order to fulfil that desire he has to compete with another masculine figure, the 
usurper Claudius. This is significant for as Jones points out, 'Hamlet's attitude 
towards his uncle-father is far more complex than is generally supposed.' 12 In 
what is a central insight, Jones goes on to observe that 'In reality his uncle 
incorporates the deepest and most buried part of his own personality, so that he 
cannot kill him without also killing himself.' 13 In essence, Hamlet's relationship 
with both Gertrude and Claudius symbolises what Jonathan Dollimore has called 
'the disturbing association of thanatos and eros' ,14 those contradictory but 
constitutive drives that underwrite human subjectivity. 
It is possible, however, to go further than Jones does and suggest that in 
certain early modern dramas the model of triangulated Oedipal desire only ever 
creates a space for the female tangentially. This means that the predominantly 
masculine realm of subjective identification locates the female as a signifier 
through which the symbolic realm is given a coherence of sorts. Nevertheless, 
the female is rarely the primary focus of desire and/or identification in these 
plays. Or to put it another way, in certain revenge dramas, 'Female identification 
with the Other always involves an excursion into "masculine" territory.' IS This 
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is not to disregard the female as a locus of erotic attachment or desire as some 
commentators have tended to do. Nor is it to privilege male-male identification 
over male-female identification. What I intend instead is a reworking of the 
conceptual map with which certain types of revenge drama might be read. 
Primarily, this reading recognises that in plays such as Hamlet and The 
Revenger's Tragedy, the patterns of subjective response and repudiation 
operated in the first instance along a definably patriarchal axis. 
As a way of theorising this issue, it may be helpful to consider the moment 
in Act Three of Hamlet when the Ghost reappears, this time to Hamlet and 
Gertrude. 
Ham. Do you see nothing there? 
Queen. Nothing at all; yet all that is I see. 
Ham. Nor did you nothing hear? 
Queen. No, nothing but ourselves. 
Ham. Why, look you there, look how it steals away. 
My father, in his habit as he liv'd. (III. iv. 132-137) 
It is possible to read this scene in a number of competing ways. In the first place, 
Hamlet may be seeing things, like those Protestant subjects examined in chapter 
five, and in this way the ghostly figure the audience sees might be an 
externalised version of the Prince's interior vision. Alternatively Gertrude may 
be dissembling, skilfully pretending that she does not see her husband's ghost in 
her chamber in order to conceal her guilt. A third reading, and the one that I will 
advance, is that this exchange charts the limits of the female gaze and therefore 
her role in constituting the masculine symbolic order. Because the masculine is 
the '''original'' point ofreference,I6 in the patriarchal construction of early 
modem subjectivity, the symbolic gaze of the masculine begins where the gaze 
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of the feminine ends. By not seeing, Gertrude forces the audience to privilege 
the gaze of Hamlet because unlike the Queen, it is clear that he also sees what 
the audience sees. Here, as elsewhere, the point of reference is the dominant 
father figure. It is also instructive to note here how the 'weak' familial triad in 
the play comprising Polonius, Laertes and Ophelia gives way during the course 
of the action to the 'strong' murderous and masculine triad of Claudius, Hamlet 
and Laertes. It is through the masculine line that the symbolic order is 
constructed. But this symbolic order is far from unified. When the father returns 
once more in Gertrude's chamber, the masculine symbolic order is in effect 
reconstituted and undermined. For as the father's ghostly status and the failure 
of the female gaze both show, the symbolic is always predicated upon 
representation, upon a chain of endlessly shifting signifiers. 
What, then, is the best way to approach the complex masculine structures 
that underpin much revenge drama of the period? In order to answer this 
question, I want to return to the tension between memorialisation and generation 
that I identified earlier at work in early modem discourse. In the case of Hamlet 
and The Revenger's Tragedy, the disjunction is provided by the fact that the 
revenger stands between the imperatives of a dead father and the odious 
presence of a usurping patriarch. This would seem to bear out Michael Neill's 
suggestion that 'revenge tragedy, at the deepest level, is less about the ethics of 
vendetta than it is about the murderous legacies of the past and the terrible 
power of memory. ,17 There was something about the amorphous presence of 
memory that was writ large in the complex interiority of the early modem 
revenger. In The Revenger's Tragedy for example, the avenger Vindice not only 
has to negotiate the memory of a dead father but the memory of his dead lover 
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killed by the patriarch, the Duke. So the masculine triad ofVindice's dead 
father, Vindice and the Duke gains symbolic coherence by and through the 
presence of the female. However, her status, not (initially) as an actant but as a 
skull, only serves to underline the precariousness of this masculine symbolic 
order. 
It seems that the Italianate setting of plays such as The Revenger's Tragedy 
also enabled writers to explore questions of masculine authority as well as 
affording them an opportunity to comment upon contemporary political 
practices. Perhaps in the Italian city-states, early modern dramatists saw a 
microcosmic replication of the hierarchical structures that underpinned the 
English political system. But there were a number of important differences. In 
most cases (such as Measure for Measure (1604) or The Duchess of Malji (c. 
1612-1614)), the central figure of authority was not normally a King but a Duke. 
Whereas the King was God's representative on earth, the Duke derived his 
power from the King and so stood on a lower rung in the mimetic chain of 
political imitation. This allowed writers a certain freedom. More than the King, 
the Duke imitated the power of another. Consequently the ways in which the 
subject interiorised hierarchical structures of political control under a Duke was 
questioned in a much more radical way than it often was when the ruler in 
question was a monarch. Robert Weimann has linked this movement to the 
political impetus of the Reformation. He notes that where older forms of reading 
and writing presupposed given models of interpretation or style, the Reformation 
changed all this: 
Because authority, including the authorization of discourse itself, was no 
longer given, as it were, before the writing and reading began, the act of 
representation was turned into a site on which authority could be 
negotiated, disputed, or reconstituted. Modern authority, rather than 
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preceding its inscription, rather than being given as a prescribed premise of 
utterances, became a product of writing, speaking, and reading, a result 
rather than primarily a constituent of representation. 18 
Authority is produced through the process of representation. Subjects in turn 
produce representation. Hence, in representation the early modem subject is able 
to explore the manner in which he or she intemalises authority and because of 
this, the means by which authority might be negotiated or even transgressed. 
There is arguably no play that explores these issues better during the period 
than The Revenger's Tragedy. I intend to suggest that the intense ambivalence 
surrounding the father figure in this play is a means of exploring the connection 
between memory, subjectivity and lineage. It also enables the play to explore the 
vexed question of authority in relation to the individual subject. As the drama 
progresses, it becomes clear that all signifiers become fatally destabilised during, 
indeed because of, the play of masculine/Oedipal revenge. The fact that the play 
is sustained well beyond the completion of the central act of vengeance offers a 
radical critique not only of the conventions of revenge tragedy but of Calvinist 
subjectivity as exemplified by the revenger Vindice. Moreover, the play's 
sustained exploration of these issues allows a critical exploration of recent work 
that seeks to go beyond the limits of the traditional psychoanalytic 'corpus', in 
both senses of the word. 
One of the most noteworthy features of the beginning of The Revenger's 
Tragedy is its studied artificiality. As the play opens, the audience is presented 
with three separate yet interrelated 'bodies': Vindice, the skull of his dead lover 
Gloriana and the ruling body. Vindice desires revenge on the Duke for poisoning 
Gloriana: 
Duke; royal lecher; go, grey-hair'd adultery; 
And thou his son, as impious steep' d as he; 
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And thou his bastard, true-begot in evil; 
And thou his duchess, that will do with devil: 
Four excellent characters. (I. i. 1-5) 
This complex representation, drawing as it does on both the Vice and memento 
mori traditions, situates Vindice at the very outset as both a part of the world he 
describes and as a metadramatic malcontent who attempts to locate himself 
outside this realm in order to comment upon it. This distinction will become 
more and more critical as the play progresses but at this stage Vindice' s primary 
objective is to pass sardonic judgement on the body politic. And 'body' is the 
key word here. An early modern audience familiar with the official Church 
homilies would also have been familiar with the ubiquitous political metaphor of 
the Tudor and Stuart ideological machine which stated, in the words of one of 
these homilies, that 'the whole body of every realm, and all the members and 
parts of the same, shall be subject to their head, their king' .19 What they are 
presented with at the beginning of the play is a representation that undermines 
this popular political metaphor. Furthermore, in Vindice the audience have an 
anti-ideological propagandist who destabilises the essentialist rhetoric implicit in 
this metaphor. If the body is unstable or is made to seem artificial, so, it follows, 
are the 'characters' that inhabit those bodies. Moreover, if 'character' is shown 
not to be an essence then the body becomes a signifier that may have various 
contingent meanings written upon it. 
Vindice acknowledges as much as he ruminates on the skull of his dead 
lover. He notes that when Gloriana was alive, 
then 'twas a face 
So far beyond the artificial shine 
Of any woman's bought complexion, 
That the uprightest man (if such there be, 
That sin but seven times a day) broke custom, 
And made up eight with looking after her. (I. i. 20-25) 
2.+2 
According to the revenger, Gloriana, and in more general terms her female body, 
made men sin during life. Yet she achieves her most potent signification in 
death. Moreover, 'she' is going to playa central role in Vindice's revenge, a 
wicked, sinful course of action by early modem standards. In this way, Gloriana 
becomes a parody of what she (blamelessly) was in life. She is 'good' in death 
and therefore beautiful because she no longer tempts men. Yet she is 'evil' too 
as she participates in avenging herself. In accordance with the play's Calvinistic 
outlook, the fallen human body does not contain an essence or essential 
characteristics. Rather it is a territory, a site of intense negotiation on which 
culture writes and through which the revenger acts. For all these reasons, it is 
perhaps Michel Foucault who comes closest to understanding this ambivalent 
attitude towards the body when he describes it as ' the inscribed surface of 
events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated 
self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity) and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration. ,20 This is certainly borne out when Vindice describes the physical 
decrepitude of the Duke: 
0, that marrowless age 
Would stuff the hollow bones with damn'd desires, 
And 'stead of heat, kindle infernal fires 
Within the spendthrift veins of a dry duke, 
A parch'd and juiceless luxur. Oh God! - one 
That has scarce blood enough to live upon, 
And he to riot it like a son and heir? (1. i. 5-11) 
The body here is cited as the means of potential retribution ('infernal fires') and 
yet it paradoxically seems a strangely inadequate instrument of revenge, as the 
play on 'marrowless age' makes clear. More importantly than this, even though 
the Duke has 'scarce blood enough to live upon', he is still able to 'riot it like a 
son and heir'. This, more than anything else, seems to be what rankles with 
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Vindice. As he says, '0, the thought ofthatl Turns my abused heart-strings into 
fret.' (I. i. 12-13) Indeed, Vindice's sense that the Duke is occupying his rightful 
place seems to be the key to the Oedipal interplay between body and revenge in 
these lines. At this point in the play, it seems that Vindice literally has no 
signifying power. 
In her book Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Julia Kristeva 
provides a framework within which to situate the Vindice's tragedy of 
nonmeaning. She writes: 
The imaginative capability of Western man, which is fulfilled within 
Christianity, is the ability to transfer meaning to the very place where it 
was lost in death and/or nonmeaning. This is a survival of idealization - the 
imaginary constitutes a miracle, but it is at the same time its shattering: a 
self-illusion, nothing but dreams and words, words, words .. .It affirms the 
almightiness of temporary subjectivity - the one that knows enough to 
speak until death comes.21 
The shadow of Hamlet looms large here, as Kristeva's reference to Act Two, 
scene two of the play shows ('What do you read, my lord?/ Words, words, 
words.' II. ii. 191-192). In more general terms, Kristeva also emphasises that the 
tragedy of subjectivity (and the SUbjectivity of tragedy) is its very temporary 
existence. In order to create meaning, to signify, the Christian subject is obliged 
to centre meaning in death, or at least in the promise of death. Kristeva suggests 
that this form of idealisation, however, is located upon the transitory nature of 
the imaginary. This is why the subjectivity of revenge tragedy might be 
understood as necessarily temporary. While revenge is necessarily deferred in 
plays like Hamlet, this is as much due to the terrible weight of the revenger's 
own SUbjectivity as it is to the conventions of the genre itself. Vindice sees the 
Duke as a dangerous patriarchal figure that he must destroy. Yet his description 
of the Duke as a 'son and heir' not only confuses this aim, it also draws a 
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curious parallel between revenger and patriarch. It is as if Vindice believes that 
the Duke has usurped his rightful subject position. As he notes sardonically, 'old 
men lustful/ Do show like young men, angry, eager, violent,! Outbid like their 
limited performances.' (I. i. 34-6) The Duke is almost too masculine and too 
angry. In many respects, it seems that the Duke possesses those very qualities 
that the revenger lacks. 
This inversion is doubly interesting in relation to Sigmund Freud's theory 
of Oedipal desire. As Freud notes in Dreams, the Oedipus complex in male 
children manifests itself primarily in sexual prohibition: 'the fear of a father is 
set up because, in the very earliest years, he opposes a boy's sexual activities, 
just as he is bound to do once more from social motives after the age of 
puberty.,22 But as befits the Duke's surrogate father status, he has not only 
opposed Vindice's 'sexual activities' he has actively usurped them by raping and 
killing Gloriana. Because of this the process of subjective development outlined 
above by Freud is complicated in Vindice's case. He deals with his predicament 
by turning to violence. Essentially, the planned violence of the revenger is in 
response to the life he feels he has been denied. In Italian, 'Vindice' means 
'Vengeance' and he assumes this mantle because the 'normal' processes of 
identity formation and acceptance into the world have been denied him. To put it 
bluntly, Vindice is trapped in a subjective state that objectifies him as 
Vengeance and forces a subjective identification with the Other, the Duke. 
Paradoxically this Other represents both what he desires and what he hates most 
in the world. Indeed, when he talks of his father's funeral, and says that 'My 
life's unnatural to me .. .1 As if I liv 'd now when I should be dead' (I. i. 120-121 
my emphasis), the analogy is unmistakeable. Vindice desires the Duke's death 
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but simultaneously identifies with the Duke's subject position, indeed mourns 
for it as his lost heritage. As Slavoj Zizek points out 'to achieve self-identity. the 
subject must identify himself with the imaginary other, he must alienate himself 
- put his identity outside himself, so to speak, into the image of his double.· 23 In 
this respect Vindice's 'double' is the Duke. More than this, the constitutive 
power of his name goes beyond the actions that objectify him as 'Vengeance'. 
As Zizek puts it, 'As soon as we enter the symbolic order, the past is always 
present in the form of historical tradition and the meaning of these traces is not 
given; it changes continually with the transformations of the signifier's 
network.,24 Vindice's subject position is a consequence of what has happened to 
him as well as a symptom of revenge drama itself, a legacy he has no control 
over. It is in this respect that the play is at its most Calvinistic. 
Vindice's brother Hippolito informs him that the Duke's only legitimate 
heir, Lussorioso, seeks 'some strange-digested fellow' (I. i. 76) to serve him. 
Vindice sees this as his chance to get to the Duke by constructing an alter ego 
for himself. The play's commitment to problematising the politics of identity is 
revealed when Vindice resolves to be 'that strange composed fellow' (I. i. 96) 
for as he notes, 'to be honest is not to be i' th' world.' (I. i. 95) Vindice resolves 
to disguise himself and at the beginning of Act One, scene three the following 
exchange takes place. Vindice enters disguised: 
VINDICE What, brother? am I far enough from myself? 
HIPPO LITO As if another man had been sent whole 
Into the world, and none wist how he came. (I. iii. 1-3) 
IfVindice and Hippolito were referring to the 'dramatic' world in these 
exchanges, then they would appear by their own logic to undermine the veracity 
of the dramatic representation and the revenger's subject position within it. 
2.+6 
Mimesis is, after all, fundamentally 'dishonest' as I pointed out in chapter two. 
Conversely, if the brothers are referring to the 'real' world then this might 
alternatively suggest that 'honesty' is more readily found in dramatic 
representation and disguise. But as Karin Coddon has said of this play, 'With no 
stable semiotic to mark off natural from unnatural, life from death, the 
ontological status of playing is itself thrown into question in a far more radical 
way than one finds in the typical "world-as-stage" topOS.,25 IfVindice's 
subjectivity is problematised through his status as a player, how, then, is 
subjectivity in this play to be understood? 
One of the most well known attempts to come to terms with this problem is 
found in Stephen Greenblatt's study Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More 
to Shakespeare. Greenblatt's central thesis is neatly summed up in the first 
sentence of the book: 'my starting point is quite simply that in sixteenth century 
England there were both selves and a sense that they could be fashioned. ,26 
Depending on the political and cultural discourses with which they were obliged 
to negotiate, Greenblatt's subjects are potentially able to 'fashion' a variety of 
selves in relation to those contingent discourses. Nonetheless, the problem with 
this thesis is the assumption that there already exists within the subject a 
transcendent self that performs the process of fashioning. If this is the case then 
the fashioned self can only ever be a persona; underneath it resides the 'true' self 
from which various positions are constructed. Such a model, I suggest, cannot 
adequately account for the ways in which a play like The Revenger's Tragedy 
deliberately destabilises ontological markers of place, space and identity. To be 
fair to Greenblatt, however, he acknowledges in his autobiographical 'Epilogue' 
that the notion of selfhood advanced throughout the book is distinctly 
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problematic. He notes that "In all my texts and documents, there were, so far as I 
could tell, no moments of pure, unfettered subjectivity'. The famous anecdote 
that begins the 'Epilogue' recounts a time that Greenblatt was on a plane and 
was asked by a distraught father, whose son could no longer speak and who had 
lost the will to live, to mouth the words "I want to die". Greenblatt could not do 
this, he explains, because it impinged upon his 'overwhelming need to sustain 
the illusion that I am the principal maker of my own identity.,27 It would appear 
that Renaissance Self-Fashioning has come the full theoretical circle from 
stating that there were selves in the Renaissance and they could be fashioned to 
saying that, ultimately, the self is an illusion. Indeed, it might be possible to go 
even further than this. When Vindice becomes 'himself after being disguised as 
Piato, he does not revert back to anything resembling a stable self. In fact, if 
anything his sense of self becomes even more precarious than it was before. As 
he says in Act Four: '0, I'm in doubt whether I'm myself, or no.' (IV. iv. 24) 
This statement could just as easily describe early modem subjectivity. For these 
reasons, I believe that just as it is theoretically inappropriate to draw a neat 
distinction between the 'dramatic' and 'real' worlds in this play, or in any other 
for that matter, so it is impossible to speak of the subject in this play or 
elsewhere as in any way fashioned, if by this is meant that a transcendent self 
undertakes these various fashionings. Indeed, what both the play and Stephen 
Greenblatt seem to be pointing constantly towards, almost despite themselves, is 
the fundamental unknowability of the subject, and also that, as Antony Easthope 
puts it, 'subjectivity is impossible. ,28 
So far, I have focused on the importance of the father figure in the play: 
what of the mother? Possibly the most important aspect of the mother, not just in 
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this play but also in early modem culture as a whole, is that 'she' was essentially 
understood as a symptom of the corporeal. This symptomology has its roots in 
the texts of Aristotle and Galen and it underwrote the patriarchal structure of 
early modem sexuality. Women, anatomically and thus morally, were believed 
to be inferior to men. Early modem theoreticians understood 'male' and 'female' 
not as distinct genders but as different manifestations of what scholars, 
following Thomas Laqueur,29 have called the one-sex body. The principle 
behind this body was one of anatomical homology. As James I's physician 
Helkiah Crooke wrote in 1615: 
The testicles in men are larger and of a hotter nature than in women ... 
Wherefore heat abounding in men thrusts them forth of the body, whereas 
in women they remain within, because their dull and sluggish heate is not 
sufficient to thrust them out.30 
What is remarkable about this model is not only that the male and female share 
the same genital physiology but also that the body is itself a fluid construct with 
(potentially at least) shifting boundaries. The clear separation between the 
categories of male and female in post-Galenic discourse cannot be presumed in 
relation to early modem texts. 
This fluidity manifests itself in a number of ways in The Revenger's 
Tragedy, the most interesting being the exploration of 'the mother' in relation to 
secrets and secrecy. Lussorioso expresses the desire that in his dealings with him 
Vindice be 'as secret as thou'rt subtle' (1. iii. 74). Vindice replies: 
My lord, 
Secret? I ne' er had that disease 0' th' mother, 
I praise my father. Why are men made close, 
But to keep thoughts in best? I grant you this, 
Tell but some woman a secret overnight, 
Your doctor may find it in the urinal i' th' morning. 
(1. iii. 78-83) 
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These lexically dense lines require further examination. In early modern English 
the word 'secret' can refer to something told to a person in confidence. Its 
secondary sense, however, is connected to the verb 'secrete' a taxonomy that as , , 
this speech makes clear, has connections with the female. This is a noteworthy 
connection because as Patricia Parker has shown: 'The language of the close or 
secret - of a hidden matter or matrix to be dilated, opened and displayed -
pervades the literature of the "privities" of women in contrast to the exteriorised 
sexual parts ofmen.,31 The secret is associated with femininity because in the 
period (male) thinkers saw a homologous relationship between the secret kept 
hidden inside and the (to men) secretly located "privities" of women' . Certainly 
Vindice privileges masculine 'closeness' over female 'secret-ions'. Nevertheless 
the masculine partiality ofVindice's reading is perhaps not quite as gender-
specific as the revenger would like it to be. For as Parker makes clear, the terms 
'secret' and 'close' are lexical and cultural bedfellows that, if anything, privilege 
the feminine over the masculine. 
Significantly, the next time that 'the mother' is mentioned in the playas a 
corporeal taxonomy is when Vindice is trying to persuade his actual mother, 
Gratian~ to prostitute his sister Castiza. In response to Vindice's monetary 
bribe, Gratiana says: 'That woman! Will not be troubled with the mother long,! 
That sees the comfortable shine of you.' (II. i. 125-127) It is noticeable that both 
here and in Vindice's speech above, the word 'mother' is objectified through the 
deployment of the definitive article 'the'. In both cases what is being alluded to 
is 'hysteria', the affliction '0' the mother'. This was a condition where the womb 
was believed to wander up the body causing loss of breath and panic in the 
subject. Once more this was not an exclusively female phenomenon. In 
250 
Shakespeare's King Lear, the King famously cries 'O! how this mother swells 
up toward my heart;/ Hysterica passio! down, thou climbing sorrow!' (II. iv. 54-
55)32 Although this condition was spoken about as if it had a physiological basis, 
early modem writers knew enough about the anatomical structure of the body to 
know that the womb probably could not wander about the body. As Thomas 
Laqueur observes: 'Whatever they were debating when they pondered whether 
the womb wandered, it was not a discussion about the actual travels of an organ 
from its ligamentary anchor below, up through a foot and a half of densely 
packed body parts. ,33 So what was at stake in this strange debate? 
In The Revenger's Tragedy, one possible answer can be found in Castiza's 
reaction to her suggested match with Lussorioso. When her mother presses her 
to accept, the following exchange takes place: 
CASTIZA I cry you mercy, lady, I mistook you; 
Pray, did you see my mother? Which way went you? 
Pray God I have not lost her. 
VINDICE [Aside] Prettily put by. 
GRA TIANA Are you as proud to me as coy to him? 
Do you not know me now? 
CASTIZA Why, are you she? 
The world's so chang'd, one shape into another, 
It is a wise child now that knows her mother! (II. i. 161-167) 
In relation to the homo social politics of the court that now impinge upon 
Castiza, 'the mother' does not exist. Her mocking tone reflects the fact that 
Gratiana has entered into a masculine domain that her daughter believes is 
unnatural. Interestingly Castiza's last comment that 'It is a wise child now that 
knows her mother' is, as R. A. Foakes points out, and inversion of the common 
proverb that states: 'It is a wise child that knows his own father. ,34 In this world 
of unstable shape-shifters, the authority of the mother and the father, indeed of 
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the family as an authoritative institution (as well as the patriarchal and aphoristic 
lexis that underpins that authority) is brought into question. As Andre Green 
points out, 'The family ... is the tragic space par excellence, no doubt because in 
the family the knots of love - and therefore of hate - are not only the earliest, 
but also the most important ones. ,35 This is why this scene represents much more 
than a comment upon the plasticity of early modem mimetic art. Indeed, by 
emphasising the fundamental malleability of familial authority through its 
manipulation of mimesis, this scene also draws attention to a deep-rooted 
tension in the period between what various loci of authority, such as the family 
or the secular ruler, promise to signify and what they actually signify in practice. 
The place where that tension is most noticeably played out is the subject. 
At this stage, it might be useful to return to the Freudian model of 
subjective identity that I have been commenting upon throughout this chapter. I 
do so because while Freud posits a similar model of the subject produced in 
relation to a split from an authorising figure (or group), there are some important 
differences in respect of the early modem model that require to be examined. In 
order to do this, it will be useful to turn to Freud's 1933 lecture entitled 
'Femininity' which effectively represents his fmal thoughts on the Oedipal 
structure of desire and identity formation. According to Freud, both male and 
female identity/sexuality is determined by a primary split from the mother: 
A boy's mother is the first object of his love, and she remains so too during 
the formation of his Oedipus complex and, in essence, all through his life. 
For a little girl too her first object must be her mother. .. But in the Oedipus 
situation the girl's father has become her love-object, and we expect that in 
the normal course of development she will find her way from this paternal 
object to her final choice of an object.36 
Clearly the configurations of this model are problematised in light of the texts 
that have been examined in this chapter, and in others. In the first place, as I 
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have argued, the patriarch in early modem culture most commonly initiates the 
primary locus of desire and trauma, whereas in Freud this association is 
reversed. In relation to early modem writing, then, is the Freudian model 
theoretically useful? The best way of addressing the problems presented by this 
model is in relation to the important work of the Freudian critic Leo Bersani. 
In his book The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art, Bersani offers 
what amounts to a radical reworking of Freud's Oedipus complex. Bersani 
approaches this task from a number of different angles. The first is textual. He 
argues that the Freudian text is itself volatile and that 'the psychoanalytical 
authenticity of Freud's work depends on a process of theoretical collapse.,37 Far 
from being a stable account of the ways in which identity is constructed, 'the 
Oedipus complex represses the unintelligibility of Oedipal relations. ,38 This 
unintelligibility arises, argues Bersani, because of what he sees as 'our refusal to 
recognise the violence in which our sexuality is grounded. ,39 This insight is 
critical because it allows Bersani to go, as it were, beyond the subject as the 
grounding ontological focus of the Oedipus complex. He notes: 
The violence of the Oedipal structure is not merely that of an imagined 
rivalry between child and parent; by inhibiting fantasmatic mobility the 
Oedipal father promotes a self-destructing sexuality, a derivative 
masochism which threatens both the individual and civilization.4o 
In going theoretically beyond Freud, Bersani conversely offers a reading of 
sexuality and identification that seems much more useful in terms of early 
modem culture. In particular, his focus on the political implications of the 
Oedipal complex is significant. The violence of the father figure, both in 
generating and radically fixing the actions of his offspring, goes indeed to the 
centre of how early modem society conceived of itself as a political entity. For 
example, in Thomas Nashe's rumination on the fragility of the contemporary 
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polis, Christ's Teares Over Ierusalem, the masculine figure of Christ says, 'At 
my breastes Ierusalem hast thou not suckt, but bitte off my breasts' .41 It is not so 
much the gender porosity that is so fascinating here as the violence that 
structures the city and informs the behaviour of its inhabitants towards their 
'founding father'. For while Christ gives both the polis and the subject life, 
represented by his feminine breasts, it is the life giving breasts that are 
simultaneously the sites of violent attack. 
In relation to my reading of early modem culture, it is necessary to go 
beyond the Freudian body and, perhaps more importantly, beyond the modem 
gender categories of 'male' and 'female' to a much more uninscribed, porous 
and violent symbolic order. While the father retains his symbolic centrality in 
the process of identity formation, it is no longer possible to ascribe masculine 
'values' or traits exclusively to that figure. The converse is also true of the 
mother. In order to explain this further, it will be useful to examine a passage 
from John Calvin's Sermons ... on the Epistles ofS. Paule to Timothie and Titus. 
In the first sermon, Calvin offers a fascinating analysis of the genealogy of the 
father: 
there is a comparison made betweene fleshly fathers, and the father of our 
soules, (which is but one) as though they were things one contrarie to an 
other: but all this wil verie weI agree together, if we once vnderstand, how 
God is our father, and how men are. This name father is so honorable, that 
it belongeth to none, but to God onely. Yea in respect of our bodies. And 
therefore, when we say, that they which have begotten vs, according to the 
flesh, are our fathers, it is an vnproper kind of speech: for no mortall 
creature deserueth this so high and excellent dignitie: yet so it is, that God 
of his singular goodnesse aduaunceth men, to this so high a steppe, that he 
will that they be called fathers: and he doth it to this end and purpose, that 
they should acknowledge them selues to be so much more bound vnto 
hi 42 m. 
As Calvin makes clear, the role of father is only grudgingly bequeathed to fallen 
humankind. Because it is a usurpation of God's all-encompassing masculinity, 
the subject position of the father participates in what Emmanuel Levinas has 
called 'This growing surplus of the Infinite' .43 This means that the father-as-
subject is always deferred. The father has no direct access to his name or to the 
patriarchal subjectivity it represents, just as man has no direct access to the 
Calvinistic God. In effect, this form of subjectivity is predicated upon a 
prohibition of the very name that structures early modern society: father, pater, 
Deus. As Leo Bersani argues: 
The fascination of our civilization, from Job to Kafka, with an absolutely 
impenetrable Law which refuses to allow itself to be obeyed is perhaps, in 
psychoanalytic terms, the displaced version of a uniquely human distress: 
the distress of being inhabited, and even constituted, by the wholly 
inaccessible and wholly inescapable, alien and alienating, objects of our 
desires. The mythology of the Oedipus complex presents this monstrous 
and unavoidable impossibility as a goal of human development, as if the 
primary Oedipal identification constituted a way of transgressing 
aggressiveness rather than the psychic operation which makes it pennanent. 
The post-Oedipal superego legalizes pre-Oedipal aggressiveness; it 
transforms object-loss into object-interdiction, and thereby makes us 
permanently guilty of those very moves of consciousness by which objects 
of desire become agents of punishment. 44 
So in early modem culture, even if the status of father is given in order that man 
might be 'so much more bound vnto him', this cleaving to God does not offer 
stability. Calvin explains in a sermon on Timothy that 'when we thinke we are 
well disposed to serue God, there is always some thing, I cannot tell what, that 
holdeth vs backe. ,45 It is impossible in this Calvinist schema for the individual 
ever to be centred, for in identifying with the father, either as a father or as a 
subject, the individual encounters a fundamental prohibition and thus a 
SUbjective lack. 
This lack might also be associated with the desire of the 'big Other'. As 
Slavoj Zizek explains, to desire repletion within the symbolic order, to be 
reconciled with, in this case God is a fantasy, 'an imaginary scenario filling out 
the void, the opening of the desire o/the Other'. The problem for the subject is 
that he/she fantasises that he/she knows what the 'big Other' wants. Zizek 
explains that this is a false knowledge: 
by giving us a definitive answer to the question 'What does the Other 
want?', it enables us to evade the unbearable deadlock in which the Other 
wants something from us, but we are at the same time incapable of 
translating this desire of the Other into a positive interpellation, into a 
mandate with which to identify.46 
The human subject is incapable of translating, or indeed of identifying with the 
desire of the 'big Other'. But because this figure structures the symbolic order, 
the subject cannot symbolically exist without that Other. 
In The Revenger's Tragedy, this lack is mediated by and through the field 
of the gaze. With Lussorioso in prison, Vindice gets his opportunity to kill the 
Duke. The revenger explains to his brother: 
the old duke, 
Thinking my outward shape and inward heart 
Are cut out of one piece (for he that prates 
His secrets, his heart stands 0' th' outside) 
Hires me by price to greet him with a lady 
In some fit place, veil' d from the eyes 0' th' court (III. v. 8-13). 
Here, Vindice acts as ironic anatomist both of himself and of his intended 
victim. In the case of the Duke, this verbal anatomy ('His heart stands 0' the 
outside') stands in ironic counterpoint to the terrible physical violence that will 
be visited upon him shortly. Hippolito asks 'where's that lady now?' (III. v. 28) 
and Vindice replies '0, at that word! I'm lost again, you cannot find me yet' (III. 
v. 28-9) reaffirming the connection between Gloriana and Vindice's subjectivity. 
He has placed her skull atop a mannequin and put poison on the lips of the 'bony 
lady' (III. v. 121), hoping to lure the Duke into kissing it. He outlines his 
rationale: 
Now to my tragic business; look you, brother, 
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I have not fashion'd this only for show 
And useless property; no, it shall bear a part 
E'en in its own revenge. (III. v. 99-102) 
In Vindice' s theatre of death, theatricality is invoked in an ironic parody of the 
world-as-stage topos, a parody that implicates the gaze of the audience as they 
try to distinguish the lineaments of the dialectical struggle between 
representation and 'reality'. 
The brothers succeed in tricking the Duke into kissing the skull. As he lies 
dying, Vindice says: 
DUKE 
VINDICE 
Look, monster, what a lady hast thou made me 
My once betrothed wife. 
Is it thou, villain? 
Nay then-
'Tis I, 'tis Vindice, 'tis 1. 
HIPPOLITO And let this comfort thee: our lord and father 
Fell sick upon the infection of thy frowns 
And died in sadness; be that thy hope of life. 
(III. v. 166-171) 
The grotesque death of the Duke represents the ultimate inversion of the 
discourse of similitude that underwrites the practice of lineage. The Duke's 
status as (false) father and representative of political authority is predicated upon 
representation, upon a series of unstable signifiers. In attacking the false father 
with the skull, the potent symbol of the sexual fulfilment he was never able to 
attain, the son highlights, in Bersani' s words, the terrible way in which, in the 
arena of violent Oedipal desire, 'objects of desire become agents of 
punishment. ,47 By making the Duke kiss the body ofVindice's lover, this act 
becomes symbolic of the reasons behind Vindice's personification as 
'Vengeance' . Indeed, when Vindice says to the Duke 'What? is not thy tongue 
eaten out yet? Then! We'll invent a silence' (III. v. 194-195) the inversion 
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becomes clearer. The Duke has been silenced by the lady and now holds an 
analogous subject position to her. In this way, the silent, ghostly body of 
Vindice's lover subverts the body of patriarchy by taking away its voice, its 
ability to confer names upon SUbjects. By writing voicelessness upon the Duke's 
body, the skull exposes the fragile ideology of political similitude upon which 
patriarchal lineage is founded. 
Both the sons avenge the father, something that Hamlet does not get to do 
until his dying moments. They also force the Duke to watch his Duchess 
cuckolding him with his bastard son, Spurio. Vindice says to Hippolito: 
Brother, 
If he but wink, not brooking the foul object, 
Let our two other hands tear up his lids, 
And make his eyes, like comets, shine through blood; 
When the bad bleeds, then is the tragedy good. (III. v. 201-205) 
These are extraordinary lines. In the first place, they profoundly disrupt the 
symbolic gaze of the audience. James I famously wrote in Basi/icon Doran 
(1603) that Kings 'are as it were set (as it was said of old) vpon a publike stage, 
in the sight of all the people; where all the beholders eyes are attentiuely bent to 
looke and pry in the least circumstance of their secretest drifts' .48 The gaze 
according to James is a one-way process and it objectifies the populace as they 
regard the authoritative Other. Vindice's actions profoundly disrupt this gaze of 
power. His insistence that the Duke's gaze 'shine through blood' inscribes the 
ruler as the primary spectator of the action he watches (his bastard son with his 
wife). The gazed-at becomes the gazer. He becomes objectified and the audience 
become the objectifying Others in relation to his personal drama. In the words of 
Philip Annstrong, 'Theatre ... perpetually contaminates the position of pure 
spectatorship, precipitating its audience into (the) action.,49 Vindice's actions not 
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only politicise the gaze, they show the audience that representation is ultimately 
an unstable basis for Law. The theatrical power of the audience's gaze disrupts 
the hegemony of the representation and of patriarchal authority by showing that 
perception is never passive but is dependent upon a subject's position within the 
symbolic order. Vindice's self-mocking comment 'When the bad bleeds, then is 
the tragedy good' shows that any claims in this play to mimetic art as a 
'representation of reality' are disrupted at the level of the gaze. 
The play now proceeds almost hastily to its violent denouement. Vindice 
(undisguised) is hired by Lussorioso, this time to kill Piato his alter ego, who 
caused Lussorioso to go to prison. Vindice gets around the problem of having to 
kill himself in a wonderful coup de theatre. He dresses the dead Duke's body in 
Piato's clothes and stabs the dead body. Vindice ruminates on the ridiculousness 
of the situation in which he finds himself. Regarding the Duke's body dressed in 
Piato's clothes he says: 
I must kill myself. Brother, that's I; that sits for me; do you 
mark it? And I must stand ready here to make away myself yonder - I 
must sit to be killed, and stand to kill myself (V. i. 4-7). 
In these lines, Vindice identifies with his 'mirror image' and says that he will 
'kill' it, as he in fact does. But this is not the end of this signifying chain. There 
is a deficiency in Vindice's perception of his actions, and that deficiency is 
brought to the fore, unsurprisingly, by the politics of theatricality. After stabbing 
the dead body, Vindice says in an important aside: 
This much by wit a deep revenger can, 
When murder's known, to be the clearest man. 
We're furthest off, and with as bold an eye 
Survey his body as the standers-by. (V. i. 92-95) 
The use of the collective contracted pronoun 'We're' attempts to locate Vindice 
and the audience as passive spectators to this act. They are all supposedly 
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'standers-by' who regard at a distance what has been and is happening on stage. 
Yet surely the audience's role is more problematic that the 'deep revenger~ 
supposes? 
Vindice continues to personify himself as 'Vengeance', a form of dramatic 
disguise. He also desires that the audience acknowledge him as 'one of them' , 
standing by, observing, detached. But his dramatic disguise, 'Piato', has been 
displaced onto the Duke. More than this, in stabbing the body he has also 
'murdered' Piato. Therefore, the audience is gazing at Vindice, gazing at his 
alter ego, his mirror of self, and refusing to acknowledge it as such. Vindice can 
only be 'a deep revenger' if he has someone or something to avenge. Yet he has 
carried out every act of vengeance that he set out to accomplish. For this reason, 
it is the audience who supply the lack in Vindice's perception. Vindice is 
impelled into the symbolic realm of mimetic revenge both by the gaze of the 
audience and by his subjective fragmentation 'in the mirror'. This is crucial for 
as Armstrong points out, 'The symbolic gaze of the Other disturbs this 
imaginary sovereignty of the optical field, by introducing that perspective from 
which the subject is surveyed as an object. ,50 In the battle between 
representation and audience for symbolic consistency on the early modem stage, 
the audience will almost always win no matter how hard the struggle. Vindice is 
impelled into the symbolic realm of mimetic revenge both by the gaze of the 
audience and by his subjective fragmentation 'in the mirror'. What he sees 
staring back at him is only ever a (dead) representation. In other words, 
Vindice's alter ego, the Duke, positioned him as subject for the nine years that 
he planned his revenge. Alive, the Duke allowed him to destabilise the semiotic 
boundaries between dramatic and 'real' worlds. However. his death is also the 
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revenger's death. For where the father generates progeny, all that Vindice 
generates is violence; a surplus of meaning that fuels the discourse of revenge 
drama but which eventually becomes nonmeaning. He becomes in Zizek' s 
words, 'an objectification of a void, of a discontinuity opened in reality by the 
emergence of the signifier.,51 The farcical, 'non-realistic' ending of the play, 
with the brothers gleefully confessing their crimes and being taken for 
execution, would appear to confinu this. Vindice ultimately signifies 
'Vengeance' and in broader tenus, revenge tragedy. Yet the one lineage he 
cannot avenge is the violent lineage of the mimetic tradition to which he 
belongs. As he signifies in violence, so he dies by violence. It is instructive here 
to recall Calvin's words on the sins of the father: it is 'no brief and simple 
revenge, but one that will extend to the children, the grandchildren, and the 
great-grandchildren, who obviously become imitators of their fathers' impiety.' 
Traditional readings of The Revenger's Tragedy are noticeable for turning 
the play and its subjects into a series of morality tableaux. In my analysis, I have 
demonstrated that the processes of subjectivity utilised and commented upon in 
this drama are much more complex than this critical tradition commonly allows. 
Specifically, this tradition sidesteps the way in which Protestantism conceives of 
the father as a deeply paradoxical figure who both demands filial devotion and 
repudiates the processes by which that devotion might be expressed. This 
patriarchal discourse fonus such an important part of revenge drama's signifying 
power because it also underwrites the subjectivity of the revenger himself. 
Consequently, plays such as The Revenger's Tragedy and Hamlet provide 
searching critiques of the investment of the genre of revenge drama in the 
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political, theological and cultural authority of the father. The subjectivity of the 
revenger is deeply problematic because in order to signify at all, the revenger 
must in some way repudiate the father (figure). Nevertheless, that repudiation 
can only ever be temporary. As The Revenger's Tragedy demonstrates so 
powerfully, the tragedy of the revenger is revenge. For as Vindice knows only 
too well, "Tis time to die when we are ourselves our foes.' (V. iii. 110) 
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Chapter Seven 
'Nothing is, but what is not'. Macbeth, Witchcraft and the 
Subject of Anti-Time 
The little world the subject of my muse, 
Is an huge task and labour infinite; 
Like to a wilderness or mass confuse, 
Or to an endless gulf, or to the night: 
How many strange meanders do I find? 
How many paths do turn my straying pen? 
How many doubtful twilights make me blind, 
Which seek to limn out this strange All of men? 
Easy it were the earth to portray out, 
Or to draw forth the heavens' purest frame, 
Whose restless course by order whirls about 
Of change and place, and still remains the same. 
But how shall men's, or manners' form appear, 
Which while I write, do change from what they were?l 
At first glance, the difficulty at the heart of Thomas Bastard's sonnet 'Ad 
Lectorem de Subiecto Operis Sui' is with the subject of writing. The 'straying 
pen' of the sixth line is only ever able to fleetingly record a necessarily 
impressionistic account of what is a turbulent and changing world. But by the 
ninth line, it becomes clear that the subject of the poem is not so much the 
physical world as the world of the subject. To 'portray out' the earth itself or 
even to 'draw forth the heavens' purest frame' is considered to be 'easy' in 
comparison to writing the subject. For in the very act of authorial inscription 
('while I write') men's 'form[s] .. ./ do change from what they were?' In order to 
achieve the kind of fixity that would contain this fluidity, it would be necessary 
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to gain authorial mastery over the intertwined exigencies of both language and 
world. The poem clearly reveals this ideal as a fantasy. Indeed, the poet's own 
name, connoting the Filius Nullius of bastardy, the son of no one, acts as an 
ironic commentary on the failure that is the subject of the poem. Yet perhaps 
more interesting than any of this is the 'wilderness' or 'endless gulf' that appears 
at the centre of the unruly 'little world'. The inscription of the author may fail to 
provide fixity and the poem may be unable to name man's ever changing 'form', 
but in an important sense these are secondary concerns. Rather, it is the 'endless 
gulf, the unaccountable interior lack that constitutes the sonnet's subject. 
I have begun with Bastard's poem because it exemplifies to a considerable 
degree the kind of subjectivity that will be the focus of this chapter. This 
SUbjectivity differs from those examined in the previous two chapters because it 
is not directly concerned with what might be called the institutional function of 
the subject. What I mean is that in the chapters on Doctor Faustus and The 
Revenger's Tragedy, I argued that the subjectivity manifested in these plays was 
inextricably linked to the corporate identity and signifying function of important 
institutional figures such as Christ, the Devil or the Father. I also suggested that 
the structural and affective gap between the institutional figure and the 
individual subject was what simultaneously constituted and undermined these 
expressions of early modem subjectivity. It is certainly the case that the 
ideological construction of these institutional figures reflects, to a certain extent, 
the political configurations and contradictions of, say, the Church or the Family. 
Nonetheless, as political avatars with which the individual has little choice but to 
affectively engage, the figures representative of these institutions also signify the 
ideological failure of early modem society and discourse to bridge the gap 
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between individual and institution. The most common result, as I have shown, is 
a subjectivity that signifies powerfully against the dominant ideological grain 
and yet is painfully bound to the very ideological discourses and figures that 
produce it. 
But what about those less visible and politically central figures and groups 
with whom early modem subjects also engaged? What about figures such as 
prostitutes, vagrants or witches or foreigners who, while not always carrying the 
same political weight as those institutional figures already mentioned, 
nevertheless signify powerfully in the early modem cultural consciousness? In 
an extension of chapter four, I focus in this chapter and in the next one on, 
respectively, the Protestant engagement with the witch and the foreigner. In 
particular, I want to suggest that the failure of central institutional figures like 
God or the Family to offer the subject complete identification opened up a space 
within which figures like witches and foreigners could signify. Indeed, if 
Catholicism can be seen as the theological unconscious of the early modem 
subject then conceivably the figures examined in the next two chapters can be 
seen as the social unconscious of that subject. 
In the first place, it is important to state that witches and foreigners were no 
different to any other groups in (or rather outwith) early modem society in being 
discussed in explicitly theological terms. Central to this discussion was the 
theory of inversion. Put simply, these figures represented a deep threat to society 
because they inverted the perceived 'normal' order of things. To tum to 
witchcraft in particular, as Stuart Clark observes, 'Witchcraft had all the 
appearance of a proper religion but in reality it was religion perverted. And since 
genuine religion was, in theory, a total experience, so its demonic copy was all-
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embracing.,2 Throughout this chapter, I will utilise Clark's definition of 
witchcraft but I will also attempt to amend it slightly to encompass the 
production of the 'endless gulf at the centre of subjectivity that I begun with. 
F or this reason, it is important to state that engagement with figures such as 
witches gave rise to an identifiable kind of subjective response that can be traced 
in those early modem writings that record such engagements. However, in a 
different way from other forms of identification, the subject who engages with a 
witch is left with, if anything, a deeper sense of the alienating strangeness of the 
self. For if a witch signifies an 'all-embracing' inversion of 'proper' religious 
observance and practice then the SUbjectivity produced through an encounter 
with a witch will necessarily offer an inversion of Christian selfhood. But this is 
not simply a case of evil inverting good. If we are to accept the premise that 
orthodox Protestant religious discourse produced a deeply divided subject, then 
it follows that in inverting this discourse, witchcraft replicates these divisions. If 
Katherine Maus is correct when she notes that 'Renaissance religious 
culture ... nurtures habits of mind that encourage conceiving of human 
inwardness ... as at once privileged and elusive, an absent, presence "interpreted" 
to observers by ambiguous inklings and tokens' 3, then any encounter with the 
witch only serves to intensify this process. In this chapter, I intend to focus on 
William Shakespeare's exploration of these issues in Macbeth (1605).4 
From the late Romantic period onwards there has been an extremely 
influential school of criticism that has effectively secularised the Witches in 
Macbeth. This has been achieved by examining them almost solely in relation to 
the concept of evil. Taken together, these two statements may seem more than a 
little contradictory, especially considering the theological significance of evil 
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and its doctrinal converse, good. However, most of the critics who comprise this 
school of critical thought have, consciously or not, followed the Enlightenment 
project of conceiving of evil as, primarily, an extrinsic moral category. For 
example, writing on the Witches around 1818, Samuel Taylor Coleridge argued 
that 'Their character consists in the imaginative disconnected from the good'. 5 
This sense of the Witches' 'disconnectedness' was taken up and developed by 
Coleridge's admirer William Hazlitt who in 1820 noted that the Witches are 
'hags of mischief, obscene panders to iniquity, malicious from their impotence 
of enjoyment, enamoured of destruction because they are themselves unreal, 
abortive, half-existences,.6 More than Coleridge, Hazlitt's reading aligns the 
numinous Witches with an extrinsic concept of eviL Broadly speaking it was this 
reading of the hags that remained dominant, at least until the later Victorian 
period. Then in 1904, A. C. Bradley published Shakespearian Tragedy in which 
he denounced what he saw as 'a "philosophy" of the Witches,.7 According to 
Bradley, the precise status of the Witches was not the central issue. Certainly 
they were not 'supernatural beings' nor were they the 'symbolic representations 
of the unconscious or half-conscious guilt in Macbeth himself.,8 Rather, the 
Witches were 'old women, poor and ragged, skinny and hideous,.9 But despite 
making this point, Bradley does not completely disavow the heritage of the 
Romantics. This is particularly the case when he observes that the hags represent 
both 'the evil slumbering in the hero's soul' and, more importantly, 'all those 
obscurer influences of evil around him in the world' .10 Evil may reside in 
Macbeth but it also exists in the extrinsic abstract. 
Perhaps the most extreme, and certainly one of the most influential 
expressions of the RomanticlBradley reading of the Witches' relationship to evil 
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was the one advanced in 1930 by G. Wilson Knight. I I He argues that in 
Macbeth, evil 
comes from without. The Weird Sisters are thus objectively conceived: 
they are not, as are phantasms and ghosts, the subjective effect of evil in 
the protagonist's mind. They are, within the Macbeth universe, independent 
entities. 12 
For Knight, the Witches represent 'absolute evil'. 13 Indeed, in a reading that 
makes explicit the presuppositions of his critical predecessors, Knight constructs 
evil as an extrinsic and essentialised moral category that exists and signifies 
independent of the human realm. By aligning the Witches within an a-historical, 
'objective' and self-determining concept of 'evil', Knight does not engage with 
the fact that the presentation of the Witches in the play is far more contradictory 
and unstable than his essentialised rhetoric would suppose. More importantly, all 
the critics that I have examined reduce the hags to a purely functional role: either 
they reflect the hero's mind or else some loosely defined evil. In opposition to 
this reading I want to suggest the converse: that Macbeth's subjectivity reflects 
his various encounters with the Witches. 
The principle of inversion that I introduced earlier is highlighted by the 
words of the Witches' chant: 'Fair is foul, foul is fair:' (I. i. 11)14 Significantly, 
this inversion is paralleled in Macbeth's very first words: 'So foul and fair a day 
I have not seen' (I. iii. 38), a sentence that seems to be constructed upon the 
linguistic negation of its own grammatical postulates. The important point about 
this parallelism is that it not only presents the audience with a linguistic 
connection between the Witches and Macbeth; it also mirrors the terminological 
instability of referential language that is so typical of contemporary witchcraft 
texts. To take one example, in James I's Daemonology (1597), the 
knowledgeable interlocutor Epistemon is forced to deny that his understanding 
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of witchcraft arises because he is himself a witch. As he says to Philomathes: . I 
thinke ye take me to be a Witch my selfe, or at the least would faine sweare your 
selfe prentise to that craft' .15 In matters of diabolism, the gap between seeming 
and being is distinctly volatile. This is why Banquo asks Macbeth: 'why do you 
start, and seem to fearl Things that do sound so fair?' (1. iii. 51-52). The crucial 
word here is 'seem'. As will become clear, Macbeth is structured around the 
uncertainty generated by whether someone or something 'seems' or, in fact, • is' . 
So by making this connection between the Witches and Macbeth at this early 
stage in the play, Shakespeare is not suggesting that the Thane of Cawdor is a 
witch, but rather that his internal being might be susceptible to their 
imprecations. 
It is important to state at this point that inversion is not simply a case of 
promoting one term in a binary opposition over the other. Rather, the principle 
takes much of its cultural potency from the fact that it is often very difficult to 
see where one opposition ends and another begins. Stuart Clark has argued: 
by defIning categories in relation to each other it [the principle of 
inversion] entails a constant and ultimately unresolvable semantic 
exchange between them. The mind only settles on the meaning of one 
contrary by confronting the meaning of its partner; whereupon the semantic 
dependence of the second term on the fIrst becomes just as apparent, and 
the initial act of understanding is unsettled. In this logical sequence there is 
neither simultaneity, nor priority, only deferment of meaning. 16 
In Macbeth, this de constructive phenomenon is reflected especially in the 
ambivalent sexual status of the Witches. Banquo asks: 
What are these, 
So wither'd and so wild in their attire, 
That look not like th' inhabitants 0' th' earth, 
And yet are on't? Live you? Or are you aught 
That man may question? You seem to understand me, 
By each at once her choppy fInger laying 
Upon her skinny lips: you should be women, 
And yet your beards forbid me to interpret 
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That you are so. (1. iii. 39-47) 
Because they cannot be definitively classified as either men or women the 
, 
Witches present Banquo, Macbeth and the audience with a perceptual and 
epistemological problem: what does their corporal ambiguity signify? The 
anonymous author of a pamphlet entitled The Witches of Northhamptonshire 
(1612) provides one possible answer to this question. The author wrote that 
'whatsoever they [witches] appear in visible form it is no more but an apparition 
and counterfeit show ofa body'.17 This is a common view in witchcraft writings 
of the period. The word that I want to focus on is 'counterfeit'. 
It might be useful to pause here in order to explore the reasons behind this 
strange tenninological choice. In the first place, early modem society lived with 
death in a way that is almost unimaginable today. Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that many should regard the putrefaction of the flesh (including their 
own) as the actual and metaphorical manifestation of the consequences of sin. 
As the moralist William Rankins said in 1587, 'the temple of our bodies which 
should be consecrate vnto him, is made a stage of stinking stuff, a den for 
theeues, and an habitation for insatiate monsters.' 18 Scholars have noted this 
negative attitude towards the body amongst Protestant writers of the period and 
it is common to see references to what one critic calls 'the estranged, filthy 
bodies of Protestant theology' .19 But in many respects this is a slightly 
disingenuous reading of what is a more complex cultural attitude, and it requires 
some modification. It is undoubtedly true to say that, for example, John Calvin 
did insist in places upon the depravity of the human body, calling it variously 
20 . . ·21 
'carrion, dirt, and corruption' and 'a shameful thing one dare not mentIOn. 
Comments such as this follow in a long Christian tradition of flagellation (both 
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metaphorical and literal) of the corporeal, a tradition that in more general tenns 
Calvin was careful to adhere to. As early as the third century AD for example, it 
is possible to find Gregory of Nyssa calling the body 'filth,22 and many of the 
early Church fathers who Calvin so admired were not known for their convivial 
attitudes towards the flesh. 
Nonetheless, this only represents one side of the tradition that Calvin 
inherited and with which he sought to negotiate. In the words of William 
Bouwsma, 'growing recognition that Calvin's formation and culture were that of 
a Renaissance humanist can now help us understand Calvin the Reformer.,23 Or 
to put it slightly differently, it would be surprising if Calvin's extensive 
humanistic training in Paris did not bequeath to him, if not a complete 
acceptance of the human body, then at least an awareness of its potential as a 
vehicle for good. Thus, it is possible to fmd him stating in a sermon on Job that 
'Our bodies are, in their essence, good creations of God' .24 The central word 
here is 'essence' because in Calvinism it is the human essence that is the 
manifestation of the divine in man. Metaphysically ratified through this interior 
function, the body signifies God's providential design that orders the world. 
Nevertheless, there is a problem with this metaphysic: sin. If God's 
providence governs all things, then this must necessarily encompass all human 
actions, including sin. Indeed, if a man or a woman sins it must logically reflect 
in some way upon their maker. Calvin famously rejected such a notion and he 
did so with statements, which if they are not to be seen as illogical, must be seen 
as one side of an argumentative dialectic. After Adam's Fall, God's image was 
'so vitiated and almost blotted out that nothing remains after the ruin except 
what is confused, mutilated, and disease-ridden. ,25 This quotation is the 
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dialectical opposite of the statement above that sees the body in its essence as a 
good creation of God. On the one hand God creates the body as a good essence, 
yet on the other hand this essence is perverted through sin and can have no 
connection with the unimpeachable divine essence. Nonetheless, it would be 
historically and theologically inaccurate to see this as evidence of a contradiction 
in Calvin's thought per se. Rather, it becomes incumbent upon the Calvinist 
subject to ensure that in hislher battle with sin they conduct themselves in a way 
that allows their subjectivity to be at one with the divine. Ultimately, if the 
human subject fails to match up to the divine, then this is the fault of the subject, 
not God. It is this kind of theological distinction that makes Calvinism the 
religion of interiority par excellence. It is also the distinction that gives witches 
their particular signifying power. 
Man's first and most proper relationship is with God and, as I have noted in 
earlier chapters, early modem theologians and writers conceived of this 
relationship in identifiably mimetic terms. Calvin noted that God 'is to be seen 
as in an image' and that 'he is shown to us not as he is in himself, but as he is 
towards us' .26 In a sense it is the perceiving subject who verifies the existence of 
God. However, as Calvin also says, man cannot in fact know God's 
27 . I th . 
'incomprehensible essence' through representatIOn, menta or 0 efWlse, 
because 'flesh is always uneasy until it has obtained some figment like itself in 
which it may fondly fmd solace as in an image of God. ,28 Calvin concludes by 
stating: 'how can the mind by its own leading come to search out God's essence 
when it cannot even get to its own?,29 This is a crucial quotation in any 
understanding of Calvinist metaphysics and the subject's place within them. In 
the first place, the Calvinist subject is radically anti-essential in its makeup. This 
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is not to say that it is an emerging subject or even a subject 'coming into being~. 
Rather it is a subject defined by and through an existential lack. It is for this 
reason that Calvin can state that God 'represents both himself and his everlasting 
Kingdom in the mirror of his works' .30 As was noted earlier, the reflection seen 
by the subject is far from clear. The subject may only know God mimetically 
through counterfeit representation, and it is this process that divides the subject 
from its theological point of origin. 
All this demands that the earlier quotation from The Witches of 
Northamptonshire ('whatsoever they [witches] appear in visible form it is no 
more but an apparition and counterfeit show of a body') is viewed in a different 
light. The early modem discourse of witchcraft not only inverts conventional 
categories of signification, it replicates the contradictions inherent in that 
discourse's metaphysic: if God is a counterfeit then so are witches. If 
Protestantism produces a subject whose interiority is structured around a 
fundamental lack then Protestant witchcraft theory appropriates that paradigm by 
foregrounding the contradictions that engender that lack. In Macbeth, the 
ambiguous Witches whose riddling speech promises 'A deed without a name' 
(IV. i. 49) and whose fantastical appearance opens up a gap between perception 
and comprehension cannot be 'interpreted' because they offer a parody of the 
subject's choice before God. To identify fully is impossible so the human subject 
identifies with the Other only in so far as he or she can. It is for this reason that 
the Witches are, in Terry Eagleton's words, 'the "unconscious" of the drama, 
that which must be exiled and repressed as dangerous but which is always likely 
·th ,31 to return WI a vengeance. 
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And return they do via Macbeth's subjective reaction to his encounter. He 
says: 
This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill; cannot be good: -
If ill, why hath it given me earnest of success , 
Commencing in a truth? I am Thane ofCawdor: 
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair, 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs, 
Against the use of nature? (I. iii. 130-137) 
It is immediately noticeable that even though Macbeth putatively attempts to see 
the shape-shifting Witches in terms of a moral binary between 'ill' and 'good' he 
cannot privilege one term over the other. The hags who 'seem'd corporal' (I. iii. 
81) manifest not essence but difference. Moreover, it is significant that Macbeth 
should call the action of the Witches 'soliciting'. While this word can refer 
simply to a request, it also implies prostitution. Indeed, the French root of the 
word means 'to disturb', a word that accurately describes Macbeth's state and 
which establishes an interesting connection between the discourses of witchcraft 
and prostitution. In the first place, both of these figures disturbed the 
conventions of patriarchal and theological dictates. Because of this, they were 
discussed in terms that were often strikingly similar. To take two examples, in 
Doctor Faustus, the seductive figure of Helen of Troy appears to Faustus, but 
almost as quickly, turns into a succubus: 'Her lips sucks forth my soul. See 
where it flies!! Come, Helen, come, give me my soul again.' (Y. i. 94_95)32 In 
the second example, the 'Water Poet' John Taylor says of the prostitute that she 
is a 'Succubus, a damned sinke of sinne' who 'may be taken for the Epicene.' 33 
These terms could equally be applied (and were) to witches. Where does the 
prostitute end and the witch begin? In a sense this question is unanswerable 
because both figures transgress what Laura Levine has called the patriarchal 
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fantasy of 'pure referentiality' .34 This transgression has clear implications for 
patriarchal subjectivity. In encountering a witch or a prostitute the subject fails 
to definitively 'locate' them, to counter their deeply ambiguous signifying status. 
For this reason, Eagleton is surely correct when he notes that Macbeth's 
engagement with the soliciting Witches threatens to reveal the 'region of 
otherness and desire within himself .35 To put it slightly differently, Macbeth 
demonstrates that 'location' always presupposes dislocation. 
These points notwithstanding, it might be useful to dwell on the tenn 
'soliciting' for a little longer. While its French derivation means "to disturb' this 
is augmented by the fact that the Latin root of the verb 'to solicit' means "to set 
in motion'. This is important for two reasons. First, early modem Protestants 
lived under a providential metaphysic whereby, as has been shown, an 
individual's existence was pre-ordained, set in motion by God. Secondly, only 
He could have foreknowledge over what would happen in the future. But the 
difficulty with the principle of diabolic inversion is that if God is to have 
foreknowledge over future events then the Devil (and by extension witches) 
must too. 
This is a problem that is at the heart of Macbeth. James I attempts to 
explain the difficulty in this way: 
as to the diuelles foretelling of things to come, it is true that he knowes not 
all thinge future, but yet that he knowes parte, the Tragical event of this 
historie declares it. .. not that he hath any prescience, which is only proper 
to God: or yet knows anie thing by loking vpon God, as in a mirrour (as the 
good Angels doe) he being for euer debarred from the fauorable 
presence ... ofhis creator, but only by one of these two meanes, either as 
being worldlie wise, and taught by a continuall experience, euer since the 
creation, judges by likelie-hood ofthinges to come ... Or else by Gods 
employing of him in a tune, and so foreseene therof. 36 
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According to the King, the Devil either guesses at what is to come or else is used 
by God as a part-time instrument of prophecy. The problem with both of these 
suggestions is that, in the first instance, prediction is not the same as 
foreknowledge and in the second, by making the Devil an instrument of God~ 
James effectively makes God the author of evil. Yet as James makes clear in 
typically Calvinistic fashion, evil is solely the prerogative of the Devil: God 
gives 'grace onelie to the elect' and 'the rest ... are given over in the handes of 
the Devill that enemie, to beare his Image'. 37 Again, it is possible to observe the 
discourse of mimetic inheritance in operation: the reprobate bear the Devil' s 
'Image' which is, of course, evil. So if James' belief that the Devil is responsible 
for evil is to be maintained then it follows that evil can only be related to God as 
a supplement. As Jacques Derrida points out in OfGrammatology: 
the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or 
insinuates itself in - the - place - of, if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it 
represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of a presence.38 
This quotation makes it possible to see that, as supplement to the Calvinist 
system, evil also inscribes an anti-time that stands in opposition to the regular 
time of providential discourse. For this reason, those like Macbeth who engage 
with diabolic figures to the extent that that encounter permeates their subjectivity 
must also carry within them an 'image' of a supplementary field of knowledge, 
one that is 'set in motion' 'in - the - place - of the divine image it repudiates. 
In Macbeth's case, this process is first manifested by and through his 
subjectivity. In his first soliloquy he goes on to say: 
Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
My thought, whose murther yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man, 
That function is smother'd in surmise, 
And nothing is, but what is not. (I. iii. 137-142) 
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The Witches' prophecies, their inversion of providential doctrine~ lead Macbeth 
to question the certainty of his own comprehension. His sense of himself as a 
'man' is now predicated upon 'what is not' and the present, associated with 
specific fears and anxieties, gives way to the horribly nebulous 'imaginings' of 
the future. The aphoristic belief that 'Time and the hour runs through the 
roughest day' (I. iii. 148) will soon be supplanted by the anti-time that 
Macbeth's actions will usher in. Indeed, if Stephen Greenblatt is correct when he 
states that 'existence depends upon institutions that limit and, where necessary, 
extenninate a threatening mobility' /9 then it becomes clear that the Witches' 
actions radically mobilise the latent lack at the centre of Macbeth's own 
'institution', his subjectivity. It cannot therefore be the case, as Ernst 
Honigmann has argued, that Macbeth's 'inward-looking honesty ... represents the 
play's most sympathetic value,4o because the 'value' of inwardness implies 
stability and this is what Macbeth's subjectivity resolutely fails to offer him. As 
he says to Lady Macbeth, '1 dare do all that may become a man.' (1. vii. 46) 
While 'become' may be read as 'befitting', it might also mean that Macbeth is 
starting to realise that the course of actions he is embarking upon will result in 
him 'becoming' a different man. To put it another way, Macbeth's subjectivity 
manifests a supplementary process that defers the promise of a unified 'state' 
because after his encounter with the Witches he believes himself to be in the 
process of becoming Other to his previous self. However, this Other is itself 
predicated upon a desire that' Vaulting ambition' (I. vii. 27) encourages but 
which is also paternalistically controlled. As Duncan says to Macbeth, 'I have 
begun to plant thee, and williabourl To make thee full of growing.' (I. iv. 28-29) 
To escape the signifying realm of the father is, as I demonstrated in the last 
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chapter, virtually impossible. Macbeth assumes the locus of the patriarch after 
the murder of Duncan but appropriating/internal ising the signifying function of 
the father proves rather more problematic. 
Interestingly, this process has ramifications for Lady Macbeth herself. She 
tells Macbeth at their first meeting that 'Thy letters have transported me beyond! 
This ignorant present, and I feel now/ The future in the instant.' (I. v. 56-58) 
Commentators often miss just how radical these lines are. In a providential 
context, Lady Macbeth is effectively attempting to bypass providence. If the 
future is no longer that which is forthcoming but instead the present instant, then 
the means through which we experience the present instant, our SUbjectivity, 
becomes the arbiter of all actions. It is no accident that these lines herald the 
beginning of the Macbeths' detailed conspiracy to alter the future course of 
events, to quarrel with providence by plotting the murder of a divinely ordained 
King. To this end, Lady Macbeth's injunction to her husband, 'To beguile the 
time/ Look like the time' (I. v. 62-63), can be seen as an attempt to inscribe her 
husband as the antithesis of divinely ordained providence. If Macbeth is 
successful in his actions, the anti-time that he institutes will run contrary, or 
rather be indistinguishable from the regular time of Duncan and his legitimate 
heirs. The Macbeths must 'mock the time with fairest show' (I. vii. 82) by 
providing the course of history with a mimetic, perverted, alternative route. 
Central to this is Macbeth's assertion that his murder of Duncan 'Might be the 
be-all and the end-all-here,! But here, upon this bank and shoal of time,! We'd 
jump the life to come.' (I. vii. 5-7) It is in these lines that Macbeth comes closest 
to glimpsing an existence, and by extension a moral order, outwith an explicitly 
providential context. But it is only a fleeting glimpse. As Ned Lukacher has 
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observed, one of the central problems in Macbeth is 'the fact that language 
cannot be manipulated by a will that can never know its own essence. ,41 Even 
though Macbeth's subjectivity is closely bound to anti-time - the inversion of 
providence that he represents - the more his subjectivity is foregrounded, the 
more Macbeth realises that this anti-time also brings to the fore a deficiency at 
the centre of his being. 
In The Imaginary Institution of Society, the philosopher Cornelius 
Castoriadis outlines a theory of representation that augments my reading of 
Macbeth so far. In the first place, Castoriadis rejects the notion that mimesis 
offers a 'representation of reality' that is then perceived by the subject: 
'Representation .. .is not a painting hung within the subject decked out with 
various kinds of trompe -/ 'oei!, or else itself an immense trompe -/ 'oeil' .42 
Instead, it is a much more uninscribed phenomenon: 
Representation is perpetual presentation, the incessant flux in and through 
which anything can be given. It does not belong to the subject, it is, to 
begin with, the subject. .. Representation is precisely that by which this 'us' 
can never be closed up within itself, that by which it overflows on all sides, 
constantly makes itself other than it 'is', posits itself in and through the 
positioning of figures and exceeds every given figure.43 
In relation to Macbeth, the protagonist's subjectivity is the focus of the drama 
because he inverts the representative and providential basis of early modem 
discourse. But because this representative order was itself, as I have argued, 
deeply contradictory, the subject who harnesses its signifying power by 
challenging it 'constantly makes itself other than it is'. Ultimately, what early 
modem discourse knows but cannot acknowledge and what Macbeth dramatises 
is the fact that, as Castoriadis concludes, 'Representation is not tracing out the 
spectacle of the world, it is that in and through which at a given moment a world 
. ,44 
anses. 
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Macbeth comes to realise that his actions have ushered in a parallel reality 
to that instituted by God. A modem analogue that helps to explain this process 
might be Robert Zemeckis's film, Back to the Future II (1989) in which the 
characters Doc Brown and Marty McFly travel forward in time. However, an 
elderly BiffTannen, the McFly family nemesis, spots them. Tannen steals 
Brown's time machine and travels back in time to give his younger self an 
almanac containing the results of all major sporting events. With the knowledge 
contained in this almanac, the younger Tannen becomes an extremely wealthy 
gambler and creates an alternate future reality in which he marries McFly's 
mother and presides over an anarchic Spring Valley where gambling and 
prostitution run rife.45 But whereas in Back to the Future II disorder is reflected 
in the perceived moral decay of American society, in Macbeth this disorder first 
manifests itself in the natural world. After the murder of Duncan, strange signs 
and occurrences usher in the 'parallel reality' of Macbeth's new order. As 
Lennox exclaims: 
The night has been unruly: where we lay, 
Our chimneys were blown down; and, as they say, 
Lamentations heard I th' air; strange screams of death, 
And, prophesying with accents terrible 
Of dire combustion, and confus' d events, 
New hatch'd to th' woeful time, the obscure bird 
Clamour'd the livelong night: some say, the earth 
Was feverous, and did shake. (II. iii. 55-62) 
The time is now 'woeful' and prophesy only speaks of 'confus'd events'. An 
early modem audience would surely have noticed the connection between this 
new anti-time and what Macbeth says soon after the discovery of his murder of 
Duncan: 'Had I but died an hour before this chance,/ I had liv'd a blessed time.' 
(II. iii. 91-92) They would also be aware that his anti-time institutes an inverted 
teleology of its own. As John Calvin notes, God's providence also includes 
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'historical contingency,46 or what theologians commonly refer to as future 
contingents. This refers to a range of possible actions in the future that God is 
responsible for. But by aping God, by killing the providentially appointed King 
and instituting his own anti-reign, Macbeth also becomes responsible for 
guaranteeing all the future contingents that pose a potential threat to his position. 
It is for this reason that the play follows the course of murder and civil strife that 
it does. Macbeth must be 'master of his time' (III. i. 40 my emphasis) for 'To be 
thus is nothing, but to be safely thus'. (III. i. 47) Accordingly Banquo and his 
line must be destroyed because as Macbeth pointedly notes, 'every minute of his 
being thrusts/ Against my near'st of life'. (III. i. 116-117) 
What Macbeth does not realise until it is almost too late is that 'his' anti-
time is not exclusive to him and his own subjective experience. It also impinges 
on the existence of those he now rules. This is reflected in his inability to master 
contingency, to contain all the threats to his throne and the anti-time it 
represents. It is significant that Shakespeare seems to be uninterested in anything 
other than those events in Macbeth's life that refer directly to his usurpation. He 
becomes, like Middleton and Rowley's Beatrice-Joanna, 'the deed's creature'. 
(III. iv. 137)47 His precarious position is highlighted most forcefully in the 
language and stage directions of the banquet scene when, after his murder, 
Banquo's ghost appears. In the first place, it is noticeable that, as the 
authoritative Folio stage direction puts it, 'The Ghost of BANQUO enters, and 
sits in MACBETH'S place.' (III. iv. 40 SD)48 The symbolic function of Banquo's 
position is foregrounded here in that, as principal claimant to the throne of 
Scotland (in Shakespeare's play, at least), he occupies his usurped symbolic 
space at the head of the realm. It is also important that it is the audience in the 
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theatre, and not those present at Macbeth's banquet, who are able to see Banquo: 
'Pr'ythee, see there!! Behold! Look! Lo! How say you?' (III. iv. 67-68). As in 
the example from Hamlet in the previous chapter, the audience is forced to 
privilege Macbeth's gaze, but in so doing, they only serve to underline his 
isolation. Macbeth expresses the terror of his isolated perception when he notes: 
'the time has been,! That, when the brains were out, the man would die,! And 
there an end; but now, they rise again'. (III. iv. 77-79) Through the appearance 
of Banquo, Shakespeare allows the theatre audience to glimpse the legitimate 
real-time of providential history that Macbeth has overwritten. However, in only 
allowing one person on stage to see Banquo, Shakespeare foregrounds the 
terrible weight of Macbeth's subjectivity. For like a perverse anti-God, Macbeth 
is now privy to the imprecations of the dead. 
This fact is brutally affirmed in Macbeth's most famous soliloquy. About 
to go into battle and having learned of Lady Macbeth's death, he says: 
To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow, 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day, 
To the last syllable of recorded time; 
And all or yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player, 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more: it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. (Y. v. 19-28) 
This speech represents an extraordinary cry of rage against the whole 
metaphysical edifice of early modem society. It is not so much, as Terry 
Eagleton suggests, that' Macbeth ends up chasing an identity which continually 
eludes him. ,49 On the contrary, Macbeth gives up chasing an identity that he 
realises he could never have attained in the first place. As Emile Benveniste has 
noted, 'It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject. 
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because language alone establishes the concept of "ego" in reality, in its reality 
which is that ofbeing.,5o Because of this, the subject is inescapably produced 
within the symbolic order. But in Macbeth's case, he fmds that the symbolic 
order is predicated upon a shifting signifier, a 'shadow' that only represents what 
it lacks. His inability to centre himself reveals the traumatic limits of language as 
representation, as well as the kernel at the heart of the subject, the 'endless gulf 
that representation attempts to overcome but that inadvertently exposes that 
which also animates this 'tale told by an idiot' . 
Macbeth's reference to the 'poor player,! that struts and frets his hour upon 
the stage' also draws attention to his own Other, the actor playing him on stage. 
This gap between player and actor is crucial as it parallels Macbeth's own status 
in the metaphysical discourse that he inverts, always one step away from the 
self-constituting subjectivity that would transgress both providence and the 
exigencies of the playhouse. Ironically Macbeth's anti-time no longer focuses on 
the present or even the future, but squarely on the past, on 'yesterday'. The 'last 
syllable of recorded time' will only record Macbeth's reign as an aberration, a 
temporary anomaly in the history of the divinely ordained progress of Kings. 
Macbeth becomes, to borrow Gerard Manley Hopkins' phrase, 'Time's 
eunuch'. 51 It is no accident that the man who kills Macbeth, Macduff, was 'from 
his mother's womb/ Untimely ripp'd.' (V. viii. 15-16 my emphasis) It is almost 
as if, in Macduffs revenge, Shakespeare is adhering to Lady Macbeth's own 
advice to her husband: 'To beguile the time/ Look like the time.' In a strange 
way, Macduff also represents anti-time, but in his case it is a 'virtuous' anti-time 
that acts as the antidote to Macbeth's time of terror. In what is clearly a 
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deliberate reference to the issue of 'time', Macduff enters with Macbeth· shead, 
and cries 'the time is free.' (V. ix. 21) 
The populace acclaims the new King, Malcolm. Yet his claim that 'what 
needful else/ That calls upon us, by the grace of Grace,! We will perform in 
measure, time, and place' (V. ix. 37-39) can, in the context of Macbeth's demise, 
be seen as nothing more than a remystification of the very processes that have 
been demystified throughout the course of the play. Malcolm may represent the 
legitimate subject of the master signifier, the Big Other, but the play has 
conclusively demonstrated the instability of the ideological discourse that 
institutes this process. As Slavoj Zizek explains: 
The subject of the signifier is precisely this lack, this impossibility of 
finding a signifier which would be 'its own': the failure of its 
representation is its positive condition. The subject tries to articulate itself 
in a signifying representation; the representation fails; instead of a richness 
we have a lack, and this void opened by the failure is the subject of the 
signifier. To put it paradoxically: the subject of the signifier is a retroactive 
effect of the failure of its own representation; that is why the failure of 
representation is the only way to represent it adequately. 52 
Macbeth and the Witches invert the 'normal' practices of society. Both stand for 
a failure of representation, but this is a failure that goes to the centre of early 
modem discourse. For in challenging providence, both show that the authority of 
the ideological centre can never convincingly repress its opposite or inverse. 
Macbeth may well be concerned with a deeply traumatic period of anti-time but 
it also allowed early modem audiences to see that their entire ideological edifice 
was predicated upon the failure of representation as a constitutive necessity. It is 
for this reason that the lack at the heart of the subject is nothing more than a 
copy, an inversion of the lack at the centre of society's most deeply held 
signifying practices. 
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Chapter Eight 
'He was as rattling thunder': Foreigners, Protestantism and 
Antony and Cleopatra as Early Modern Apocalypse 
In this final chapter, I want to show how Protestant discourse feeds into the 
construction of foreigners during the early modern period. In accordance with 
one of the central arguments of this thesis - that the Other emerges from within 
- I intend to focus on what might be termed indigenous foreigners, those peoples 
and representations who emerged from within the dominant discourses of early 
modern England. I take it as axiomatic that comparatively few early modern 
individuals, and certainly those who lived outwith the metropolis, had actual 
experience of foreign peoples. For these reasons, early modern constructions of 
foreigners are very often fantasy accounts that are closer to the centre of early 
modern culture than their subjects' 'foreign' origins and locations might 
suppose. I also want to offer this chapter as a practical example of how the study 
of early modern religion might be integrated within an account that is not 
directly about religion matters. Certainly religion is ubiquitous in early modern 
culture and discourse, as I have demonstrated in this thesis. But if religion is to 
be satisfactorily reintroduced into the mainstream of early modern scholarship, 
then it must also be reintegrated as one of a number of important critical tools 
'19'"' 
- .) 
that scholars might use in the course of their analyses. This chapter, therefore, 
stands as a practical example of how this integration might proceed. 
Common to these aims is the philosophical and theological idea of 
revelation. As the philosopher Giorgio Agamben writes, 'What revelation allows 
us to know must. .. be something not only that we could not know without 
revelation but also that conditions the very possibility of knowledge in general' . I 
For Agamben, revelation constitutes the epistemological function of discourse 
itself. As he goes on to note: 
Language, which for human beings mediates all things and all knowledge, 
is itself immediate. Nothing immediate can be reached by speaking beings 
- nothing, that is, except language itself, mediation itself ... There can be no 
true human community on the basis of a presupposition - be it a nation, a 
language, or even the a priori of communication of which hermeneutics 
speaks. What unites human beings among themselves is not a nature, a 
voice or a common imprisonment in signifying language; it is the vision of 
language itself and, therefore, the experience of language's limits, its end.2 
In what follows, I want to suggest, by focussing on the early modern Egyptian, 
that this figure threatens to reveal the limits both of language, and more 
importantly, of the contemporary nation state. Following on from this I argue 
that the common critical approach to Antony and Cleopatra which privileges the 
racial differences of Egypt and Rome often fails to take into account the way in 
which the play's mimetic strategy mediates the construction of the foreigner by 
refusing to locate difference 'elsewhere', but resolutely here. To this end, the 
play's extensive use of the book of Revelation offers a comment on the nature of 
racial difference as well as the fragility of the Protestant nation. 
On the 31 st of December 1600, Queen Elizabeth I granted the East India 
Company its first charter. Even by Elizabethan standards, the venture was a 
massive commercial success. Over the first five voyages, the company' averaged 
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enormous profits of 101 per cent' ,3 and extended abundant gains to those 
members of the mercantile classes and nobility that possessed sufficient capital 
to speculate on the venture. The stated aim of the project was that the voyagers 
for the honour of this our realm of England as for the increase of our 
navigation and advancement of trade [and] of merchandise within our said 
realm and the dominions of the same[,] might adventure and set forth one 
or more voyages ... to the East Indies, in the countries and parts of Asia and 
Africa ... as where trade and traffic of merchandise may[,] by all 
likelihood[,] be ... had.4 
The phrase 'trade and traffic of enterprise' is, in effect, predicated upon a 
proto-capitalist principle of the parity of economic exchange value. As Femand 
Braudel rightly observes, 'markets are found everywhere, even in the most 
rudimentary societies' .5 But what is central is the mode and practice of exchange 
that a particular market might foster. In respect of the East India Charter, cultural 
dissimilarity is subsumed within the overriding imperatives of colonial 
expansionism. Exchange seemingly takes place according to some unwritten but 
universally accepted principles of economic and cultural equality. In each case, 
the legitimation of the grand recit would seem to rely upon a discourse of 
similitude, not difference: at what price is this legitimation achieved? In The 
Modern World System Immanuel Wallerstein points out that in Tudor England, 
the monarchy was caught in the contradiction of wishing to create a 
national economy based on new forces that could compete successfully in 
the new world-economy and being the apex of a system of status and 
privilege based on socially conservative forces. 6 
It would be surprising in the extreme if those documents of Tudor expansionism 
exhibited a politics of Utopian economic parity in relation to their projected 
trading partners. Instead, it is necessary to read against what would appear to be 
the dominant ideological thrust of documents like the East India Charter in order 
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to excavate those oppositional positions that might, in this case, be closer to the 
ideological centre. 
In many respects, the way in which this reading is undertaken depends very 
much upon how older forms of ideological assimilation are approached in 
theoretical terms. In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson offers one 
particularly useful model. Outlining the dynamics of what he calls 'the ideology 
of form' 7 most commonly encountered in the textual products of a given society, 
he goes on to note: 
The analysis of the ideology of form, properly completed, should reveal the 
formal persistence of. .. archaic structures of alienation - and the sign 
systems specific to them - beneath the overlay of all the more recent and 
historically original types of alienation - such as political domination and 
commodity reification - which have become the dominants of that most 
complex of all cultural revolutions, late capitalism, in which all the earlier 
modes of production in one way or another structurally coexist.8 
In relation to the East India Company Charter, this 'archaic' structure of 
alienation is revealed, I think, in that nervous little phrase found towards the end 
of the quoted extract, 'by all likelihood' . This phrase raises the possibility that 
the Elizabethans' projected trading partners might not be as amenable to the 
project as might otherwise have been hoped. All this may seem rather obvious, 
but what it also points towards is the connection between the early modem 
economic base and that culture's constructions of what might be termed trading 
subjectivities. Difference, manifested at the barely recognised level of the 
individual is what defers the otherwise inevitable victory of the dominant 
colonial narrative. It is this aspect that must be focused upon. 
The following example from John Webster's play The White Devil (1612) 
will help to illustrate the points made so far. Set in Italy, a place of political 
intrigue and sexual licence for early modem audiences, The White Devil offers 
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amongst other things a baroque exploration of the politics of exchange in 
relation to sexuality. The second scene of Act One is concerned with the 
prostitute Vittoria's seduction of Duke Brachiano. It is a representation of 
extraordinary sophistication. As a prostitute, Vittoria's body already stands as 
both the subject and object of patriarchal commodification. This is important for 
in the words of Judith Butler, 'The radical difference between referent and 
signified is the site where the materiality of language and that of the world in 
which it seeks to signify are perpetually negotiated. ,9 Such ambivalence can be 
read in Brachiano's attempt to tie Vittoria to the patriarchal strictures of a name: 
'We call the cruel fair', he states: 'what name for you/That are so merciful?' (I. 
ii. 213-214)10 The question is not answered. Instead, and significantly, Vittoria's 
maid Zanche, in her only comment in the entire scene, remarks 'See now they 
close.' (I. ii. 214) The word 'close' is extremely polysemous in early modem 
English and connotes a number of discourses such as secrecy, concealment, 
seclusion, intimacy, union and occultism. 11 But the word also carries with it 
inferences of trade, of a deal being done. Exchange is associated here with a 
hidden, transgressive locus that both audiences on the stage and in the playhouse 
are voyeuristic gazers upon. That Zanche should use this word is doubly 
suggestive because as a Moor, she adds to the potent sexuality of the scene in an 
important way. Witness this fascinating stage direction: 'ZANCHE brings out a 
carpet, spreads it and lays it on two fair cushions.' (I. ii. 204 SD) A mixture of 
prostitute's boudoir, Moorish harem and trading post, Zanche's framing 
narrative contributes towards a sense of what Dympna Callaghan has called the 
,. , 12 
erotIc grotesque . 
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After the scene has been set, what takes place is an exchange between 
Brachiano and Vittoria that is commonly dismissed as nothin th . g more an a pIece 
of risque knockabout: 
BRACHIANO. What value is this jewel? 
VITTORIA. 
'Tis the ornament 
Of a weak fortune. 
BRACHIANO. In sooth I'll have it; nay I will but change 
My jewel for your jewel. 
[ ............................................................. ] 
BRACHIANO. Nay let me see you wear it. 
VITTORIA. Here sir. 
BRACH. Nay lower, you shall wear my jewel lower. 
(I. ii. 226-233) 
Here, the sexual exchange takes on the tone of a colonial encounter. One of the 
most prized treasures of colonial expeditions of the period were precious stones. 
Indeed, a tract of 1573 makes the relatively commonplace claim that 'Our men 
gathered up carbuncles and diamonds with rakes under the spice trees' ,13 a 
statement that throws into immediate relief the competing value systems of 
trader and native. However, in the case of The White Devil it is noticeable that 
Brachiano does not so much take the jewel from Vittoria as offer ajewel in 
exchange. Brachiano is placed in a position whereby he is forced to 'trade' with 
the exotic Vittoria on her own terms. This scandalous parity not only 
foregrounds the fluidity of the early modem economic base beneath the 
ideological fa~ade, it also draws attention to the potentially subversive power of 
female colonial subjectivity. Zanche is reduced to providing the framing 
narrative for Vittoria and making one (albeit crucial) comment during the scene. 
This in no way diminishes the agency of either of these females. Indeed, in this 
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scene, Vittoria is able to provide a subversive counter-discourse in opposition to 
the Duke through Zanche because the Moor provides that discourse's objective 
representation. This is a paradigm that was to prove suggestive to many writers 
of the period. 
Such moments bring to light the outlines of a particularly complex cultural 
movement. In the first place, it is important to be aware of the fact that these 
'foreign' subjectivities are produced by a dominant culture that posits, 
consciously or not, a connection between economic fluidity and the instability of 
identity. I want to argue that this connection has become less central than it 
might be in early modem studies. For example, it is noticeable that in his book 
The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation, Richard Halpern feels the need to offer 
what occasionally reads like an apologia for utilising Marxist theories of 
production in his powerful analyses of Tudor economics, pedagogy and textual 
practices. By arguing for 'the complementarity of Marxist and non-Marxist 
approaches',14 especially Michel Foucault's theories of discourse and power, 
Halpern is able to suggest that 'Marx's prehistory of capital provides a model for 
how theoretical discourse can absorb a genealogical narrative without simply 
fragmenting.,15 So if Fredric Jameson was concerned to retrospectively locate 
the 'archaic structures of alienation' by offering a reading of textual production 
against the grain, then Halpern reverses this paradigm. Instead, he attempts to 
'locate those regions within English Renaissance culture where the elements of a 
specifically capitalist culture begin to emerge in nascent or anticipatory forms 
from within the context of a late feudal society.' 16 This is the model that I intend 
to utilise in the remainder of my discussion. For while I recognise that there can 
be no theoretical position that is not in some way a retrospective practice, 
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Halpern's model moves out from the textual products of early modem culture in 
a way that consciously offers a collision with the retrospectively constructed 
narratives of the critic. In this way, a dialectic is produced that looks both 
forward and back, Janus-like, from a nascent economic moment, to a developed 
late capitalist location that comments on both its own historicity and its more 
deep-rooted structures of alienation. In order to develop this idea, I want to turn 
now to what might be termed the early modem Egyptian question. 
Tudor and Jacobean England had a problem with Egyptians. In what is in 
some ways an uncanny pre-echo of the contemporary 'debate' on asylum 
seekers, the Elizabethan government sought at regular intervals to legislate 
against a group who were considered to be extremely dangerous. An Act of 
parliament passed in 1597 noted: 
all such persons not being Fellons wandering and pretending themselves to 
be Egipcyans, or wandering in the Habbite Forme or Attire of counterfaite 
Egipcians; shalbe taken adjudged and deemed Rogue Vagabondes and 
Sturdy Beggers, and shall sussteyne such Payne and Punyshment as by this 
Acte is in that behalfe appointed. 17 
It is clear from this extract that the term 'Egipcyan' conflates both 'Egyptian' 
and 'Gypsy', and since Gypsies were commonly believed to originate in Egypt, 
the modalities of this particular term of abuse are relatively clear. Nonetheless, 
the lexical and ideological separation of tenns and meanings is not as 
straightforward as this distinction might presuppose (it would be interesting to 
know if anybody was in fact prosecuted as a 'counterfaite Egipcian' in early 
modem England). The Tudor government felt compelled to legislate directly 
against the 'Egipcians' because of their dangerous mobility. As John Cowell 
writes in The Interpreter (1607): 
Egyptians (Egyptiani) are in our statues and lawes of England, a counterfeit 
kinde of roages, that being English or Welch people, accompany 
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the~selves togethe~, disguising themselves in straunge roabes, blackening 
theIr faces and bodIes, and framing to themselves an vnknowen language, 
~ander vp and down~, and vnder pretence of telling Fortunes, curing 
dIseases ... abuse the Ignorant common people, by stealing all that is not too 
hote or too heauie for their carriage. 18 
In a society where status and order were still to a large extent detennined by 
regulating the subject's geographical and economic mobility, such fluidity was 
threatening. Indeed, as Edward Hext, Justice of the Peace in Somerset, wrote to 
Lord Burghley in 1596: 
Experience teacheth that thexecution [sic] of that godlye lawe vppon that 
wycked secte of Roages the Egipsions had clene cutt them of, but they 
seynge the liberty of others do begynne to sprynge up againe and there are 
in this Cuntry of them' . 19 
It is significant to note that Hext's rhetoric invokes an explicitly raciallexis ('in 
this Cuntrey'), which appeals to a notion of racial privilege that is so common in 
English writing of the period. If 'that wycked secte of Roages the Egipsions' 
were really only English people dressed up, why then invoke a clear discourse of 
geographic and racial otherness? Clearly, the term 'Egyptian' as a simple 
synonym for 'Gypsy' or even Englishman/woman will not do. This is not to 
propose that these early modem 'Egipsions' were in fact racial Egyptians. 
Rather, it is to suggest that this term is rather more complex than it may at first 
appear, connoting as it does a dangerous economic and racialliminality. 
This liminality was also expressed in the alleged actions of these peoples. 
In his Lanthorne and Candle-Light (1608), Thomas Dekker goes out of his way 
to locate the racial origin of the Egyptians firmly within England. He argues: 
If they be Egiptians, sure I am they never discended from the tribes of any 
of those people that came out of the land of Egypt: Ptolomy (King of 
Egiptians) I warrant never called them his SUbjects: no nor Pharaoh.before 
him. Looke what difference there is between a civell citizen of Dubhn and 
a wilde Irish Kerne, so much difference there is betweene one of these 
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counterfect Egiptians and a true English Begger. An English Roague is just 
of the same livery.2o 
It is possible to note again a curious logic at work in Dekker's text. 'Egiptians' 
are not actual Egyptians, yet this contrariety is not predicated upon difference 
but on an essentialist notion of SUbjectivity. So even though the 'civell citizen of 
Dublin' and the 'wilde Irish Keme' are both from the same country and may be 
supposed by this logic to share common national traits, the fonner is 'more Irish' 
than the other. In the same way, it is possible to tell an Egyptian from a 'true 
English beggar' because that beggar is more 'English' than the Egyptian. The 
other problem in this account is that Dekker also draws on a stock of racial 
commonplaces and stereotypes drawn principally from travel writers who -
unlike Reginald Scot who said they were 'The counterfeit A egyptians , and 
Robert Burton who called them a superstitious and idolatrous race21 - were 
concerned with explaining what other nations were 'actually like' from the 
inside out. For example, in the same way that the travel writer D' Audity notes 
that 'the Aegyptians have been the most superstitious, or rather the most 
ridiculous of the idolaters' ,22 so Dekker relates a list of the Egyptians' 'blacke 
and deadly-damned Impieties' .23 Where does the racial Egyptian begin and the 
counterfeit Egyptian end? Racial difference becomes here less a question of skin 
tone or physical characteristics and more one of subjective fluidity connected 
firmly to economic and spatial mobility. 
To return to the English Egyptians, it might be useful to draw attention to 
another section of Thomas Dekker's text. In this part, he talks of the Egyptians' 
cruelty. 
The bloudy tragedies of al these, are only acted by the Women, who 
carrying long knives or Skeanes under their mantles, do thus play their 
parts: The stage is some large Heath: or a Firre bush Common far from any 
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houses. Up~n which casting them-selves into a Ring, they inclose the 
M~dered, 11.11 th~ Massacre be fInished ... But if any mad Hamlet hearing 
this, smell vl11arue, and rush in by violence to see what the tawny Divels 
are dooing, then they excuse the fact, lay the blame on those that are the 
Actors, and perhaps (if they see no remedie) deliver them to an officer. 24 
Like the anti-theatrical writers of the period, Dekker forces the reader to 
consider where the actor ends and where the role begins. The fact that Hamlet, 
that exemplar of early modem subjectivity for so many modem critics, is 
invoked here as arbiter suggests that perhaps it is no longer possible to 
distinguish between original and copy, between where the native ends and where 
the Egyptian begins. Moreover, these phallic 'bloudy tragedies' are carried out 
exclusively by the women. To this end, it is no mistake that contemporary 
writers point to emasculation as a given of life in Egypt: 'The women of Aegypt 
did in old time ... a11 the offices belonging to men; whereas their husbands were 
idle, and kept their houses.,25 Or as Achillas makes clear in John Fletcher's play 
The False One (1620): 
'Tis confessed, 
My good Anchoreas, that in these eastern kingdoms 
Women are not exempted from the sceptre, 
But claim a privilege equal from the male; 
But how much such divisions have ta'en from 
The majesty of Egypt, and what factions 
Have sprung from these partitions, to the ruin 
Of the poor subject. (1. i. 14-22i6 
What these examples help to demonstrate is that Dekker's female, Egyptian, 
English, emasculating, murdering actors represent a fundamental challenge to 
the early modern polis. First, their 'stage' provides a subversive, unlicensed 
counter-arena that takes the transgressive actions flirted with in the commercial 
theatre, and objectifIes them: in the place of cross-dressed boys, actual women 
and in the place of entertainment, murder. Secondly, the Egyptians are 
associated with a form of femininity that challenges the ideological centre 
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because it emerges primarily, as I have shown,from a centre otherwise 
constructed as margin. For Dekker, as Judith Butler puts it, 'The "threat" that 
compels the assumption of masculine and feminine attributes is, for the former, a 
descent into feminine castration and abjection and, for the latter, the monstrous 
ascent into phallicism. ,27 Because of its cultural centrality, the gaze of the 
Egyptian-who-is-in-fact-English-but-isn't-quite is acutely seductive as well as 
decidedly dangerous, operating as it does on the liminal axis between abjection 
and monstrosity, between England and Egypt. 
It might be objected at this stage that my argument simply becomes 
complicit in the colonial project by reaffirming the dominant culture's often-
unpleasant constructions of the East. This charge can be answered by stating that 
it is too often disregarded that the most popular and well-known presentations of 
the East in the period remained, at very best, fantasy constructions. Fantasy 
constructions, moreover, that had little or nothing to do with whatever empirical 
knowledge was possessed.28 It is also, in my view, too often forgotten that 
Shakespeare's was a popular theatre and that in all probability the literate 
patrons of that theatre would have been far more conversant with works by, for 
example, William Bullein or Thomas Nashe than by D' Audity, Sir Walter 
Ralegh or Richard Hakluyt. So for example, writing in 1573, Bullein talks of 
men called 'F anesii' who have 'two heads and six hands' as well as the 
'Scipodes' who have one foot 'which is so broad that they cover all their bodies 
for the rain and the sun. ,29 Pure fantasy: popular fantasy. It is also worth 
recalling at this point the man 'Of here and everywhere' (1. i. 138), the 
supposedly worldly Othello and his description of 'The Anthropophagi, and men 
whose headslDo grow beneath their shoulders' (1. iii. 144-145).30 Constructions 
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on the early modem stage of anyone who was not white, male and godly attain, 
in the first instance - and that is an important qualification _ a primarily 
representational status. 
In order to develop these points, I want to tum now to William 
Shakespeare's exploration of Egypt and Rome, Antony and Cleopatra (c. 1607). 
What seems most common to scholarship on this play is a structural and 
theoretical approach predicated upon difference. In many respects, this is hardly 
surprising. Much of the power of Antony and Cleopatra arises from its avowedly 
contestatory systems of power, for example Rome versus Egypt, male versus 
female, sea versus land or eroticism versus asceticism. However, to focus 
primarily on difference is also, by inference, to privilege that difference in 
theoretical terms. If part of the play's power arises from the contesting 
discourses I have outlined above then its tragic force surely originates in the 
inability of these systems to provide absolute definition, to prevent slippage 
between two opposing categories, whatever they might be. So while it may be 
true, as Mary Hamer writes, that early modem constructions of Cleopatra were 
drawn from 'the Roman poets or Plutarch,31 or, that in the words of Ania 
Loomba, Cleopatra 'is framed by a discourse of non-European devilry and 
libidinousness' ,32 such differential accounts must necessarily remain incomplete. 
What I want to suggest in the following reading is that the difference critics fmd 
at work in the play, a difference that, according to Catherine Belsey, locates 
Cleopatra 'inconsistently elsewhere' ,33 turns the gaze of both audience and 
theorist back upon the ideological centre. And this gaze profoundly disrupts the 
strange mimetic project of the play precisely because it refuses to locate 
difference 'elsewhere', but resolutely here. 
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The opening scene of Antony and Cleopatra draws an important contrast 
between boundaries and excess. Philo notes that 'the dotage of our general' s/ 
O'erflows the measure' (1. i. 1_2)34 and then declares that, like a raging river, 
Antony's eyes 'now bend, now turn/The office and devotion of their view upon 
a tawny front.' (I. i. 4-6) At the very outset then, the Roman gaze upon Egypt is 
called to the audience's attention. But once the imperial lovers enter, a strange 
logic of quantification appears to be at work. 
CLEOPATRA 
If it be love indeed, tell me how much. 
ANTONY 
There's beggary in the love that can be reckoned. 
CLEOPATRA 
I'll set a bourne how far to be beloved. 
ANTONY 
Then must thou need fmd out new heaven, new earth 
(I. i. 14-17). 
Almost as ifin response to Philo's (unheard) criticism, Cleopatra seeks to 
quantify, to regulate, and to measure the love that she and Antony share. As 
Terence Hawkes has pointed out, 'The 'bourns' Cleopatra imposes on love will 
prove very confining indeed. They extend, in the event, to only half of what we 
are, for their limits are those of the body.,35 For his part, Antony recognises this 
desire as futile but this does not stop Cleopatra seeking to 'set a bourne'. But 
while Hawkes is correct up to a point, there is also a sense in which the 'limits' 
are themselves already undennined by the plasticity of early seventeenth century 
English. The most recent Arden editor of the play, John Wilders, also glosses 
'bourne' as a 'limit', and while this is a perfectly acceptable reading, neither he 
nor Hawkes allows for a second possible meaning. 
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'Bourne' can also refer to a stream that runs intermittently and the OED 
gives c. 1325 as the first such usage in English.36 While the grammatical 
structure of the sentence rules this out as a direct meaning of the word, it does at 
least invoke what is an avowedly supplementary discursive field and one that 
calls into question this editorial (and monarchical) fixity. A 'bourne' offers both 
a limit as well as an apex of dissolution. This foregrounds the irony of Antony's 
comment, 'Let Rome in Tiber melt, and the wide arch! Of the ranged empire 
fall! Here is my space!' (1. i. 34-35) In typical Roman fashion, Antony associates 
the fixity of geographical location with the fixity of subjectivity. If he cannot 
have Rome, he will have Egypt. But the ground is already shifting beneath his 
feet. 
His last comment about finding out a new heaven and a new earth might be 
read as romantic hyperbole, but is also a quotation from the book of Revelation 
at the point that St. John the Divine sees the New Jerusalem. As the Geneva 
Bible puts it: 'And I saw a new heauen, and a new earth' (21: 1).37 And as the 
Geneva version made abundantly clear to early modern Protestants, the New 
Jerusalem was instituted to wipe out the perversion that was Rome. But more 
interesting than this, as Francis Junius explains in his notes on Revelation, Rome 
'is spiritually termed Sodome and Egypt' .38 For the Roman Antony, to be 
paraphrasing Revelation is highly significant. Indeed, Shakespeare's use of the 
book of Revelation in Antony and Cleopatra is a subject that has received almost 
no critical attention, perhaps due to the fact that his use of this text seems to run 
against the grain of most critical interpretations which are predicated on 
difference.39 What Shakespeare seems to be doing in his use of this biblical text 
is drawing attention to the lack of difference between Rome and Egypt and the 
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extent to which the existence of one nation seems to be predicated upon the 
other. To this end, it is instructive that, as Antony'S world crumbles, the failed 
coloniser should say: 'The land bids me tread no more upon't,/ ... I am so lated in 
the world that II Have lost my way forever.' (III. xii. 1-4) The flip side of early 
modern colonial imperialism, it would seem, is spatial and affective dislocation. 
This is hardly surprising given the Protestant conception of the Roman nation. 
As Heinrich Bullinger makes clear in his influential A Hvndred Sermons Vppon 
the Apocalypse of Iesu Christ (1573), 'as the Lybarde [sic] or Panther is spotted 
of sundry colours: so are the Romaynes, a collection of many nations, borne to 
make sedition and slaughter.,4o For early modem Protestants, Rome was 
constantly in a state of disintegration. 
Central to this process in Shakespeare's play is the 'enchanting queen', (I. 
ii. 117) that acutely seductive figure, Cleopatra. It is perhaps difficult for us 
today to understand just how remarkable a figure Cleopatra would have been on 
an early modem stage especially in the context of Revelation. In the fIrst place, 
she is an Egyptian. 1 have demonstrated the unique standing of this race in early 
modem England, but it is also worth stating that Reformed theologians also had 
great difficulties with these peoples. This is largely because their very existence 
as an ethnic group could not be countenanced in the Protestant view of the 
world. As John Calvin notes, they 'extend their antiquity to six thousand years 
before the creation of the world!,41 Because Protestant polemicists like Bishop 
John Jewel or John Foxe took great pains, as was seen earlier, to establish that 
the Protestant Church was both the oldest and thus the truest in the world, such 
an alternative history could not be ideologically countenanced. Yet Cleopatra 
offered an early modem audience that very alternative. In the fIrst place, it is 
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important that she is called 'serpent of old Nile.' (1. v. 25) For while this 
description can be read in purely figurative terms, it would surely have carried 
with it the resonances of a cultural discourse associated with seduction and fall, 
a discourse that was transgressive precisely because it could not be easily 
separated from the familiar Christian narrative. 
Cleopatra, the transgressive queen who joins witchcraft with beauty is 
dangerous because mimetically, spatially and culturally, she is never quite where 
we might expect her to be. Her presentation and mimicry utterly negates the 
concept of dramatic mimesis as a simple 'reflection of reality' for in the words 
of Homi Bhabha, her 'Mimicry repeats rather than re-presents' .42 But this is a 
mimicry that must be historicised within the context of early modern 
representational politics. It is therefore impossible to read Cleopatra, as some 
post-colonial critics have tended to do, simply as Rome's homogenised Other. 
With her seductive assimilation of English eroticisms and Anglo-centric 
fantasies of what colonial eroticisms might be, Cleopatra resists any 
interpretation that would seek to 'locate' her in one fixed geographical, cultural 
or political realm. 
In order to develop this enquiry further, it might be useful to turn to the 
crucial moment that Antony loses the sea battle against the Roman forces. This 
occurs in Act Three and to this end, it is significant that it is in this Act that 
Shakespeare's use of Revelation really starts to come to the fore. Antony's 
defeat at sea is the point in the play at which any clearly defmed sense he had of 
geographical fixity is lost. As he cries 'Authority melts from me.' (III. xiii. 94) 
He recovers sufficiently to state, in a moment of remarkable self-assertion, 'I 
ami Antony yet' (III. xiii. 97-98) but this fixity does not last long. And the blame 
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is attached to Cleopatra. As early as Act Three, scene six, Cleopatra is associated 
with an enemy that would have generated a particular fear in a primarily 
Protestant audience: Caesar remarks that Antony 'hath given his empire/ Up to a 
whore, who are now levying! The kings o'th' earth for war.' (III. vi. 67-69) This 
is apocalyptic language and refers explicitly to the seventeenth and nineteenth 
chapters of the book of Revelation and in particular the Whore of Babylon, 
associated in Protestant exegesis with the Roman Church. For example, in 
Revelation 17: 1-2, the Geneva Bible states: 'Come: I will shew thee the 
damnation of the great whore that sitteth vpon many waters'. It is surely no 
accident that Shakespeare should utilise as he does a concerted series of 
quotations from this biblical text in a play that takes place at the point in history 
that the imperial hegemony of Rome began to give way to its spiritual primacy. 
After his defeat, Antony turns on Cleopatra. He says to her: 
I found you as a morsel, cold upon 
Dead Caesar's trencher - nay, you were a fragment 
Of Gnaeus Pompey's, besides what hotter hours, 
Unregistered in vulgar fame, you have 
Luxuriously picked out. For I am sure, 
Though you can guess what temperance should be, 
You know not what it is. (III. xiii. 121-127) 
Antony's language inscribes Cleopatra as the 'Whore' so well known to early 
modem culture. It is noticeable that he should use the metaphor of eating to 
insult his lover. As Francis Junius makes clear in his notes to Revelation, the 
Whore of Babylon is 'In profession, the nourisher of all' and is 'most pernicious 
besotting miserable men with her cup, & bringing vpon them a deadly 
giddiness. ,43 More than this, Revelation tells us that the Whore of Babylon sat 
'vpon a scarlet coloured beast' (22: 3) and as Junius notes, 'This beast is that 
Empire of Rome. ,44 In their sexual and dynastic union, Antony and Cleopatra 
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not only produce war, they symbolically prefigure the 'birth' of the Roman 
Church. Antony's claim that he has 'Forborne the getting ofa lawful race' (III. 
xiii. 112), can in this light, be read as a piece of clearly defined anti-Catholicism. 
As most early modem writers knew, the historical Antony and Cleopatra lived at 
a moment that seemed to prefigure the rise of the Roman Empire, a movement 
that for Protestant theologians also ushered in the spread of Catholic religion. As 
Arthur Dent explains in The Rvine Of Rome or An Exposition vpon the whole 
Reuelation (1603), 'Rome is called Babylon mystically, figuratiuely ... In which 
respects Rome is spiritually compared to Sodome and Egypt: To Sodome for 
filthinesse, and to Egypt for idolatry.,45 In a Protestant context, the play's 
concern with the merging of spatial, geographic and personal identities would 
have come as no surprise. Antony is as much a representative of 'Egypt' as 
Cleopatra is a representative of 'Rome'. In an important respect then, Antony 
and Cleopatra offers us a very Protestant apocalypse. 
This apocalypticism is reflected in much of Antony's language after his 
defeat. Speaking of Octavius Caesar, Antony says: 
He makes me angry, 
And at this time most easy 'tis to do't, 
When my good stars that were my former guides 
Have empty left their orbs and shot their fires 
Into th'abysm of hell. (III. xiii. 148-152) 
These lines are taken from Revelation 9: 1 which states: 'the tift [sic] Angel 
blew the trumpet, and I saw a starre fall from heauen vnto the earth, and to him 
was giuen the key of the bottomlesse pit.' Exegesis of this passage commonly 
states that this verse refers to the damnation suffered by the wicked.46 This 
interpretation is strengthened by Cleopatra's statement that 
The next Caesarion smite, 
Till by degrees the memory of my womb, 
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Together with my brave Egyptians all, 
By the discandying of this pelleted storm 
Lie graveless (III. xiii. 167-171) 
Cleopatra's fear that her 'brave Egyptians' will 'Lie graveless' because of 
Roman force is very close to Revelation 11: 8 which states: 'their corpses shall 
lie in the streets of the great citie, which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt' , 
that is to say, Rome. In the same way that Antony represents 'Egypt', so 
Cleopatra's dead Egyptians figuratively stand for 'Rome'. It is noticeable that as 
the war turns conclusively against Antony, once more he loses his sense of 
SUbjective place. At the beginning of Act four, scene fourteen, he asks Eros, 
'thou yet behold'st me?' (IV. xiv. 1) and he begins to accept that his subjective 
dislocation is related to his inability to separate himself from Egypt. He says: 
Here I am Antony, 
Yet cannot hold this visible shape, my knave. 
I made these wars for Egypt, and the Queen -
Whose heart I thought I had, for she had mine, 
Which, whilst it was mine, had annexed unto't 
A million more, now lost - she, Eros, has 
Packed cards with Caesar, and false-played my glory, 
Unto an enemy's triumph. (IV. xiv. 13-20) 
In a sense, this is the most realistic of all Antony's speeches. For while he is 
wrong that Cleopatra has gone over to the Roman side, the subtext of the speech 
places Rome and Egypt not in opposition but as elements of the dialectic that for 
a Protestant audience, leads to the production of idolatrous Roman religion, the 
'enemy's triumph'. 
After his botched suicide, Antony quite literally returns to Egypt. 'I am 
dying, Egypt, dying' (IV. xv. 19) he exclaims to Cleopatra. He also seems to 
accept the impossibility of distinguishing definitively between Rome and Egypt. 
As he says after stabbing himself: 'Not Caesar's valour hath 0' erthrown Antony/ 
But Antony's hath triumphed on itself.' (IV. xv. 15-16) If Caesar is associated 
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with Rome then it might be said that in killing himself, Antony is aligning his 
suicide with Egypt. But his death is not as straightforward as this. Shakespeare 
inscribes Antony not as a freestanding subject but as an effect of those 
apocalyptic discourses that have shaped him and neither located him in this 
place or in that. 
This can all be connected, I believe, to what might be termed the spatial 
importance of the book of Revelation. Saint John the Divine was thought to have 
written the book on the island of Patmos, a fact that was of some consequence 
for Protestant theologians. As Arthur Dent explains: 
Some write that this He of Pathmos is accounted amongst the Hands called 
Sporades, which lye ouer against Asia, and the Citie of Ephasus, and was 
in the sight of both Europe and Africa, so that it seemed to be as it were a 
middle seate or holy chaire, out of the which Christ preached by fohn from 
heauen to the whole world.47 
The liminal status of Patmos, facing both Europe and Africa, stands as a 
metaphor for the extraordinary spatial politics of Antony and Cleopatra. The 
lovers represent both Rome and Egypt. Yet neither physical location, nor what it 
stands for is exclusive to the Roman or the Egyptian. This is because of the 
subtext of the play, the apocalyptic birth of the Catholic faith. Indeed, Cleopatra 
poignantly makes this link after Antony has died. She says of her lover: 
His face was as the heavens, and therein stuck 
A sun and moon which kept their course and lighted 
The little 0, the earth. 
[ .............................................................. ] 
His legs bestrid the ocean; his reared arm 
Crested the world; his voice was propertied 
As all the tuned spheres, and that to friends; 
But when he meant to quail and shake the orb, 
He was as rattling thunder. 01. ii. 78-85) 
This speech utilises Revelation 10: 1-5 and as Junius makes clear, this is the 
chapter of the book which 'is a transition from the common historie of the world 
313 
unto that which is particular of the Church. ,48 Yet when she asks Dollabella if 
'there was or might be such a man! As this I dreamt of?' the reply is almost 
unbearable: 'Gentle madam, no.' (Y. ii. 92-93) It might be true that 'Rome is 
called Egypt', but such statements only serve to draw attention to the textuality 
of such utterances as well as to the inchoate centre, the objet petit a that 
structures Antony and Cleopatra's love. 
It is noticeable that Cleopatra's biggest fear after Antony dies is that she 
will be brought to the colonial centre, Rome: 
The quick comedians 
Extemporally will stage us, and present 
Our Alexandrian revels: Antony 
Shall be brought drunken forth, and I shall see 
Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness 
I' th' posture of a whore. (Y. ii. 212-217) 
Cleopatra imagines her objectification on the Roman stage from the position of 
the colonial subject she would become. Like Calvin's God, the thought of being 
objectified in the mimetic sphere by someone who could never partake of her 
'greatness' is what Cleopatra could not bear. Gazing upon a representation of 
herself from the colonial centre would not only expose the simultaneously 
decorous and rebarbative imperatives of early modem mimetic spatiality; it 
would deconstruct the exigencies of Reformed representational politics. 
And, of course, this is precisely what it does do. Cleopatra's metadramatic 
comments only serve to draw attention to the fact that, on the early Jacobean 
stage, she is a 'squeaking', cross-dressed boy, yet another potent fantasy figure 
in early modem culture. It is almost as if the early modems did not want to get 
too close to their fantasy constructions, Egyptian or otherwise, for fear of 
destroying the powerful cultural narratives built around them. Possibly 
Shakespeare saw this desire for what it was: a pure fantasy that could not be 
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sustained indefinitely. As Jacques Lacan has stated, the gaze is never a one-way 
process: it always returns. And in its return, it reveals the centre as a spurious 
unity, infinitely deferred. 
At the centre of Antony and Cleopatra's love is a conjunctive, an 'and' that 
both unites and defers. Shakespeare's use of the book of Revelation in this 
remarkable play points us towards the end of this 'and', the end of lovers, the 
end of individuals, the end of time, and the end of discourse. Perhaps in this 
respect the audience are as seduced by Cleopatra as much as Antony is. The pre-
Christian Whore of Babylon who quotes from the book Revelation, which she 
could never have known, ultimately collapses both historical and temporal 
markers. A more radical challenge to Protestant discourse would be hard to find. 
After all, the most worrying aspect of the English Egyptian was that s/he would 
offer the populace a glimpse of something that should otherwise have remained 
hidden. As Thomas Hartman notes: 'the wretched, wily, wandering vagabonds 
calling ... themselves Egyptians ... hiding and covering their deep, deceitful 
practices, feeding the rude and common people ... and practising palmistry to 
such as would know their fortunes. ,49 But to achieve the end, the promise of 
Revelation, whether offered by Cleopatra or the 'Egipcian' on the heath, also 
requires death. Perhaps here, then, it is possible to glimpse obliquely the objet 
petit a at the heart of the play in the haunting, ambiguous, sensuous dying words 
of that 'Rare Egyptian': 'What should I stay-' (Y. ii. 312). If Agamben is correct 
when he notes that 'The fulfilled revelation of language is a word completely 
abandoned by God,5o then at the moment of Cleopatra's death when she seems 
briefly to fight death off, her gaze returns, impelling the audience to confront, 
however briefly, the Catholic darkness behind the bright Protestant day. 
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Conclusion 
Paradise in the middest of hell 
In Timothy Bright's A Treatise of Melancholie (1586) there is a striking 
moment when he briefly seems to see the central Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination as an essentially rebarbative discourse: 
F or as a sworde taken at the wrong end is readie to wound the hand of the 
taker, & held by the handle is a fit weapon of defence; euen so the doctrine 
of predestination being preposterously conceiued, may through fault of the 
conceiuer procure hurt. 
It can also be said that the same principle applies to the critical 'conceiuer' of a 
movement as complex as the connections between Calvinism and the experience 
of early modem subjectivity. In this context, and facing the various demands of 
institutional and intellectual pressures, is easy to be critically pre-posterous, to 
anticipate the event, to write as though the lineaments of certain selective 
intellectual and cultural movements anticipate the interpretation. But in a study 
such as this selection is inevitable and the subjectivity of interpretation is 
unavoidable: the illusion of something exemplary being said must necessarily 
haunt the critical project. In particular, I am aware that I have tended to focus 
throughout this thesis on the faultlines in early modem culture, on the more 
extreme expressions of Calvinism and on those writers and subjects who actively 
negotiated with the contradictions of Calvinist doctrine. I have, by and large, 
chosen not to examine those early modem subjects for whom the acceptance, 
intemalisation even, of Calvinist doctrine was unproblematic. 
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that for many, if not for the majority of 
early modem subjects, the internalisation of Calvinist doctrine was not a 
straightforward matter. If Doctor Faustus, The Revenger's Tragedy, Macbeth. 
and Antony and Cleopatra as well as the many other texts considered here share 
one common element, it is that because of the cultural and subjective adoption of 
Calvinism: 'Identity is only ever possible as misrecognition,.2 Whether 
negotiating their subjectivity with the Devil, the Father, the witch or the 
foreigner, the linguistic split between the'!, who enunciates and the'!, of 
enunciation is replicated in the division in the subject between themselves and 
the ultimate figure of authority, God. As Alan Sinfield rightly points out, for the 
early modem subject 'It is incoherence that makes the self aware of itself, that 
sets it to work in the endlessly deferred task of discovering coherence' .3 In many 
respects, the early modem experience of subjectivity does not make sense, not 
only to those who lived it but also to those trying to understand it within a 
historical context. By constructing a narrative, by attempting to explain early 
modem subjectivity, there is a sense in which the critic is trying to make 
coherent that which is, ultimately, incoherent. 
Perhaps as a final move, this incoherence can be related back to the figure 
that haunts both this thesis and, much more importantly, Western culture as a 
whole: Jesus Christ. To return for the fmal time to William Perkins; in A 
Declaration o/The True Manner o/knowing Christ Crucified (1596) he states: 
'When thou commest to die, set before thine eyes Christ in the middest of all his 
torments on the crosse: in beholding of which spectacle to thy endless comfort, 
thou shalt see a paradise in the middest of hell' .4 A 'paradise in the middest of 
hell': what Perkins makes clear through this linguistic and theological paradox is 
"';1 
-'-
that the experience of Calvinist subjectivity is always the experience of deferred 
death, an experience mediated by and through Christ. As the theologian Graham 
Ward puts it in a slightly different context: 
[Christ's] body becomes the symbolic focus for all bodies loved and now 
departe?: real, imag.inary and symbolic mothers: real, imaginary and 
s~bohc f~thers. HIS body calls forth all the cathartic objects of our past 
desIres which ~ave been abjected to facilitate our illusory self-unity. The 
all~e ~f the ~bJect, and the mourning which now will always accompany 
ChristIan deSIre, manifests an internalisation of displacement itself. That is: 
the lack will now foster an eternal longing that will structure our desire for 
God.5 
In the context of this thesis, it is not so much that 'in the Renaissance God was 
in trouble,6 but that He had always been in trouble from His very inception. 
What makes the early modern period so fascinating is that it is one of the 
comparatively few moments in Western history prior to the twentieth century 
when a society implicitly recognised the avowedly secular conclusion of its most 
profoundly theological structures and doctrines. As John Donne knew and as 
early modern culture frequently conceded, to desire God is, in many respects, to 
desire both the destruction of the subject and His destruction. Consequently if its 
theological edifice was to remain intact then it was the subject's knowledge of 
his or her distance from the deity, not proximity, which determined the Calvinist 
experience of subjectivity. The alternative was a world without God, an 
alternative that at this point in the history of ideas, society was not yet prepared 
to embrace. There is something perverse, something abject about a system that 
engenders such an outcome but it was an outcome nevertheless that Christianity, 
and in particular Calvinism, had to embrace. Calvinist doctrine demonstrates 
better than almost any other version of Christianity the cruelty of what might be 
called the disavowed revelation: even at the point of death, subjects of Calvinism 
will always be referred to the ultimate death of Christ and the majority will be 
found wanting. There can be no Calvinist subject before or while Christ "lives', 
and in His death He effectively negates the epistemological postulates of the 
human subjectivity that His very existence presupposes.7 In a sense, the 
Calvinist subject never dies because that subject was, in fact, never properly 
allowed to live. 
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